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V. Abstract 
The aim of the present thesis was to examine the way in which biological motion is 
coded and imitated during imitation learning by improving upon methodologies currently used 
in the literature to examine imitation of underlying movement kinematics. Across four 
experiments, imitation of the kinematic structures of biological and non-biological motion 
models was examined to investigate the processes involved in imitation learning. The purpose 
of the first experimental chapter, Chapter Two, was to examine the way in which biological 
motion kinematics were coded during imitation learning by establishing whether imitation of 
biological motion kinematics was a function of lower-level visuomotor processing or top-
down attentional modulation.  Results showed that not only were imitations of typical and 
atypical biological motion different, but both models were imitated as accurately during 
spatially incompatible trials as compatible. Accurate imitation of spatially incompatible 
atypical biological motion confirmed biological motion coding is a function of lower-level 
visuomotor processing.  
Following results from Chapter Two, Chapters Three, Four and Five assumed lower-
level visuomotor processing of biological motion and were designed to further examine 
whether this lower-level visuomotor processing of biological motion was modulated by top-
down attentional factors (e.g. end-state-targets, visual attention, social primes). The first of 
these top-down modulations was included in Chapter Three, which examined the influence of 
end-state-targets on biological motion coding during imitation learning. Although kinematics 
was not modulated by end-state-targets, movement time was less accurate when end-state-
targets were present, which suggests that lower-level and top-down processes operate together 
during the processing of visual information during imitation learning. In addition to end-state 
target modulation, imitation data further confirmed the coding of atypical biological motion 
 xiv
by demonstrating differences in imitation of two relatively similar atypical biological motion 
models (atypical17 and atypical26). The top-down attentional factor examined In Chapter 
Four was visual attention, which was measured by recording eye movements during 
observation of the model stimuli. Analysis of eye movements demonstrated that visual 
attention was directed towards the model throughout the entirety of the observation phase 
during trials where end-state-targets were both present and absent. As goal-directed eye 
movements were not made during observation of the models, results suggest that the kinematic 
data contained within each of the models was observed and consequently featured in the 
representation formed for motor execution.  
Chapters Two, Three and Four provide a fundamental understanding of how biological 
motion is coded during imitation learning by using robust protocol that improves upon the 
validity of those used in the current literature and specific modulations that discredit 
significant top-down modulatory explanations for biological motion coding. The way in which 
biological motion coding occurs in neurotypicals (no neurologically atypical patterns of 
thought or behaviour) is important when trying to understand where deficiencies in those with 
intellectual disabilities occur. The intellectual disability most closely associated with the 
current thesis is autism, where deficiencies in imitation are suggested to be linked to social 
components. Therefore, to establish a foundational understanding of how social context 
influences neurotypical imitation, Chapter Five examined the influence of social primes on 
the coding of biological motion. Results showed that social primes modulated the accuracy of 
imitation, where peak velocity was more like those of the models following observation of an 
anti-social prime. In addition, observation of both the pro- and anti-social primes was shown 
to reduce the variability of imitation relative to observing no social prime at all. These findings 
demonstrate that social primes are being coded and incorporated into the motor output such 
 xv
that both the accuracy and consistency of imitation of biological motion are modulated. 
Together, the results presented in the current thesis demonstrate imitation of novel, atypical 
biological motion is a function of complimentary lower-level and top-down processes that 
facilitate the coding of both underlying kinematics and environmental context. 
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Chapter 1: Exploring the Processes Underpinning Biological Motion Coding During 
Imitation Learning 
 2
1.1 Aim of the Chapter 
 
The following introductory chapter outlines the rationale and aims of this thesis, 
providing an overview of imitation of biological motion during imitation learning, as well as 
a review and discussion of the current theories relating to the factors that may modulate this 
process. In addition to discussing the current understanding of biological motion coding 
within existing literature, the introductory chapter will also outline how the methodology used 
in the present thesis will progress and expand upon this understanding to provide a more 
rigorous examination of biological motion coding during imitation learning and how that 
impacts wider research areas such as Autism Spectrum Condition (ASC). 
 
1.2 Imitation 
 
1.2.1 Definition of Imitation 
 Imitation is an important learning strategy for humans (van Gog, Paas, Marcos, Ayres 
& Sweller, 2009) and is largely defined as a method of acquiring novel actions or behaviours 
(Heyes, 2001). Research examining children’s abilities to imitate suggest that imitation is one 
of the earliest forms of reciprocal interaction between infant and caregiver (Nadel, Guerini, 
Peze & Rivet, 1999) and facilitates the learning of fundamental abilities such as language and 
social skills (Adams, 1987). Successful imitation involves observing an action and coding the 
visual information into a representation that contains any perceived goals or means (the way 
in which the movement was executed i.e. movement velocity), such that an appropriate motor 
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response can be generated voluntarily when required (Blake, 1958; Bandura & Huston, 1961; 
Bandura, 1986; Heyes, 2001, 2011; Heyes et al., 2005). Imitation thus enables an individual 
to improve their response accuracy (termed ‘motor control’; Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003) 
through a sensorimotor loop (Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000) by updating the representation 
based on the afferent (i.e. visual; proprioceptive) and expected sensory signal information. 
This loop is continuous, as is the updating of the representation, such that prolonged exposure 
to the model combined with repeated imitation attempts results in reduced error as the motor 
response becomes more like the model (Schmidt, 1975; Bandura, Ross & Ross, 1963; Carroll 
& Bandura, 1982). It has been suggested that observation and imitation are part of a system 
in which they are linked by a common representational domain (Prinz, 1997), wherein visual 
information is processed using higher-order top-down (cognitive) and lower-level 
(visuomotor) mechanisms (Byrne & Russon, 1998; Brass & Heyes, 2005). Lower-level 
mechanisms refers to the direct engagement of neural processes through the stimulation of 
sensory receptors (Teufel et al., 2010), whereas top-down mechanisms elicit motor activity 
based on decomposed stimulus features such as goals or environmental context e.g. attention/ 
instruction/ social context (Csibra, 2007).  
 
1.2.2 Importance of Imitation 
While imitation is important in acquiring and developing motor skills (e.g. holding a 
fork, throwing a ball), it is also intricately linked with social interaction and the development 
of social skills such as facial expressions (Piaget, 1962), hand gestures (Fontaine, 1984; 
Vinter, 1986) and other socio-cognitive skills (Meltzoff & Decety, 2003) from infancy 
(Meltzoff & Moore, 1999). Imitation of these skills was initially found in infants between 8-
 4
12 months of age (Piaget, 1962), however it was later discovered that imitation could be 
observed at an earlier age (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977; Heimann, Nelson & Schaller, 1989). 
This led to the question: what function does imitation at such an early age serve? Initially, the 
answer was 2-fold: the imitative responses were either ‘reflexive’ or a display of ‘social 
cognition’. In terms of the former account, the suggestion was that a displayed model 
automatically triggers a preset motor program where the response is involuntary and 
unplanned (Bjorklund, 1987). The latter account suggests that infants interpret the intermodal 
equivalence, i.e., correlating a model’s display with one of their own (Harvey & Johnston, 
1973), such that imitation is used for social-communication purposes (Meltzoff & Moore, 
1985). Further research on this suggestion found that infants used imitation to enrich their 
understanding of persons and actions used for communicative purposes, as well as to identify 
people by familiarising themselves with nonverbal behaviours to create identity (Meltzoff & 
Moore, 1992). 
Adults, like infants, use imitation as a learning tool (van Gog et al., 2009). However, 
adults are also able to use imitation as a social medium to appear more affable by creating 
positive connections or a sense of familiarity. This was demonstrated when observers were 
shown two loosely related images and asked to highlight the similarities they shared (van 
Baaren, Janssen, Chartrand & Dijksterhuis, 2009). Participants who were being mimicked by 
an examiner reported a greater number of similarities between the images than those who were 
not being mimicked, suggesting that imitation had the power to change the way people think 
and perceive situations. As well as influencing perception, imitation has also been shown to 
increase behaviours such as rapport (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), trust (Bailenson & Yee, 
2005), memory (van Baaren, Horgan, Chartrand & Dijkmans, 2004), enjoyment (Tanner, 
Ferraro, Chartrand, Bettman & van Baaren, 2007), and likeability (Jacob, Guegeun, Martin & 
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Boulbry, 2011; Herrmann, Rossberg, Huber, Landwehr & Henkel, 2011; Stel, Mastop & 
Strick, 2011). Equally, a lack of imitation has been reported when people have a dislike or 
dissimilarity to those they are observing based on criteria such as obesity (Johnston, 2002), 
religion (Yabar, Johnston, Miles & Peace 2006) and attractiveness (van Leeuwen, Veling, van 
Baaren & Dijksterhuis, 2009) to name a few. Thus, if people want to disaffiliate with others, 
they are likely to imitate them less. 
 
1.2.3 Types of Imitation 
While the concept of imitation may seem straightforward due to its recognisability in 
day-to-day life, there are various types of imitation that are underpinned by different, and very 
complex, mechanisms. Therefore, it is important to consider the characteristics of imitation 
that are most relevant to this program of research and the processes that define and facilitate 
each type. 
 
1.2.3.1 Emulation 
Emulation is a goal-centric type of imitation in which the observer learns something 
about the environment but not about the behaviour of another (Tomasello et al., 1987). 
Emulation changes the saliency of certain goals such that during observation, the purpose or 
goal to which the demonstrator is striving is made obvious by its actions and as a result 
becomes the goal for the observer as well (Tomasello, 1996). The means by which the goal is 
achieved may be the same as those observed, however it is a matter of individual learning and 
not fundamental to emulation. Further, it has been suggested that goal emulation contains 
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elements of cognitive priming, where, providing goals are either familiar or identifiable, they 
are primed in the brain and are addressed before unprimed ones (Byrne, 1998). For example, 
studies have shown that chimpanzees who observed demonstrators collecting out-of-reach 
food with a rake, then used a similar tool themselves to obtain food and importantly, appeared 
to do so without using the same technique as the demonstrators (Call & Tomasello, 1994; 
Nagell, Olguin & Tomasello, 1993; Tomasello, Davis-Dasilva, Camak & Bard, 1987). By 
using dissimilar techniques but primarily obtaining the food, authors suggested the effects 
were a demonstration of emulation. 
 
1.2.3.2 Simple Imitation 
Simple imitation; also, termed ‘mimicry’ (Tomasello, 1996), ‘automatic imitation’ (Heyes et 
al., 2005), ‘priming’ and ‘response facilitation’ (Byrne & Russon, 1998), occurs when an 
observer copies the movements or actions of another that already exist as part of the observer’s 
behavioural repertoire (Heyes, 2011). This is commonly seen in social interactions, where 
preconscious mimicry (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001) of facial, vocal or postural cues (Hess, 
Philippot & Blairy, 1999) has been observed, e.g. ear touching (Bekkering, Wohlschlager & 
Gattis, 2000). However, simple imitation is considered dissimilar to emulation (Tomasello, 
1996). An example of the distinction was demonstrated in a study that required observation 
of a demonstrator who touched their ear using ipsilateral (same side of the body) or 
contralateral (opposite side of the body) arm movements (Bekkering et al., 2000). When a 
demonstrator touched their right ear with their left hand, the goal of the movement was to 
touch the left ear and the contralateral arm movement defined the way in which the goal was 
attained. In this instance, emulation of the movement would have been to touch the right ear 
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regardless of which hand was used, whereas imitation of the movement required not only the 
touching of the right ear, but also the contralateral arm movement. Whilst the focus of this 
thesis is imitation learning (complex imitation), not automatic imitation (simple imitation), 
automatic imitation research is regularly referenced due to the commonalities it shares with 
complex imitation in relation to the underlying mechanisms, as outlined by the ASL theory 
(Heyes & Ray, 2000), that mediate imitation (Heyes, 2005).  
 
1.2.3.3 Complex Imitation 
Complex imitation, also termed ‘imitation learning’ (Tomasello, 1996), ‘true 
imitaiton’ (Zentall, 2006; Cook & Bird, 2012), ‘observational learning’ (Carroll & Bandura, 
1982), occurs when an observer copies a novel sequence of movements. Importantly, these 
are movements that are not already part of the motor repertoire (Heyes, 2011). Throughout 
the thesis, the common term used will be imitation learning. Imitation learning is believed to 
depend on complex psychological processes whereby visual information from a model is 
translated into a motor output that looks the same. Like simple imitation, imitation learning is 
concerned with imitation of both the goal and the way in which the goal was obtained. The 
important distinction though, is that because the to-be-imitated movement is novel, it requires 
an element of learning, e.g. performing a semaphore-like movement with the hand and arm 
(Carroll & Bandura, 1982). As such, it is initially unclear how the cognitive system works out 
which potential action corresponds to the one that was observed as it is one that will not have 
been performed before (Bird & Heyes, 2007). Moreover, a recent review article of imitation 
posited that the processes underpinning the early stages of imitation learning are ‘far from 
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obvious’ due to the complexities and unknowns regarding the available solutions (Heyes, 
2011).  
 
1.2.4 Theoretical Models of Imitation 
1.2.4.1 EP-M Model 
 The EP-M model is a dual route model concerned with how actions are processed and 
is like other dual route models proposed for imitation of actions (Tessari & Rumiati, 2002), 
language processing (Lichtheim, 1885) and stimulus-response compatibility, subsequently 
referred to as SRC (Heyes, 2011). The EP-M model is associated with the perception-action 
system and is made up of two components: the ‘EP’ and the ‘M’ routes (Hamilton, 2008). The 
EP route is involved in understanding, planning and achieving the goal of an observed action, 
which is generated using pre-existing sensorimotor representations (e.g., picking up a fork), 
which are scaled relative to the task-demands. The EP route is suggested to originate in the 
middle temporal gyrus (MTG) and ends at the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) travelling via the 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL), the region that is associated with identifying the goal of an 
action. The M route is involved in the processing of movement kinematics and makes direct 
associations between the visual and motor components, termed ‘visuomotor mapping’, such 
that automatic mimicry is feasible without cognitive interpretation. It is generally used when 
observing actions that are novel, or are lacking any obvious goals, e.g. accuracy of imitation. 
The M route is also suggested to originate in the MTG, however visual information is sent 
directly to the IFG, leading to direct associations between visual and motor representations. 
Often during observation, these routes are used together to provide a complimentary 
understanding of the goal of the movement and the way in which the goal was obtained 
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(Hamilton, 2008). A similar dual route model was generated in relation to SRC (Heyes, 2011) 
that discussed an intentional and automatic route in relation to stimulus-response association. 
The intentional route was suggested to generate short-term stimulus-response association 
between the sensory and motor representations based on task instructions that generally lasted 
for the duration of the task (Barber & O’Leary, 1997). Conversely, the automatic route is 
modelled as a long-term stimulus-response association between the sensory and motor 
representations, which has recently been shown to be a function of learning (Oostenbroek, 
Suddendorf, Nielsen, Redshaw, Kennedy-Costantini, Davis et al., 2016). 
 
1.2.4.2 Goal-Directed Theory 
 Goal-directed imitation refers to a type of top-down modulation that is suggested to 
influence the direct visuomotor mapping associated with lower-level processing. Broadly 
speaking, goal-directed imitation has largely been examined in terms of meaningful (MF) and 
meaningless (ML) actions (Rumiati & Tessari, 2002; Press & Heyes, 2008), or transitive 
(object-related) and intransitive (non-object related) actions (Bekkering et al., 2000; Press, 
Bird, Walsh & Heyes, 2008). While MF and ML actions are not examined directly in the 
current thesis, their examination and subsequent contribution to goal-directed imitation is 
noteworthy. Imitation accuracy (Rumiati & Tessari, 2002) and reaction time (Press & Heyes, 
2008) are improved following observation of MF (goal-directed) compared with ML (not 
goal-directed) actions, which authors have postulated are a function of a dual-route model of 
imitation (Rumiati & Tessari, 2002). The dual-route model proposed a direct route for 
imitation of unknown actions, which relies on direct visuomotor mapping of an action and a 
semantic route for imitation of known actions that utilises long-term memory. MF actions are 
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stored in the long-term, semantic memory and therefore engage the semantic route, while ML 
actions could only be reproduced through the direct route as they had no pre-stored goals in 
the semantic memory. It was suggested that the less accurate imitation of ML actions was a 
result of using the direct route, as it bypassed the semantic route and created greater demands 
on the short-term and working memory systems (Rumiati, Weiss, Tessari, Assmus, Zilles, 
Herzog et al., 2005). 
Another interpretation of goal-directed imitation suggests that goals are embedded 
within observed and executed actions (Bekkering et al., 2000). It posits that the motor 
representation constructed for imitation is decomposed during observation of an action into 
its constituent components and later reconstructed based from these components. Importantly, 
this process is guided by the viewer’s perception and interpretation of the motor program in 
relation to its goal-directed features. If a tangible goal is present, it is generally considered to 
be of more importance than the way in which the goal is achieved. For instance, touching the 
ear is more important than using the correct ipsilateral (i.e. left hand to touch left ear) or 
contralateral (i.e. right hand to touch left ear) arm movement to touch the ear (Gordon, 1920; 
Head, 1923; Schofield, 1976; Bekkering et al., 2000). However, if there was no obvious goal 
of a movement, e.g. moving a limb into a space (Bekkering et al., 2000; Wild, Poliakoff, 
Jerrison & Gowen, 2010), then the way in which the movement was performed would likely 
be recognised as the primary goal. Within the interpretation of goal-directed features, GOADI 
suggests that goals are represented as a hierarchical structure where specific goals are encoded 
as having greater importance (Bekkering, Wohlschlager & Gattis, 2000; Wohlschlager, Gattis 
& Bekkering, 2003). Consequently, the goals that are prescribed greater importance are likely 
to generate a greater accuracy of imitation. The goals that are selected then elicit the motor 
program with which they are most strongly associated and therefore, do not necessarily lead 
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to matching movements. Consistent with the EP route of the dual route model (Hamilton & 
Grafton, 2006; 2007), neuroimaging research examining the mirror neuron circuitry has 
demonstrated observation and imitation of goal-directed tasks activate parietal regions of the 
brain, specifically the IPL (Rizzolatti, Fogassi & Gallese, 2004; Iacoboni, 2005), which are 
controlled and regulated by the prefrontal cortex, subsequently referred to as PFC (Quintana 
& Fuster, 1999; Miller, 2000).  
 
1.2.4.3 Associative Sequence Learning 
 The associative sequence learning (ASL) theory suggests imitation occurs because the 
sensory and motor representations generated during observation and imitation are connected 
by direct ‘vertical associations’ that are highly experience-dependent (Heyes, 2001). Some of 
these vertical associations are innate, that is, executed autonomously without cognition, e.g. 
yawning, smiling (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977). However, the majority are formed because of 
correlated experience of observation and execution of the movement, where humans use self-
reference after imitating to gauge the accuracy of the representation. As well as direct vertical 
associations, there are also indirect vertical associations between the sensory and motor 
representations, whereby the representation is mediated by an additional representation, e.g. 
a word or phrase. The indirect association can occur during the observation or execution of 
the movement, which then informs the direct association. Vertical associations characterise 
sensorimotor representations and the execution of an imitative movement may be a 
combination of multiple representations. These connections are made through horizontal 
associations to form a sequence or sensorimotor representations. It is suggested that the 
acquisition of novel motor skills assumes that activation of motor representations via vertical 
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associations provides input to task general processes of motor learning, and results in imitative 
performance unless inhibited by mechanisms regulating intentional action. These mechanisms 
then connect the vertical associations to an output in relation to goals that formulate the 
execution of imitation (De Renzi, Cavalleri & Facchini, 1996).  
 
1.2.4.4 Direct-Matching Hypothesis 
 The direct-matching hypothesis has been suggested to operate using a ‘resonance’ 
mechanism (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi & Gallesse, 1999), whereby the visual information 
observed (e.g. a picture; movement kinematics) is mapped onto a motor representation of the 
same action in the nervous system (Rizzolatti, Fogassi & Gallesse, 2001). Moreover, this 
hypothesis predicts that cortical areas where matching occurs must contain neurons that 
discharge during observation and that some of them should also receive input based on the 
action they are encoding. Therefore, these areas should have motor properties that are likely 
to be more active when the imitation is primed by observation of the to-be-executed action 
(Iacoboni, Woods, Brass, Bekkering, Mazziotta & Rizzolatti, 1999).  
 
 Several theories have been outlined in this review of current literature to demonstrate 
the complex and specific processes underpinning the ability to imitate. It is important to note 
that no one theory is entirely correct, or incorrect – depending on the feature of imitation that 
is examined, each can assume varying applicability. Therefore, the current thesis is not 
designed to corroborate one particular theory, but to consider all theories and their relevance 
to the findings discussed throughout. That withstanding, certain theories are expected to be 
more relevant to the current thesis based on the research questions examined. The primary 
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research question in the current thesis concerns whether atypical biological motion is coded 
during imitation learning. If results demonstrate, as expected, that atypical biological motion 
is coded and imitated differently to typical biological motion, these findings would support 
the ASL theory by evidencing direct associations between the observed and executed 
movements to produced different visual representations formed during observation that 
resulted in scaled imitation of the respective models. 
 
1.3 Perception-action System 
 
 The perception-action system is believed to contain the neural circuitry that is active 
during imitation learning. The term ‘mirror’ is a reference to the connection between neuron 
activation during observation and imitation respectively; that is, regions of the brain believed 
to activate during observation also activate during imitation of the same stimulus. The first 
example of these ‘mirror neurons’ was discovered in monkeys (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, 
Gallese & Rizzolatti, 1992), specifically in the IFG located in the F5 region, and forms a 
circuit with the posterior parietal area, also containing neurons with mirror properties 
(Gallesse, Fadiga, Fogassi & Rizzolatti, 2002; Fogassi, Ferrari, Gesierich, Rozzi, Chersi & 
Rizzolatti, 2005). Subsequently, there have been many neuroimaging studies examining the 
perception-action system in the human brain. However, it is still uncertain which regions of 
the brain ‘consistently contribute’ to observation and imitation processing (Caspers, Zilles, 
Laird & Eickhoff, 2010). Early neuroimaging studies involving humans suggested mirror 
neuron activation was in the inferior frontal (Iacoboni, 2001), premotor and parietal (Decety, 
Chaminade, Grezes, Meltzoff & Grezes, 2002; Buccino et al., 2004) regions of the brain. Yet, 
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a more recent review of 20 studies found discrepancies based on the regions that were 
consistently activated (Molenberghs, Cunnington & Mattingley, 2009). The first strong 
evidence of a perception-action system in humans was found using motor evoked potentials 
(MEPs) that were activated by single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) while 
observing upper-limb movements (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi & Rizzolatti, 1995). The study 
found that activation of MEPs during observation of another person’s movement were similar 
to those recorded during execution of the same movement. Neuroimaging studies have also 
reported a mirroring effect between observation and imitation in tasks such as observing goal-
directed hand-grasping movements (Gangitano, Mottaghy & Pascual-Leone, 2001; see 
Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004), playing guitar chords (Vogt, Buccino, Wohlschlager, Canessa, 
Shah, Zilles et al.., 2007) and compatible finger movements (Biermann-Ruben et al., 2008).  
 Further research using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
electroencephalography (EEG), magnetoencephalography (MEG) and TMS methods, 
indicated a contribution from the primary motor cortex (Nishitani & Hari, 2002; Jarvelainen, 
Schurmann & Hari, 2004) and the dorsal premotor cortex (Grezes, Armony, Rowe & 
Passingham, 2003; Leslie, Johnson-Frey & Grafton, 2004) in the mirror-circuitry due to their 
activation during action observation. In addition to the core circuitry, it had also been 
suggested that other regions of the brain not containing mirror properties are active during 
action observation. For example, the posterior part of the superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) has 
been shown to act as a visual relay to the IPL and frontal lobe structures (Nishanti & Hari, 
2002; Iacoboni et al., 2001). Specifically, it was suggested that the visual information 
provided by the pSTS to the fronto-parietal mirror regions facilitates goal-directed 
information processing in the IFG and ventral premotor cortex (vPM), as well as kinematic 
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information processing in the rostral part of the inferior parietal lobule (aIPL) (Iacoboni, 
2005).  
More recently, it has been posited that the frontal regions of the perception-action 
system code the kinematics, whereas the parietal regions code the goal(s) of an observed 
movement (Hamilton, 2008). Moreover, it has also been suggested that these regions not only 
code the kinematics or goal of an observed movement, but also contribute to the understanding 
of actions and their consequences (Hamilton & Grafton, 2008). This was demonstrated using 
a repetition suppression (RS) protocol to measure blood oxygen level-dependent signal 
(BOLD), which highlights active regions during visual information processing, after viewing 
videos of novel or repeated kinematics, goals and outcomes. A selection of RS studies have 
reported suppression of the lateral occipital cortex (LOC) and IFG when constructing the 
visual and motor representations of kinematics (Hamilton & Grafton, 2007; Kilner, Neal, 
Weiskopf, Friston & Frith, 2009), as well as in the IPL when processing the goals or outcomes 
of a movement (Hamilton & Grafton, 2008; Chong, Cunnington, Williams, Kanwisher & 
Mattingley, 2008). However, RS studies have also indicated that while these regions are 
active, they may not in fact contain neurons with mirror properties. Rather, motor areas have 
distinct, segregated populations of visual and motor neurons where the visual neurons 
discharge during observation and the motor neurons fire during imitation (Dinstein, Thomas, 
Behrmann & Heger, 2008). It was proposed that if mirror neurons existed in humans, they 
should adapt at a synaptic level based on repetitive exposure to the same information through 
common pathways (Sawamura, Orban & Vogels, 2006). However, it was suggested that 
adaptation effects were difficult to interpret as common pathways are often lacking (Bartels, 
Logothetis & Moutoussis, 2008). For example, frontoparietal regions receive visual 
information during observation from the superior temporal sulcus (STS) (Rizzolatti & 
 16
Luppino, 2001; Iacoboni, 2005), whereas during imitation it mostly comes from the frontal 
lobes (Fuster, 2008). Moreover, this inference of separate neural regions involved in visual 
and motor processing is unlikely based on the volume of literature demonstrating congruency 
between the regions and neurons involved in observing and imitating motor acts (Fadiga et 
al., 1995; Strafella & Paus, 2000; Maeda, Kleiner-Fisman & Pascual-Leone, 2002). Therefore, 
if visual information reaches neurons that encode the same motor act such that imitation is 
achieved, the neurons involved in these processes have mirror properties (Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia, 2010). 
 
1.4 Biological Motion 
 
1.4.1 Definition of Biological Motion 
‘Biological motion’ refers broadly to the movement of an animate object. Relative to 
human movement, it refers more specifically to body movements (e.g. hands, eyes, face) that 
may provide information about specific actions or intentions (Allison, Puce & McCarthy, 
2000). The original methodology designed to measure biological motion processing used a 
rudimentary version of point-light displays (PLD), which allowed for studying of the 
movement without interference from the form (Johansson, 1973). It was suggested that 10-12 
light bulbs located on the major joints in the human body, observed against a contrasting 
background (often in a darkened room) were sufficient to be able to convey enough visual 
information to be able to distinguish between the highly specific movement patterns that 
comprise actions such as walking, running and dancing (Johansson, 1973). The theory is 
founded on the basis of physics principles, which state the motion of a single point is 
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characterised by its position and the forces applied to it. That is, the movement of a single 
point, as well as it’s interaction with the other visible points within a PLD, contain enough 
relative information to represent motion structure. It is suggested that recognition occurs due 
to the implicit recognition that the visual information follows the laws of human motion. One 
law of human movement is the minimum jerk (MJ) velocity profile, which describes a ‘bell-
shaped’ velocity curve during a point-to-point movement (e.g. drawing a horizontal line across 
a piece of paper). A MJ velocity profile starts with a slow acceleration from a stationary 
position where the magnitude of acceleration gradually increases until it reaches a peak 
velocity (typically between 40%-60% of the movement displacement; Elliott, Helsen & Chua, 
2001), before a gradual decrease in magnitude of velocity as the movement reaches its 
conclusion (Abend, Bizzi & Morasso, 1982; Flash & Hogan, 1985). Relative to the current 
thesis, the MJ velocity profile is representative of one of the model data that was observed by 
participants as it complies with the laws of human motion. That is, it is a movement that 
humans make implicitly when moving between two points (Abend et al., 1982). 
 
1.4.2 Importance of Biological Motion 
 The functional implications of being able to detect biological motion have developed 
over time. From an evolutionary standpoint, it has been shown to facilitate the identification 
of predators, prey and those of one’s own kind (Ewert, 1987). Specifically, within humans, 
observation of biological motion has allowed for the distinction between animals and humans 
(Mather & West, 1993), genders (Kozlowski & Cutting, 1977), identities/ familiarity (Cutting 
& Kozlowski, 1977; Troje, Westhoff & Lavrov, 2005), facial expressions (Bassili, 1978) and 
actions (Dittrich, 1993) to name a few. These effects are largely consistent when observing 
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static or dynamic biological motion. However, it has been suggested that the depth of 
movement recognition is greater when observing dynamic biological motion (Mather & 
Murdoch, 1994; Troje, 2002). Importantly, the ability to process observed biological motion 
to infer actions and intentions (termed ‘social perception’; Allison et al., 2000) is a function 
that defines humans and can be identified in infants as early as days old (Simion, Regolin & 
Bulf, 2008; Meary, Kitromilides, Mazens, Graff & Gentaz, 2007). Four-month-old infants 
were reported to stare at human motion sequences for longer duration than at random 
movements (Bertenthal, 1993; Fox & McDaniel, 1982). While it has been suggested that 
infants may process biological motion in a similar way to adults (Jokisch, Daum, Suchan & 
Troje, 2005; Reid, Hoehl & Striano, 2006), it has also been shown that children improve their 
abilities to perceive and process biological motion until they reach adult levels of performance 
at approximately age 5 (Pavlova, Krageloh-Mann, Sokolov & Birbaumer, 2001). Being 
socially cognisant is a feature that allows humans to thrive in complex social situations and is 
the cornerstone of human life (Amodio & Frith, 2006). 
 
1.4.3 Neural Mechanisms and Application of Biological Motion Processing 
 In the adult brain, multiple areas are required for biological motion processing (for 
reviews, see Allison et al., 2000; Puce & Perrett, 2003) such as inferior occipital cortex 
(Bonda, Petrides, Ostry & Evans, 1996; Pelphrey, Mitchell, McKeown, Goldstein, Allison & 
McCarthy, 2003; Dayan, Casile, Levit-Binnun, Giese, Hendler & Flash, 2007), lingual gyrus 
(Vaina, Solomon, Chowdhury, Sinha & Belliveau, 2001; Pelphrey et al., 2003; Dayan et al., 
2007), premotor cortex (Saygin, Wilson, Hagler, Bates & Sereno, 2004; Saygin, 2007) and 
primarily, the STS (Bonda et al., 1996, Pelphrey et al., 2003; Saygin et al., 2004; Safford, 
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Hussey, Parasuraman & Thompson, 2010). Each of these areas is suggested to process 
different components of the visual information such as motion and form (Vangeneugden, de 
Maziere, van Hulle, Jaeggli, van Gool & Vogels, 2011). However, the STS is considered the 
primary area associated with biological motion processing and is believed to integrate all 
components of biological motion processing to construct a complete visual representation of 
an observed movement (Puce, Allison, Bentin, Gore & McCarthy, 1998; Vangeneugden, 
2011). STS activation in response to observed human movement was first discovered using 
single cell recordings in macaque monkeys (Oram & Perrett, 1994). More recently, 
neuroimaging studies have substantiated and elaborated upon this finding to show that it is 
specifically the pSTS that is most active when observing human movement, as demonstrated 
in PLD paradigms (Bonda et al., 1996; Grossman & Blake, 2002; Grossman, Blake & Kim, 
2004). However, the breadth of regions that appear to be responsive to observed biological 
motion have meant it is unclear whether they are responding to general human movement or 
if they are specifically linked to biological motion (Troje, 2008). Nevertheless, neuroimaging 
studies spanning 20 years have sought to find definitive answers. 
 Some of the first studies on humans used positron emission tomography (PET) during 
observation of biological PLDs, such as hand-grasping actions and whole body movement. 
Increased activity was reported in the STS when observing biological motion compared to a 
non-biological control conditions that showed random motion (Bonda et al., 1996; Grossman 
et al., 2000) or scrambled motion (reconfigured biological PLD motion; Grossman et al., 
2000). As well as PET, TMS has been used to temporarily disrupt cortical activity in specific 
areas of the brain. Applying repetitive TMS (rTMS) over the right pSTS prior to completing 
a biological motion discrimination task showed a decrease in detection of biological motion, 
suggesting normal function of the pSTS is required for the perception and processing of 
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biological motion (Grossman, Battelli & Pascual-Leone, 2005). Moreover, TMS has impaired 
biological motion coding when applied to the STS relative to control regions of the brain not 
associated with biological motion coding (vertex) and decreased sensitivity in the STS when 
observing biological, compared to non-biological (scrambled biological) motion (van 
Kemenade, Muggleton, Walsh & Saygin, 2012). These finding underscore the unique 
involvement of the STS in the processing of human movement. 
More recently, neuroimaging studies have used fMRI as it is considered safer than 
PET and is more appropriate and accurate for determining the contribution from areas of the 
brain than TMS. Early fMRI studies demonstrated activations in portions of the STS region 
when observing facial movements, e.g. directed/ averted eye gaze that were both dynamic 
(Puce et al., 1998) and static (Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini, 2000). The study using dynamic 
eye movements displayed human models that appeared to make eye movements from a central 
fixation to either the right or left side and then return to a central fixation while the head stayed 
in register. These eye movements were shown alongside clips of the same length, 
demonstrated by the same models, which demonstrated the eyes maintaining a central fixation. 
Brain activity in the STS region, specifically the pSTS was greater during clips where the eyes 
made a movement to either side, compared to when they maintained a fixation, which 
suggested the STS was active in the perception of biological motion contained in certain body 
movements (Puce et al., 1998). While the same conclusions were reported when using static 
images of eye movements and gaze direction, it was suggested that in addition to the 
perception of eye movements and gaze direction, the STS is also involved in higher-level 
representations of actions (Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini, 2000), specifically recruiting the 
spatial-cognitive system to encode the direction in which eye movements or gaze were 
focussed. This is concurrent with a recent repetition suppression fMRI study that used the 
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repetition suppression (RS) design during observation of PLDs and suggested the STS 
generates higher-level representations of biological motion during action coding (Grossman, 
Jardine & Pyles, 2010). RS is based on the theory that consecutive activations of the same 
neuronal population create a reduced haemodynamic response compared to consecutive 
activations of different neuronal populations (Buckner et al., 1998; Grill-Spector & Malach, 
2001). The experiment consisted of observation of pairs of images; the first animation was of 
a PLD showing one of twenty-five action sequences, e.g. walking, running etc., and the second 
was either (a) the same animation repeated, (b) a PLD of a different animation, or (c) the same 
animation mirror-reversed. Results showed that activation in the pSTS was suppressed after 
observation of the same animation and of the mirrored animation but not after observing 
different animations. The implication is that regions of the STS not only detect biological 
motion, but also generate higher-level representations to form a more complex understanding 
of actions and movements.  
In addition to the wealth of neuroimaging research demonstrating a connection 
between the STS region and the perception of biological motion, this association is made even 
more robust by the implementation of the theory in behavioural studies that observe 
interactive performance (Saygin, 2007; Lange & Lappe, 2006; van Kemenade et al., 2012). 
One example of biological motion processing affecting behavioural performance was 
demonstrated when participants performed linear arm movements while concurrently 
observing orthogonal arm movements. Online imitation of the vertical human arm movement 
produced involuntary movement deviation in the execution of horizontal arm movements 
whereas observation of the vertical robot arm movement did not. The suggestion is that the 
observation of incompatible biological properties to those of execution create an interference 
effect during the processing of the visual information (Kilner, Paulignan & Blakemore, 2003). 
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This effect has also been replicated when observation was of a robot arm reproducing 
biological motion (Chaminade, Franklin, Oztop & Cheng, 2005), inferring it is the underlying 
nature of the movement, not the form in which the movement is presented, which creates the 
interference. This was recently corroborated when a curvilinear arm movement was included 
in addition to the same vertical and horizontal arm movements used in the above studies 
(Roberts, Hayes, Uji & Bennett, 2015). Although no interference was reported during 
observation of the congruent, horizontal arm movements, observing the curvilinear arm 
movement produced a significant interference resulting in vertical deviations when trying to 
execute the horizontal movements. As the end-points of the movement were the same, authors 
concluded that the interference was a result of the observed biological motion being different 
to that being executed and represented the overlap in processing of different representations 
of biological motion. These perceived interference effects during online imitation have been 
termed ‘motor contagion’ (Blakemore & Frith, 2005) based on the theory that during 
observation, the observed biological properties directly activate a corresponding 
representation in the observer’s motor repertoire.  
Similarly, during imitation learning, observers have been shown to imitate movement 
kinematics such as peak velocity and differences in velocity of biological motion performed 
by both human (Wild, Poliakoff, Jerrison & Gowen, 2010) and non-human (Bisio Stucchi, 
Jacono, Fadiga & Pozzo, 2010) agents. Moreover, the imitation of biological motion 
kinematics appears to be more accurate when environmental context facilitates ‘true imitation’ 
such that there is no social or goal-based context (Iriki, 2006; Wild et al., 2010). It has been 
suggested that the imitation of movement kinematics is representative of the ability to code 
kinematic markers repeatedly during observation. This temporal coding has been 
demonstrated using MEPs during single TMS pulses while observing a reaching-grasping 
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action (Gangitano et al., 2001). The TMS pulses were administered relative to specific 
kinematic landmarks linked to certain phases of the reaching-grasping movement such as 
maximal finger aperture. It was reported that in addition to coding the features or goals of 
biological motion to form a motor plan, this process also automatically codes visual 
information relative to the temporal features, which accounts for the ability to code kinematic 
features such as changes in velocity. These findings have all been amalgamated in a recent 
study that showed biological motion kinematics are coded during imitation learning and 
moreover, and that imitation is more accurate when there are no target goals present during 
the task (Hayes, Dutoy, Elliott, Gowen & Bennett, 2016). Participants were tasked with 
imitating novel biological motion stimuli with different kinematic profiles relative to peak 
velocity and the time at which peak velocity occurred (percentage-time-to-peak-velocity). 
There were two atypical biological motion models wherein the peak velocities were greater 
and occurred earlier than ‘normal’ and a non-biological constant velocity model. Imitating 
accurately but also relative to the respective models, showed participants could distinguish 
between different types of biological motion to accurately code and imitate specific features 
of the movements. This finding suggests the coding of biological motion involves lower-level 
sensorimotor systems to produce high-level, complex representations of observed visual 
stimuli. 
 
 In the review of imitating biological motion, there is relative consistency within 
neuroimaging research that identifies certain regions of the brain that are activated when 
identifying biological motion (STS) and coding the underlying kinematics of an observed 
stimulus (IFG, mPFC), compared to coding the cognitive, attentional features of the 
environmental context e.g. goals (IPL). Although there appears to be a general consistency in 
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how the visual information is processed, the way in which the visual information influences 
physical imitation seems more varied. For example, there is evidence to suggest that spatial 
compatibility between observation and imitation of transitive hand movements is both 
required (Sturmer et al., 2000; Brass et al., 2001) and not required (Brass et al., 2005) to 
facilitate successful imitation of the observed action. While there are not always behavioural 
discrepancies in the research, inconsistencies in behavioural research provide an insight into 
how complex imitation can be.   
Similarly, it is difficult to identify any right or wrong regarding the theories that are 
suggested to underpin imitation of biological motion. Each theory discussed previously has 
been experimentally proved and disproved, which further suggests the environmental context 
can heavily influence how people imitate certain features of an observed stimuli. Instead, these 
discrepancies allude to the complexities involved in imitating that may, by definition, not be 
explained by one single theory. Instead, it is predicted that the various modulations included 
in each of the experimental chapters may corroborate different theories of imitation relative 
to the purpose of the experiment e.g. the end-state-target modulation in Chapter Three may 
confirm GOADI in the context of goal-directed imitation of biological motion kinematics 
during imitation learning. While the experiments examining top-down modulations may 
support their corresponding theories, the theory behind coding of biological motion 
kinematics is predicted to be more straightforward. The ASL theory suggests that direct 
associations between the visual and motor representations are formed during processing of the 
visual stimulus, which facilitates accurate imitation. Therefore, in line with ASL theory, it is 
expected that imitation of novel atypical biological motion will be scaled to the model and 
different to that of the other models used in the respective experiments e.g. typical biological 
motion/ constant velocity.  
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1.5 Other Factors That May Modulate Imitation 
 
 While the effect goals, or the absence thereof, on imitation have been alluded to above 
(see Goal-directed Theory of Imitation; pg 9), it is important to discuss some of the other 
factors that influence the processes underlying imitation. While there are numerous factors 
that could be discussed, those addressed below are central to some of the studies presented in 
this thesis, namely spatial compatibility, visual attention and social primes. 
 
1.5.1 Spatial Compatibility 
 SRC refers to the situation where the selection of a response is directly related to the 
position of the related stimulus. When the relationship between stimulus and response is 
natural and direct, it is described as natural. When it is unnatural and indirect, it is described 
as incompatible (Proctor & Vu, 2006). Basic understanding of this subject has used simple 
tasks involving finger pressing of keys. Faster responses were generated in both horizontal 
(left and right; Proctor & Reeve, 1990) and vertical (top and bottom; Chan, & Chan, 2005) 
axes when the stimulus was compatible, compared with incompatible, to the response 
required, e.g. left light stimulus paired with left button rather than right button response. From 
an imitation perspective, spatial SRC protocols have been used to extensively to explore action 
representation and control, seminal among which were the Simon effect (1969) and spatial 
Stroop effect (1935). 
 In a Simon task, the relevant stimulus is a non-spatial physical feature (e.g. colour, 
shape) that is assigned to left or right manual responses often controlled by key-presses, and 
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the location in which the stimulus occurs (left or right) is irrelevant. A spatial Stroop task is 
largely the same, however the relevant stimulus is a word or feature that conveys spatial 
information, e.g. the word “LEFT”. Measurements are often recorded in relation to reaction 
time and error scores, where compatible and incompatible trials are directly compared. In both 
the Simon and spatial Stroop tasks, responses are faster when the stimulus appears at a 
congruent position (e.g. “LEFT appearing on the left side of the screen), than at an incongruent 
position. More recently, this effect has been examined in automatic imitation where protocols 
based on the original spatial Stroop and Simon tasks were used. Largely, they were choice 
reaction time SRC protocols where the cues were photographic images of human models 
performing the actions required in the response set. For example, Sturmer, Aschersleben and 
Prinz (2000) examined hand-opening and hand-closing. As the hand started to either open or 
close, the hand would change colour to signal either the opening (blue) or closing (red) of the 
observer’s hand as quickly as possible. Results showed that reaction time was quicker when 
the stimulus hand was compatible with the correct response (e.g. open hand stimulus to open 
hand response), compared to when the stimulus and response were incompatible (e.g. close 
hand stimulus to open hand response). Similar results have been demonstrated when lifting 
movements of the index or middle finger were examined (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlager & 
Prinz, 2000). A number would appear to signify the lifting of either the index (“1”) or middle 
(“2”) finger, which coincided with the lifting of either the index or middle finger of the 
stimulus hand. Again, reaction time was quicker when the stimulus finger was compatible 
with the correct response e.g. index finger stimulus and index finger response. 
 While similar studies (Gillmeister, Catmur, Liepelt, Brass & Heyes, 2008; Bach & 
Tipper, 2007; Leighton & Heyes, 2010) have contributed to robust findings regarding this 
automatic imitation effect within SRC protocols, the protocols themselves were not designed 
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such that the effects could be definitively attributed to imitation. Relevant to observation of 
body movement, the term “imitation” is often used to describe actions that are topographically 
similar (Heyes, 2001). However, it is possible that the tendency to produce a topographically 
similar response, e.g. “imitatively compatible” (Catmur & Heyes, 2011), could be confused 
with the tendency to respond in the same relative position as the stimulus, e.g. “movement 
compatible” (Brass, Bekkering & Prinz, 2001). For example, observing a hand move quickly 
to a target could prompt the response to also move quickly to a target (imitatively compatible) 
but it could also have prompted the response to simply reach the target and thus finish the 
movement in the same location (spatially compatible) regardless of speed (Wild et al., 2010). 
The bigger issue however, is that when considering a multitude of action types, such as power/ 
precision grip (Chong, Cunnington, Williams & Mattingley, 2009), index finger movements 
(Brass et al., 2000; Brass et al., 2001; Bertenthal, Longo & Kosobud, 2006), and hand and/ or 
mouth opening/ closing (Heyes et al., 2005; Press et al., 2008; Leighton & Heyes, 2010), it is 
not always possible to dissociate imitation effects from spatial compatibility effects.  
 
1.5.2 End-state-targets 
 The theory underpinning meaningfulness and transitive goal-directed imitation was 
discussed earlier in the chapter. This section will discuss some of the research that 
incorporated end-state-targets as the specific transitive goal, designed to induce top-down 
modulation of imitation. When end-state-targets are present, they provide a tangible, 
achievable goal that defines the movement and acts as a definitive form of completion of an 
imitation attempt. The goal-directed theory of imitation suggests that when there are obvious 
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goals of a movement, these goals are incorporated into the to-be-used motor representation 
and moreover, arranged within a hierarchy based on their perceived importance. 
One of the most thoroughly examined paradigms used to explore this theory required 
participants to imitate a model making either ipsilateral or contralateral arm movements to 
touch their ears (Head, 1920; 1926; Gordon, 1923; Schofield, 1976; Bekkering et al., 2000). 
In these instances, touching the ear represented the goal of the trial and was deemed the ‘end-
state-target’ that concluded the imitation attempt. Results have consistently shown more 
ipsilateral than contralateral responses are produced, regardless of the way in which the model 
demonstrated the task, to touch the correct ear as demonstrated by the model. The most recent 
of these studies (Bekkering et al., 2000) extended these findings by including two further 
manipulations. Firstly, only one ear was used as an end-state and thus reduced the number of 
objects at which the arm movements were directed. This resulted in more correct arm 
movements being made during imitation. Secondly, an additional trial type was included 
where the model made the same ipsilateral or contralateral arm movements, but in addition to 
touching the ear and thus being goal-directed, also moved to a nondescript space by the side 
of the head. There trial types were classified as being goal-less, and reduced the preference to 
make predominantly ipsilateral arm movements. Instead, the type of arm movement used by 
the model in goal-less trials was more accurately imitated. Results primarily corroborated 
previous research that showed that imitation is mediated by goals. They also showed that when 
multiple goals are available, they are organised into a perceived hierarchy that inform what 
elements of an action are imitated. Further, if there are no obvious goals present during 
observation, the way in which the action is achieved becomes the primary goal and is thus 
imitated with more accuracy. 
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 The structure of goal-directed imitation was further explored using a modified version 
of the classic SRC protocol mentioned earlier in the chapter (Brass et al., 2000). Participants 
were shown clips of a finger movement that produced either a biomechanically possible 
(flexion) or impossible (hyperextension) movement but were not given instruction as to their 
physical nature (Longo et al., 2008; Experiment 1). Even though participants were largely 
aware of the biomechanical differences between the movements, comparable automatic 
imitation was elicited from both actions, which suggested the actions were coded in relation 
to their respective goals (e.g. tapping a surface) rather than their constituent movements. In a 
subsequent study (Longo et al., 2008; Experiment 2), participants were informed they would 
see both possible and impossible actions prior to completing the same task. Results indicated 
that the automatic imitation effects from Experiment 1 were only found during imitation of 
biomechanically possible actions. In line with previous suggestions (Bekkering et al., 2000), 
the authors agreed that goal-directed coding appears to be the default response when 
generating imitative responses. Further, these results suggest that the proposed hierarchy of 
goals appears to incorporate additional top-down factors such as attention and instruction.  
 In addition to automatic imitation, top-down modulation has also been examined 
relative to imitation learning and more complex movements. For example, participants were 
required to imitate a model that moved between two points and displayed different movement 
kinematics (Wild et al., 2010). The kinematics represented either ‘fast’ or ‘slow’ speeds and 
were displayed either between beginning and end-state-targets (goal-directed), or two 
nondescript points in space (goal-less). Results showed that the presence of end-state-targets 
modulated the accuracy of kinematic imitation such that it was less accurate compared with 
when there were no-end-state-targets present. In line with GOADI, these results suggest that 
goals have a modulatory effect on imitation and moreover, that these top-down modulations 
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apply to all forms of imitation. Further, they demonstrate that in the absence of any obvious 
goals during observation, the way in which a movement is completed becomes the primary 
goal of the movement, as demonstrated by the more accurate imitation of movement 
kinematics during goal-less trials.  
 
1.5.3 Visual Attention 
 Visual attention is defined by two basic phenomena: limited capacity for processing 
information; and selectivity. Limited capacity refers to amount of information available on 
the retina that can be processed to influence behaviour, while selectivity is the ability to filter 
out unwanted information (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Taken together, these phenomena 
suggest that at some point between input and response, objects in the visual input compete for 
representation, analysis or control (Treisman, 1960; 1993). This competition has been 
demonstrated several times in experiments where two objects are presented in the visual field 
that require property identification of both stimuli, with separate responses for each. These 
types of experiments highlighted several important facts: dividing attention almost always 
results in poorer performance than focussing attention on one object (Duncan, 1984); 
interference and subsequent performance limitation only occurs when multiple stimuli are 
presented simultaneously (Duncan, 1980); interference is independent of eye movements (e.g. 
fixation or periphery) and spatial separation (Sagi & Julesz, 1985). Once there is competition 
in the visual field, the next issue is how selectivity is coordinated across the different systems 
so that a target object is selected for perceptual and spatial analysis as well as for motor 
control.  
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 Selectivity refers to the ability to screen out unwanted or irrelevant information, but 
this process is complex. Depending on the difficulty of filtering out a non-target, responses 
such as reaction time can be affected by as much as 50 ms (Treisman & Gelade, 1980), 
although this number varies continuously depending on the task (Treisman & Gormican, 
1988). The biased competition model (Desimone & Duncan, 1995) suggests a bottom-up bias 
can influence selectivity where features such as inhomogeneity (Sagi & Julesz, 1984), new 
objects (Jonides & Yantis, 1988) or objects that are larger, brighter or faster (Treisman & 
Gormican, 1988) are naturally biased towards. However, this natural, instinctive bias would 
be impractical unless there was also a way to bias the visual competition towards whatever is 
relevant to current behaviour. That is, bottom-up, stimulus driven biases need top-down 
attentional control. Because the spectrum of behaviourally relevant input can be so broad, it 
is argued that some form of description of the information is required to control the 
competitive bias in the visual system such that matching inputs are favoured by having 
attention directed towards them (Wolfe, Cave & Franzel, 1989). 
 Attention refers to the ability to focus one’s cognitive resources on information (e.g. 
motion, goals), which from an imitation perspective could subsequently influence 
performance. While it has been demonstrated that intentionally directed attention to a stimulus 
or feature is not a requirement to imitate (Leighton & Heyes, 2010), there is evidence to 
suggest that intentionally mediated attention and feature selection can influence the magnitude 
of imitation effects. For example, when required to imitate an index/ middle finger tapping 
motion, instructions slowed reaction time down when it was believed the movement being 
observed was either impossible (Longo, Kosobud & Bertenthal, 2008) or represented non-
biological motion (Longo & Bertenthal, 2009). When instructions did not mention any 
stimulus features, both possible and impossible, biological and non-biological motions 
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produced an effector compatibility effect. Using the same paradigm, instructions also 
modulated imitation based on the belief of the origins of the observed stimuli (Liepelt & Brass, 
2010). When observing a gloved human hand, those who were told the hand was wooden 
showed smaller imitation effects than those who were told the hand was human. In all three 
instances, authors concluded that any reduced imitation effects (impossible, non-biological 
motion, wooden hand) could have been a result of attention being on the kinematics of the 
stimuli, rather than the end-point of each of the movements. Importantly, even when attention 
was not directed to a specific feature of the stimuli, some feature of the observed stimuli was 
acknowledged as the goal (i.e., the end-point of the movement). This demonstrates that while 
attention can be directed to purposefully allude to task-relevant or irrelevant information for 
experimental purposes, attention can also be non-consciously self-focussed to imitate or 
achieve a goal (Chartand & Baugh, 1999). 
 Neurophysiological studies have shown that relevant and irrelevant items to task goals 
both enhance and suppress cortical activity respectively (Reynolds & Chelazzi, 2004). For 
successful top-down modulation to occur, attention should be focussed on task-relevant 
stimuli while irrelevant distractions are ignored (Gazzaley & Nobre, 2012). This subsequently 
activates the ‘control’ regions of the brain, such as the PFC and the parietal cortex (Curtis & 
D’Esposito, 2004; Gazzaley & D’Esposito, 2007), both of which are known to be involved in 
information processing within the perception-action system. Moreover, the ability to observe 
and then imitate a task is dependent on certain stages of processing and neural representations, 
which are also linked to attention e.g. expectation, encoding, maintenance and retrieval. These 
stages contribute in some part to forming a representation that facilitates imitation, although 
expectation and encoding are the key contributors, and all are enhanced when attention is 
specifically directed (Gazaley & Nobre, 2012).  
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The expectation phase arrives before any visual stimuli is visible. Indeed, specifying 
where or what to attend to can enhance perceptual performance, most notably to improve the 
speed or accuracy of a response (Posner, 1980). Pre-stimulus enhancement has been 
demonstrated in regions of the brain associated with visual information following cues that 
attend to task features such as location (Kastner, Pinsk, De Weerd, Desimone & Ungerleider, 
1999) and stimulus features (Giesbrecht, Weissman, Woldorff & Mangun, 2006). 
Demonstration of the latter effect was shown in an automatic imitation study that presented 
pre-cues of either a finger-tapping or finger-lifting movement prior to having to execute a 
finger tap movement (Brass, Bekkering & Prinz, 2001). Results showed that when the 
stimulus features of the pre-cues were task-relevant (finger tap) as opposed to task irrelevant 
(finger lifting), reaction time was significantly quicker and more accurate.  
The encoding phase follows the presentation of any visual stimulus, where the 
information is initially processed to construct a representation of what has been observed, 
usually in terms of any goal-related tasks (see GOADI; Bekkering et al., 2000). Goal-related 
tasks can occur at any point during the observation of stimuli (Hillyard, Vogel & Luck, 1998) 
and have been shown to activate specific regions of the brain associated with goal-directed 
attention (visual association cortex; Gazzaley, Cooney, McEvoy, Knight & D’Esposito, 
2005). For example, identifying goals early in movement observation (within 200 ms of 
stimulus onset) can improve performance (Gazzaley, 2011). Still, optimal performance 
requires the addition of filtering irrelevant information, thus allowing for increased attention 
to the task-relevant information (Zanto & Gazzaley, 2009). This was demonstrated by children 
who were required to imitate a model that made goal-directed and goal-less movements 
(Bekkering et al., 2000). The goal-directed task was to imitate a model who touched their ear 
using either ipsilateral (same side e.g. left hand touched left ear) or contralateral (e.g. left hand 
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touched right ear) arm movements. The goal-less task used the same arm movements but 
instead of touching an ear, the model moved the hand to the space at either side of the head. 
Results showed that when children were required to touch their ears (make a goal-directed 
movement), they generally did so using ipsilateral arm movements regardless of how the 
model had executed the task. This demonstrated identification of goals within an observed 
stimulus (touching the ear) and the filtering of irrelevant information (how the ear was 
touched) to focus attention on what was perceived as the goal of the movement. 
  
1.5.4 Social Primes 
 Social interaction in humans is ubiquitous and often involuntary or spontaneous (van 
Baaren et al., 2009), but as with attention it can influence imitation. Social interaction is 
complex and dynamic. It defines humans (Hari & Kujala, 2009) and is conveyed through 
multiple verbal and non-verbal behaviours. It is widely understood in social psychology that 
humans will communicate through these unintentional social interactions that form the basis 
of relationships. For example, people have exhibited imitative behaviours connected to 
postures, gestures, facial expressions, emotions and language (Chartrand & van Baaren, 
2009). Social psychology suggests that imitation has positive social consequences on social 
interaction whereby liking and affiliation are created between those involved (Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999) through processes linked to the perception-action system (Catmur, Gillmeister, 
Bird, Liepelt, Brass & Heyes, 2008; Catmur, Walsh & Heyes, 2009; Heyes, 2011). The 
perception-action system creates a direct link between perception and action where the 
sensory input automatically activates a motor response (Brass & Heyes, 2005), which has led 
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to the suggestion that this link is formed through ASL (Heyes, 2001; Catmur et al., 2008; 
Catmur et al., 2009).  
While imitation is often subconscious and involuntary, there is also the theory that 
imitation within social interaction may be strategically implemented to change the social 
context for self-advancement, termed the social top-down response modulation theory 
(STORM; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003), or perhaps to simulate theory of mind (Pickering & 
Garrod, 2004; Gallese, 2006). In relation to the latter, the suggestion is if I were to imitate 
someone, that gives me a better understanding of their feelings or intentions. The STORM 
theory suggests when I consciously choose to imitate another person, they unconsciously 
detect my behaviour such that they positively change their attitude towards me. Therefore, if 
it was beneficial for someone to like me, I could imitate them more to improve my social 
standing. This has been evidenced in studies demonstrating greater liking (Chartrand & 
Baugh, 1999), feelings of closeness (van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami & van Knippenberg, 
2004), trust (Bailenson & Yee, 2005) and levels of persuasion (Maddux, Mullen & Galinsky, 
2008) between people who imitate strangers.  
 From a neurological standpoint, the STORM model has two core components: 
visuomotor mapping and a top-down modulation system. The visuomotor mapping contains 
a series of connections running from higher-order visual systems through the inferior parietal 
cortex to premotor and motor cortices (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010). Generally, for imitation to 
occur, connections are formed between visual and motor representations after actions are 
observed and performed (see ASL theory; Heyes, 2011). While imitation is a very natural and 
instinctive response (e.g., seeing an action automatically activates the ability to imitate in the 
perception-action system), the tendency to imitate must obviously be restrained to avoid over-
imitating. Therefore, the suggestion is that social imitation is governed and inhibited by top-
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down control from regions in the prefrontal lobes (Teufel, Fletcher & Davis, 2010). For 
example, patients with prefrontal lesions have difficulty with tasks that require the inhibition 
of dominant responses, e.g. go/ no-go paradigm and will often over-imitate, displaying traits 
of echolalia or echopraxia (Lhermitte, Pillon & Serdaru, 1986). Similarly, the mPFC and TPJ 
display stronger activations when the natural tendency to imitate something incongruent needs 
to be suppressed (Wang, Newport & Hamilton, 2011; Kampe, Frith & Frith, 2003; Teufal et 
al., 2010). This top-down control has been demonstrated in modulation of imitation using 
various social cues, such as eye contact (Wang, Newport & Hamilton, 2011), word scrambles 
(Leighton et al., 2010; Cook & Bird, 2011) and social status (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003).  
 Of these well researched social cues, most pertinent to the current thesis is eye gaze. 
Eye gaze is considered a critical social cue as it expresses social knowledge of imitative 
behaviour and, based on the STORM theory, direct eye contact is sufficient for an interactive 
partner to detect imitative behaviours and thus improve performance (Wang & Hamilton, 
2012). For example, a study examined the reaction time of executing a hand-opening or hand-
closing movement in response to either a congruent or incongruent stimuli, while concurrently 
playing a video of a model displaying either direct or averted gaze (Wang, Newport & 
Hamilton, 2011). Results showed that direct gaze improved the speed of hand action imitation 
relative to the averted gaze, demonstrating the positive affect social cues can have on features 
of imitation. Similar research showed that by moving the position of the hand stimuli such 
that it was besides, not directly in front of, the model displaying direct or averted gaze (Wang 
& Hamilton, 2014), direct gaze again enhanced imitation whereas the averted gaze did not. 
This finding demonstrated that attention is not necessary for social primes to influence 
imitation, and subsequently that it may be the social elements of the primes that directly 
influence or control imitation.  
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 While imitation can be used to form positive social connections and improve 
performance, it has also been shown to generate negative responses and reduce performance 
following engagement in a social priming task prior to completion of  the hand-opening/ hand-
closing stimulus response compatibility paradigm discussed previously (Leighton et al., 
2010). The social priming task required the formation of sentences from a series of scrambled 
words that included either pro-social, neutral or anti-social words. Results showed an 
automatic imitation effect, where reaction time was faster while imitating compatible, rather 
than incompatible hand movements (Sturmer et al., 2000; Heyes et al., 2005). In addition to 
an automatic imitation effect, results showed a pro-social priming effect (Wang & Hamilton, 
2011a; Wang & Hamilton, 2014) where reaction time was faster after completing the pro-
social word scrambles compared with the neutral and anti-social word scrambles. In addition, 
results also showed that the anti-social word scrambles decreased performance such that the 
both the automatic imitation effect and reaction time were decreased following the anti-social 
primes, relative to the neutral primes. It was suggested that anti-social primes may have 
increased the inhibition of imitation responses relative to a neutral baseline of inhibition and 
subsequently decreased performance.
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 Figure 1.1. A schematic showing the structure, purpose and hypotheses of the four experimental chapters in the current thesis. 
 
Chapter 2: Spatial Compatibility 
RQ:  -Is BM coded during imitation learning? Methods: -Atypical vs Typical 
 -If so, how does this coding occur?  -Compatible vs Incompatible 
Hypotheses:  -Difference in imitation of Atypical and Typical models 
-No difference between compatible and incompatible trials, suggesting 
lower-level visuomotor processing 
Chapter 4: Visual Attention 
RQ:  -Do eyes track cursor during observation Methods: -Atypical vs Typical vs CV 
 of model?     -Targets vs No Targets 
Hypotheses:  -Eye movements are expected to track cursor during observation 
-Eye movements may become more goal-directed when targets are present 
Factors influencing biological motion 
processing during imitation learning 
Chapter 3: Targets 
RQ:  -Is Atypical BM coded during 
imitation learning? 
-Do end-state-targets modulate 
biological motion coding? 
Methods: -Atypical17 vs Atypical26 vs CV 
 -Targets vs No Targets 
Hypotheses:  
-Difference in imitation of Atypical17 and 
Atypical26 
-End-state-targets will modulate imitation of 
BM 
Chapter 5: Social Primes 
RQ:  -Is BM coded during imitation 
learning? 
-Do social primes modulate 
biological motion coding? 
Methods: -Atypical vs Typical vs CV 
-Pro-social vs Anti-social vs Neutral 
Hypotheses:  
-Difference in imitation of Atypical and Typical 
-Social primes will modulate imitation of BM 
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1.6 Summary of Research and Current Thesis Aims 
 
 The aim of the introductory sections was to give an account of imitation of biological 
motion kinematics and the processes that underpin it, as well as ways in which the processing 
can be modulated. It appears to date that although the way in which biological motion is 
processed is largely lower-level (Iacoboni et al., 1999; Brass & Heyes, 2005), there are 
numerous top-down factors that can modulate this process (Kilner et al., 2007; Stanley, 
Gowen & Miall, 2007). However, explicit measurement of the coding of biological motion 
kinematics and the processes that underpin them during imitation learning are not currently 
well understood. Therefore, the purpose of the present thesis is to examine a methodology 
designed to develop the current understanding of biological motion coding. Principally, the 
methodology in the present thesis defines the to-be-observed models through discrete 
variables (peak velocity and percentage-time-to-peak-velocity) that are considered 
appropriate kinematics markers to differentiate model stimuli (Hayes et al., 2014), which are 
also used to determine imitation accuracy during data analysis.  
In addition to developing the fundamental methodology, the present thesis will also 
seek to clarify the underlying processes associated with biological motion coding. Within the 
current literature, it has been suggested that some imitation effects may be the result of 
reproducing spatial properties of observed stimuli, rather than the underlying kinematics 
contained within the observed stimuli (Heyes, 2011). Therefore, Chapter Two will spatially 
decouple the observed and imitated stimuli to isolate the coding of biological motion to either 
lower-level or top-down processing. Once a baseline for unmodulated imitation has been 
established in Chapter Two, subsequent experimental chapters will examine additional top-
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down modulatory effects (end-state-targets, visual attention) to expand upon the information 
processing contained within imitation of biological motion during imitation learning. 
Finally, as imitation is widely shown to be influenced by social context (Bandura, 
1986; Blake, 1958; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Wang & Hamilton, 2012), Chapter Five 
examined the way in which biological motion coding was modulated by social priming during 
imitation learning. In addition to developing the current understanding of social priming on 
biological motion coding by integrating it with an improved methodology, the social 
manipulation in Chapter Five was included to provide a baseline for social modulation of 
imitation learning in neurotypicals, which would facilitate future research in people with ASC. 
Imitation is a well-established issue for people with ASC (Ritvo & Provence, 1953; 
Ramachandran & Oberman, 2006), so Chapter Five was the first in a series of experiments 
using a similar methodology (Hayes et al., 2016; Hayes, Andrew, Foster, Elliott, Gowen & 
Bennett, 2017), to examine the sensorimotor processing of biological motion in people with 
ASC.  
 
1.6.1. Aims of Thesis 
 The primary aim of the present thesis is to examine whether biological motion 
kinematics is processed during imitation learning. If biological motion coding is established, 
the way in which the biological motion is processed will be examined, as well as the ways in 
which that processing can be modulated. The following section describes the specific 
hypotheses pertinent to each of the chapters individually: 
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1.6.1.1. Chapter Two 
 The primary aim of Chapter Two is to examine whether biological motion is coded 
during imitation learning by examining the imitation of atypical and typical biological motion 
models. Further, by decoupling the spatial properties of the observed and executed stimuli, 
Chapter Two will examine the underlying processes associated with biological motion coding. 
Participants will observe the biological motion models in trials that are either spatially 
compatible or incompatible. Imitation of the model stimuli will always be from left to right 
and spatially compatible trials will be observed in the same direction and spatial orientation. 
Spatially incompatible trials will require observation of the model either in the opposite 
direction (right to left), or orthogonal plane (top to bottom/ bottom to top). Firstly, if biological 
motion is coded during imitation learning it is expected that there will be differences in 
imtation between the atypical and typical models. Secondly, if biological motion coding is a 
function of function of lower-level visuomotor processing (Iacoboni et al., 1999; Heyes, 
2001), the kinematics of atypical biological motion should be imitated as accurately during 
spatially incompatible trials as compatible trials. Conversely, if biological motion coding is 
mediated by top-down attentional control related to the spatial coordinates of the model 
kinematics (Proctor & Vu, 2006; Bisio et al., 2010; Heyes, 2011), spatially incompatible trials 
will be less accurate than spatially compatible trials. 
 
1.6.1.2. Chapter Three 
 The imitation task in Chapter Three presents the visual stimuli in a single horizontal 
trajectory for both observation and imitation, thus removing any spatial incompatibility. 
Biological motion coding will be further examined by examining two structurally similar 
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atypical biological motion models (atypical17 and atypical26) rather than atypical and typical 
models. In addition to the coding of atypical biological motion, the modulatory effect of goals 
on biological motion processing will be measured by including the presence of end-state-
targets in 50% of the trials (Wohlschlager et al., 2003; Wild et al., 2010). If biological motion 
kinematics are coded during imitation learning, it is expected that imitation of atypical17 and 
atypical26 models will be scaled relative to the respective models. Further, if imitation is goal-
directed, it is expected that the reproduction of biological motion kinematics will be less 
similar to those of the models when end-state-targets are present during the imitation task 
(Bekkering et al., 2000). 
 
1.6.1.3. Chapter Four 
 In Chapter Four, eye movements will be recorded to confirm the direction of visual 
attention during observation of the model stimuli. The imitation task will examine the coding 
of biological motion through imitation atypical, typical and constant velocity models, as well 
as the modulatory effect of end-state-targets on both imitation and eye movements (Wild et 
al., 2010). It is expected that if biological motion is coded during imitation learning, there will 
be differences in imitation of the atypical, typical and constant velocity models. If end-state-
targets modulate the processing of biological motion, it is expected that imitation of the 
models will be less accurate, compared to when end-state-targets are absent. Further, eye 
movements will confirm whether visual attention is directed the cursor or other environmental 
factors (e.g. end-state-targets) during the observation phase of the imitation task. 
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1.6.1.4. Chapter Five 
 Chapter Five will examine whether social context modulates imitation of biological 
motion kinematics (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). The imitation task 
will use the same biological and non-biological models as Chapter Four (atypical, typical and 
constant velocity) but remove end-state-targets, and social primes will be examined by 
showing an image displaying a pro-social, anti-social or neutral eye gaze prime prior to 
imitation of the model stimuli. The pro-social prime displays a face making direct eye contact; 
the anti-social prime displays a face looking away from the monitor; and the neutral prime 
displays a grey background with no person on it. The expectation is that participants will show 
improved imitation accuracy following the pro-social prime and decreased imitation accuracy 
following the anti-social prime (Leighton et al., 2010). 
 
1.6.1.5. Chapter Six 
 The aim of the final chapter is to provide a summary of the above program of work 
and to integrate these findings with the current understanding in the literature. In addition, 
conclusions for this body of work will be made and future directions of research will be 
discussed.   
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Chapter 2: The Coding of Biological Motion Kinematics During Imitation Learning is 
a Function of Lower-level Visuomotor Processing 
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2.1. Abstract 
 
The present chapter investigated the effect of SRC on the representation of atypical 
biological kinematics during imitation learning. Typical and atypical biological motion 
models were observed and then imitated with either compatible or incompatible spatial 
congruency. A compatible trial constituted one where the observed model stimuli moved from 
left to right and imitation was also executed from left to right. An incompatible trial 
constituted one where the observed stimuli moved from left to right, but the imitation was 
executed either right to left, top to bottom or bottom to top. Participants were instructed to 
observe the model with the intention to later imitate the movement as accurately as possible. 
Results showed that irrespective of whether the stimulus was observed in a spatially 
compatible or incompatible orientation, participants imitated both atypical and typical 
biological motion and imitation was scaled relative to the respective models. Therefore, by 
demonstrating imitation of novel kinematics during spatially incompatible imitation learning, 
the current chapter has isolated the processing and representation of atypical biological 
kinematics to the underlying sensorimotor processes, rather than spatial encoding of peak 
velocity via processes associated with SRC. 
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2.2. Introduction 
 
Learning novel movements provides an important means by which humans interact 
within the world, and with other people. One form of sensorimotor learning is called imitation 
learning, and requires a person to watch a model with the intention of physically recalling and 
reproducing the observed action. For example, when observing a hand move between two 
points at different speeds (‘fast’ or ‘slow’), participants could distinguish between the speeds 
of the movements and produce an imitation attempt that was scaled to the respective model 
(Wild et al., 2010). Using TMS to examine the links between perception and action, it was 
shown that sensorimotor training (Bird, Brindley, Leighton, & Heyes, 2007; Heyes, et al., 
2005) could reconfigure the motor system after periods of compatible and incompatible 
training prior to executing index- and little-finger movements (Catmur et al., 2007). 
Incompatible training (e.g. observing a little finger movement while executing an index-finger 
movement) resulted in a countermirror effect, where MEPs were greater in the little-finger 
when observing the index-finger, and vice versa. These findings show that even though the 
peripheral motor system is not task-specifically engaged during observation (e.g., a limb is at 
rest), a sensorimotor representation of the action is developed by engaging a common-coding 
system linking perception and action (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Jeannerod, 1994; Prinz, 1997).  
Direct activation of the sensorimotor system during the observation of actions is said 
to be underpinned by processes preferentially tuned to biological motion (Press, 2011). As 
well as facilitating socio-cognitive functioning during interactions between people (Cook, 
Blakemore, & Press, 2013; Press, Cook, Blakemore, & Kilner, 2011), biological tuning is 
important for the acquisition of novel motor actions during observational practice (Bird & 
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Heyes, 2005). Biological tuning has been confirmed across numerous behavioural studies 
where participants observe different model stimuli that depict typical or atypical human 
biological kinematics (Hayes, Dutoy, Elliott, Gowen, & Bennett, 2016; Hayes, Elliott, & 
Bennett, 2010; Hayes, Roberts, Elliott, & Bennett, 2014; Hayes, Timmis, & Bennett, 2009; 
Roberts, Bennett, Elliott, & Hayes, 2015). Typical kinematics had a movement profile where 
peak velocity occurred at approximately 50% of the trajectory, which is consistent with goal-
directed upper-limb aiming movements (Elliott et al., 2010). Atypical kinematics were novel, 
and displayed peaks occurring at 18% (Hayes et al., 2016) or 77% (Hayes et al., 2014) of the 
movement trajectory. From a theoretical perspective, the presentation of atypical kinematics 
was fundamental for understanding the contribution of low-level visuomotor processes during 
imitation learning. For example, if a model is presented that has typical kinematics it cannot 
be ruled out that imitation is based on recognising the movement speed, as opposed to 
representing the underlying biological motion kinematics. In this case, the feedforward 
contribution to motor execution would have been associated with rescaling a pre-existing 
motor representation of a familiar and meaningful movement based on higher-order semantic 
processes (Rumiati et al., 2005). Whereas, imitation of atypical kinematics cannot be solved 
by merely recruiting an existing sensorimotor representation, and therefore the sensorimotor 
system needs to be configured during imitation learning based on representing the kinematics 
within a mechanism that activates sensorimotor processes. 
While an acceptable conclusion, it is relevant that these protocols did not control for 
the influence of SRC (Heyes et al., 2005). Therefore, it remains a possibility that the spatial 
position of peak velocity could have been represented through interpretation of the observed 
visuomotor situation (Hommel & Lippa, 1995). To better isolate processing of biological 
motion to sensorimotor processes, S-R compatibility can be controlled by arranging the 
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stimulus and response in an orthogonal (e.g., stimulus hand vertical; responding hand 
horizontal) orientation (Bertenthal, Longo & Kosobud, 2006; Catmur & Heyes, 2011; Heyes 
et al., 2005; Press, Bird, Walsh, & Heyes, 2008). Indeed, during automatic imitation, which 
recruits similar sensorimotor processes as imitation learning (Heyes, 2011), motor responses 
are facilitated in compatible compared to incompatible trials, thus confirming direct activation 
of motor representations during action-observation. 
Based on the aforementioned methodology, the present chapter investigated S-R 
compatibility on the reproduction of atypical biological kinematics during imitation learning. 
Participants observed a model (a single dot) with the intention to reproduce the movement as 
accurately as possible. During the imitation phase, the model was always imitated moving in 
a left to right direction on a monitor. During the observation phase, spatially compatible and 
incompatible trials were randomly interspersed and required observation of the model from 
one of four origins of movement. In the compatible trials, observation was also in a left to 
right direction, whereas incompatible trials were observed in a right to left, top to bottom or 
bottom to top direction. This controlled for both spatially incompatible direction and plane of 
movement during imitation trials. If the reproduction of atypical biological kinematics is 
underpinned by direct activation of sensorimotor processes, it is expected that imitation 
accuracy will be comparable in the spatially incompatible as compatible trials (Catmur et al., 
2007; Heyes, 2011). If, however, reproduction is mediated by S-R compatibility associated 
with spatial orientation, the compatible trials should be more accurate than the incompatible 
trials (Brass et al., 2000; Sturmer et al., 2000). 
 49
2.3. Methods  
2.3.1. Volunteers  
Twenty participants (aged between 18 and 21 years) volunteered for the study. All 
participants were right-hand dominant, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave 
written informed consent. The experiment was designed in accordance with the 1964 
Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the research ethics committee of the host University. 
 
2.3.2. Apparatus and Stimuli 
Participants sat facing a 21-inch CRT monitor (Iiyama Vision Master 505) operating 
with a resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels and a refresh rate of 85 Hz, located on a table at a 
viewing distance of 555 mm. The monitor was connected to a PC (HP Compaq 8000 Elite), 
which also recorded input of a hand-held stylus on a graphics tablet (Wacom Intuos Pro XL), 
which displayed a 1:1 ratio between the tablet and screen to reduce any potential learning 
effects required to complete the imitation task. This ratio was consistent throughout all 
experiments contained within the current thesis. Experimental stimuli were generated using 
COGENT toolbox (developed by John Romaya at the Laboratory of Neurobiology at the 
Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience) and implemented by MATLAB 
(Mathworks Inc.).  
 Two non-human agent models were created by a human volunteer performing typical 
and atypical horizontal movements using a hand-held stylus on a graphics tablet (Figure 
2.1A). The stylus movement was represented as a white-dot (diameter = 6 mm) on the 
computer monitor, and traversed from the left-hand start-position (red-dot, diameter = 12 mm) 
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to the right-hand end-position located at an amplitude of 200 mm. The total movement 
duration was exactly 1700 ms. For both models, raw position data were first filtered using a 
low pass 4th order autoregressive filter with an 8 Hz cut-off. Data were then differentiated 
using a three-point central difference algorithm to obtain velocity. The typical model reflected 
an exemplar trial, and thus displayed a typical (Elliott et al., 2010; Flash & Hogan, 1985) bell-
shaped velocity profile (dashed trace in Figure 2.1C) with a peak velocity of 0.2 mm/ms that 
occurred at 44% of the movement duration. For the atypical model (black trace in Figure 
2.1C), peak velocity was 0.41 mm/ms and occurred at 18% of the movement duration. Peak 
velocity and percentage-time-to-peak-velocity were selected as the kinematic dependent 
variables as they had been used in previous research that had reached publication (Hayes et 
al., 2014) and were therefore considered appropriate kinematic markers within the literature. 
Further, as peak velocity and percentage-time-to-peak-velocity were the discrete kinematic 
markers used to define the model stimuli, it followed that they were also the kinematic markers 
used to determine imitation accuracy.  
The method of using a human volunteer to generate both models was important 
because it ensured the kinematics were biological and reproducible by participants (Hayes et 
al., 2016). This did result in movement deviation in the x and y axes, however the latter was 
minimal (i.e., perpendicular deviation). In addition to conforming with kinematic parameters 
suggested by previous literature, the typical and atypical biological motion models were also examined 
through rigorous pilot testing. Although several models were compared, the atypical and typical 
models used in the current chapter, and indeed much of the thesis, were most frequently identified as 
being human movements that presented discernibly different kinematic structures when viewed by 
novice observers. Comprehensive pilot testing of the models and inclusion of a familiarisation phase 
prior to testing alleviated a requirement to post-experimentally debrief participants on their perception 
of the stimuli or requirements of the task. 
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Figure 2.1. (A) A schematic representation of the experimental trials. The black outlined 
rectangle represents a graphics tablet. The white circle displayed on the CRT monitor 
represents the model. The single-segment movement is depicted by the arrow (i.e., from the 
A 
C 
Direction of Stimulus During Observation 
B 
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start-position to the end-position). (B) The directions of the model stimuli during observation, 
originating from the white circle. (C) Displacement time-series displaying typical (dashed 
trace) and atypical (black trace) velocity models. 
 
2.3.3. Procedure 
The experiment consisted of familiarisation and experimental phases. In the 
familiarisation phase, participants performed 6 trials with the intention of understanding the 
imitation protocol. The 6 familiarisation trials had an observation and imitation phase, as in 
the experimental phase, and consisted of observing a constant velocity model, which displayed 
the exact movement duration and amplitude of the experimental models, but with a constant 
velocity in the horizontal x axis of 0.120 mm/ms. Observing the constant velocity model 
ensured construct validity by preventing participants experiencing biological motion before 
the imitation trials, although no specific information was provided regarding the nature of 
model, nor was feedback regarding imitation performance provided. Following an 
observation, participants were instructed to imitate the model as accurately as possible by 
using the stylus on the tablet. The familiarisation phase allowed participants to understand the 
spatiotemporal relationship between the stylus movement on the graphics tablet and cursor 
movement on the screen, and quantified base-line motor behaviour associated with performing 
typical goal-directed movements. 
The experimental phase consisted of 80 trials that comprised 10 blocks of 8 trials. A 
block contained 4 typical and 4 atypical biological kinematic models wherein each of the 4 
trials had a different point of origin during observation (left to right; right to left; top to bottom; 
bottom to top; see Figure 2.1B). Every imitation was from left to right, so each block had 1 
spatially compatible atypical and typical trial and 3 spatially incompatible atypical and typical 
trials. Trial order within a block, as well as block order, was randomised across volunteers. 
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The randomised structure reduced predictability of an upcoming models and promoted 
imitation on a trial-by-trial basis. This research design was like previous research examining 
biological motion coding that had reached publication (Hayes et al., 2009; 2014) and thus, 
was accepted as a balanced and thorough way in which to design the experimental protocol.  
 
2.3.4. Data Reduction 
To quantify imitation of movement kinematics, analysis focused on x-axis data. 
Position data of the start and end of the movement was identified in each imitation trial. The 
start was identified when the cursor was moved beyond the perimeter of the home-position, 
while the end was identified when the participant clicked the lower-button on the stylus. From 
this identification process, the position data was filtered using a low pass 4th order 
autoregressive filter with an 8 Hz cut-off. The filtered data were then differentiated using a 3-
point central difference algorithm to obtain velocity. A MATLAB routine extracted the 
movement and displayed the velocity curve for each trial. Using a mouse, an experimenter 
manually selected the start, peak, and end of the movement on the velocity curve. While the 
clicking of the lower-button during the imitation trial indicated a general point at which the 
participant considered their imitation trial to be complete, manual picking of the data ensured 
a consistent end-point based on minimum velocity thresholds, where the MATLAB routine 
integrated the velocity curve to identify the start of the movement when velocity was > 0.003 
mm/ms, and the end when velocity was < 0.003 mm/ms. Peak velocity and percentage-time-
to-peak-velocity from each trial was quantified, with percentage-time-to-peak-velocity 
calculated as (time to peak velocity / movement time) x 100. Intra-participant means were 
calculated from 10 trials associated with each model and origin of movement (e.g., 10 trials 
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for the atypical model in the left-to-right origin). These kinematic dependent variables were 
chosen as they provide discrete measures that accurately reflect whether participants imitate 
the magnitude and timing characteristics of the observed biological motion kinematics (Hayes 
et al., 2014; 2016; Andrew et al., 2016). 
 
2.3.5. Data Analysis 
Intra-participant mean data were submitted to separate 2 Model (atypical; typical) x 4 
Origin (left-to-right; right-to-left; top-to-bottom; bottom-to-top) repeated measures ANOVA. 
Significant main and/or interactions effects involving more than two means were analysed 
using Tukey HSD post-hoc procedure and alpha was set at p < 0.05.  
 
2.4. Results 
 
2.4.1. Peak Velocity 
A main effect of model [F(1, 19) = 39.241, p < 0.001] for peak velocity indicated that 
magnitude was significantly higher when imitating atypical (M = 0.280 mm/ms; SD = 0.079 
mm/ms) compared to typical (M = 0.192 mm/ms; SD = 0.033 mm/ms) biological kinematics. 
As seen in Figure 2.2A, the ANOVA did not reveal a main effect of origin [F(3, 57) = 1.707, 
p = 0.176] or a model x origin interaction [F(3, 57) = 1.800, p = 0.157].] 
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Figure 2.2. (A) Peak velocity of imitation across all four origins of movement (error bars 
represent standard error of the mean) presented as a function of model. Dashed line represents 
the model. (B) Percentage-time-to-peak-velocity of imitation across all four origins of 
movement (error bars represent standard error of the mean) presented as a function of model. 
Dashed line represents the model. 
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2.4.2. Percentage-Time-To-Peak-Velocity 
A main effect of model [F(1, 19) = 46.639, p < 0.001] for percentage-time-to-peak-
velocity indicated that peak velocity occurred significantly earlier when imitating the atypical 
(M = 32 %; SD = 11%) compared to typical (M = 45 %; SD = 8%) biological kinematics 
(Figure 2.2B). The ANOVA did not reveal a main effect of origin [F(3, 57) = 1.161, p = 0.332] 
or a model x origin interaction [F(3, 57) = 0.893, p = 0.450].  
 
These effects can be seen in the exemplar velocity traces illustrated in Figure 2.3. 
When imitating the atypical biological kinematics, peak velocity occurred earlier in the 
movement across all origins (Figure 2.3A). When imitating the typical biological kinematics, 
peak velocity occurred toward the midpoint of the movement for all origins (Figure 2.3B). 
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Figure 2.3. (A) Exemplar velocity traces for imitation of the atypical model during compatible 
(black trace) and incompatible (light-grey, light-grey dashed, and black dashed traces) trials, 
as well as the model (red trace). (B) Exemplar velocity traces for imitation of the typical model 
during compatible (black trace) and incompatible (light-grey, light-grey dashed, and black 
dashed traces) trials, as well as the model (red trace).  
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2.5. Discussion 
 
 The present chapter investigated the influence of S-R compatibility on the 
reproduction of atypical biological kinematics during imitation learning. Results showed that 
percentage-time-to-peak-velocity occurred earlier in the movement trajectory, and was scaled 
to the model, during imitation of the atypical, compared with the typical model. Similarly, the 
magnitude of peak velocity was greater during imitation of the atypical, compared with the 
typical model. Following observation of the typical model, peak velocity occurred towards 
the midpoint of the trajectory and reflected the constraints of the task, as well as a pre-existing 
motor repertoire. In addition to the imitation of atypical biological motion kinematics, results 
showed both atypical and typical biological motion kinematics were imitated with a similar 
degree of accuracy during spatially compatible and incompatible trials. 
These findings support previous work (Hayes et al., 2016) that showed atypical 
kinematics are represented during imitation learning. As before, it is suggested that this occurs 
within a mechanism that activates sensorimotor processes. However, to control the influence 
of S-R compatibility (Hommel & Lippa, 1995), the observation and imitation trials were 
spatially decoupled in both the direction (left to right and right to left) and plane (top to bottom 
and bottom to top) of the imitated movements. The fact that incompatible trials showed 
reproduction of the atypical kinematics when physically executing the movement in the 
opposite (left to right) or orthogonal (top to bottom, bottom to top) direction, strengthens the 
suggestion that sensorimotor adaptation occurs via lower-level processes linking visual and 
motor representations (Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2007; Catmur & Heyes, 2011). For example, 
there is a possibility that participants represented a kinematic landmark during observation, 
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such as the position that peak velocity occurs (e.g., spatial position relative to the monitor 
frame), however this is a less likely explanation that would require a spatial translation to 
reproduce an accurate atypical trajectory in an incompatible reproduction of the stimulus.  
In addition to low-level sensorimotor processes underlying the adaptation effects, 
other higher-order processes may have been involved. Specifically, visual attention and 
intention could have modulated the lower-level processing of the atypical kinematics 
following the instructions given to participants to observe the model with the intention to 
execute a movement during imitation that was as accurate to the observed stimulus as possible 
(Hayes et al., 2014; 2016). Also, having perceived the atypical model had an explicit 
acceleration profile that differed from the typical model that was observed, and/or their own 
pre-existing sensorimotor repertoire, it follows that during the experimental phase inductive 
processes could have influenced the developing sensorimotor representation (Burke, Tobler, 
Baddeley, & Schultz, 2010; Turnham, Braun, & Wolpert, 2011). However, the randomised 
trial order would have minimised the frequency of repeated stimuli and thus the opportunity 
to directly compare lower-level sensorimotor representation through repeated trials 
(Tenenbaum, Griffiths, & Kemp, 2006; Turnham, et al., 2011). Therefore, in line with 
automatic imitation research (Catmur & Heyes, 2011; Cook & Bird, 2011; Grezes et al., 2003) 
the imitation of atypical biological motion is more likely to reflect the sensorimotor 
representation of atypical biological motion resonating with the motor system such that a 
correlated motor response is generated. 
The coding of atypical biological motion through lower-level sensorimotor processes 
supports previous research that has suggested that biological motion kinematics are processed 
in the parietal and frontal regions of the perception-action system (Casile et al., 2010; Dayan 
et al., 2007; Higuchi et al., 2012; Press, Catmur, Cook, Widmann, Heyes & Bird, 2012). In 
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addition to confirming perception-action system activity, parietal and frontal neural activation 
during lower-level biological motion coding corroborates the EP-M model of imitation 
(Hamilton, 2008). Within the EP-M model, the M-route suggests that the STS generates a 
visual description of the observed stimulus, which is coded in IFG based on the kinematic 
properties and directly mapped as a motor representation containing the underlying kinematic 
features for subsequent imitation. This direct transformation of visual description to motor 
representation corroborates the ASL theory (Heyes & Ray, 2000), which suggests vertical 
associations are made between the sensory and motor representations that are strengthened 
through correlated sensorimotor experience of the stimuli. The direct association between the 
visual and motor representations formed through lower-level processing suggest the imitation 
of atypical biological motion is likely to be a result of reproducing the underlying kinematics, 
rather than the spatial properties of the movement (Iacoboni et al., 1999; Buccino et al., 2004).  
To conclude, the present chapter confirmed that atypical biological kinematics 
associated with an observed novel action are represented and reproduced during imitation 
learning. Although this effect has been shown previously (Hayes et al., 2014; Hayes et al., 
2016; Andrew, et al 2016), the current data extends theoretical knowledge of the processes 
underlying imitation learning by implementing a methodology that controls movement 
direction of a model during action-observation and imitation, and thus spatial compatibility. 
This method better isolates the representation of atypical kinematics to sensorimotor processes 
rather than spatial encoding. Moreover, by using discrete kinematic markers to both define 
the models and measure imitation accuracy, these data represent the most accurate 
measurement of biological motion coding during imitation learning in the current literature. 
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Chapter 3: Atypical Biological Motion Kinematics are Represented by Complimentary 
Lower-level and Top-down Processes During Imitation Learning 
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3.1. Abstract 
 
Learning a novel movement requires a new set of kinematics to be represented by the 
sensorimotor system. This is often accomplished through imitation learning where lower-level 
sensorimotor processes are suggested to represent the biological motion kinematics associated 
with an observed movement. Top-down factors have the potential to influence this process 
based on the social context, attention and salience, and the goal of the movement. In order to 
further examine the potential interaction between lower-level and top-down processes in 
imitation learning, the aim of this study was to systematically control the mediating effects 
during an imitation of biological motion protocol. In this protocol, a non-human agent model 
that displayed different novel atypical biological motion kinematics, as well as a control model 
that displayed constant velocity. Importantly the three models had the same movement 
amplitude and movement time. Also, the motion kinematics were displayed in the presence, 
or absence, of end-state-targets. Kinematic analyses showed atypical biological motion 
kinematics were imitated, and that this performance was different from the constant velocity 
control condition. Although the imitation of atypical biological motion kinematics was not 
modulated by the end-state-targets, movement time was more accurate in the absence, 
compared to the presence, of an end-state-target. The fact that end-state-targets modulated 
movement time accuracy, but not biological motion kinematics, indicates imitation learning 
involves top-down attentional, and lower-level sensorimotor systems, which operate as 
complementary processes mediated by the environmental context.  
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3.2. Introduction 
 
Imitation is a powerful mechanism that supports human interaction. In familiar social 
settings, imitation involves the automatic activation of a motor response triggered by 
observing a similar motor action (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Heyes, 2001, 2011; Heyes et al., 
2005). For example, individuals execute faster pre-specified movements (e.g., finger tapping) 
when observing biologically compatible (finger tapping), compared to incompatible (finger 
lifting), movements (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000). 
The shorter motor reaction times occur independent of task instructions, which suggests 
involvement of automatic sensorimotor processes linking perception and action (Brass & 
Heyes, 2005; Prinz, 1997). 
To understand if the automatic sensorimotor effects are developed through experience, 
and linked to a general mechanism incorporating processes associated with perception, action 
and attention (Leighton, Bird, Orsini & Heyes, 2010), studies have examined automatic 
imitation following correlated sensorimotor training (Bird, Brindley, Leighton, & Heyes, 
2007; Catmur, Mars, Rushworth, & Heyes, 2011; Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2007, 2009; 
Cavallo, Heyes, Becchio, Bird, & Catmur, 2014; Heyes, et al., 2005). For example, individuals 
performed a countermirror protocol that required compatible or incompatible sensorimotor 
training (Catmur, et al., 2007). During compatible training, individuals executed index-finger 
movements, whilst simultaneously observing index-finger movements. During incompatible 
training, individuals executed index-finger movements, whilst simultaneously observing 
little-finger movements. After incompatible training, TMS-induced MEPls recorded from the 
little finger abductor muscle were greater during observation of index-finger movement 
compared to a little-finger movement. These findings demonstrate the sensorimotor system 
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was reconfigured during correlated sensorimotor training, and thus indicate imitation is 
associated with a general mechanism involving lower-level visuomotor processes that 
represent biological motion, as opposed to a specialised mechanism that mediates (Meltzoff 
& Moore, 1977) the translation of visual information into a motor action. 
Of primary interest to the present chapter is the suggestion that similar sensorimotor 
processes operate during automatic imitation and imitation learning (Brass & Heyes, 2005; 
Buccino et al., 2004; Heyes, 2011; Iacoboni, 2009). Like the countermirror principle, imitation 
learning often requires the sensorimotor system to represent a novel biological motion across 
consecutive imitation trials. Although there is strong evidence that biological motion is 
processed during automatic imitation (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlaeger, & Prinz, 2000; 
Heyes, et al., 2005; Press & Heyes, 2008) and interpersonal observation-execution imitation 
tasks (Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003), support from imitation learning studies has 
typically been based on protocols that manipulated the speed of the imitated movement (Bisio, 
Stucchi, Jacono, Fadiga, & Pozzo, 2010; Hayes, Timmis, & Bennett, 2009; Wild, Poliakoff, 
Jerrison, & Gowen, 2010). 
Although participants have been shown to imitate different movement speeds (e.g., 
slow, medium, and fast upper-limb aiming movements), it is notable that the observed 
stimulus was representative of typical aiming movements (Wild, et al., 2010). Thus, it remains 
possible that imitation was limited to recognising differences in movement speed between 
observations, as opposed to representing the underlying biological motion kinematics. In this 
case, the feedforward contribution to motor execution could have been associated with an 
individual recruiting and rescaling a pre-existing motor representation of a familiar and 
meaningful aiming movement (Hayes, Roberts, Elliott, & Bennett, 2014; Hayes, et al., 2009). 
This would imply imitation was based on higher-order semantic processes (Rumiati, Papeo, 
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& Corradi-Dell’Acqua, 2010; Rumiati et al., 2005), as opposed to lower-level sensorimotor 
processes representing the observed biological kinematics. 
The current chapter adopted a novel protocol that enabled direct examination of 
biological motion processing during imitation learning. In addition to displaying a constant 
velocity control model, the structure of two experimental models was manipulated so that 
peak velocity in the aiming movements no longer occurred at the typical mid-point (40-60% 
of the total time) of the trajectory (Elliott, Helsen, & Chua, 2001). With such stimuli, imitation 
can be quantified according to timing and magnitude of velocity, which in combination would 
not reflect the kinematics of typical aiming movements (Hayes, et al., 2014). Following this 
logic, imitation of two different biological motion models was compared, in which 
percentage-time-to-peak-velocity occurred at 17% or 26% of the total movement time 
(henceforth atypical17 and atypical26), and thus earlier than normally expected when aiming 
to a target. By maintaining equal movement time and amplitude, magnitude of peak velocity 
also differed between the biological motion models (atypical 17 = 0.37 mm/ms; atypical 26 = 
0.24 mm/ms). These specific kinematic features were selected for atypical17 and atypical26 
based on rigorous pilot testing and conformity with the guidelines for atypical kinematics 
within current literature. Peak velocities for both models occurred earlier than the 40-60% 
associated with a typical velocity profile (Elliott et al., 2001) and importantly, were both 
identified as being different to each other and faster than the typical model used in the previous 
chapter during pilot testing.  
Finally, given that the lower-level processes that code biological motion kinematics 
are modulated by various top-down processes (Bekkering, Wohlschlaeger, & Gattis, 2000; 
Heyes & Bird, 2007; Leighton, et al., 2010; Rumiati, et al., 2005; Southgate & Hamilton, 
2008; Wang & Hamilton, 2012), motion stimuli was displayed as a non-human agent (a white 
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dot) to control social context, and in the presence or absence of end-state-targets. The latter 
manipulation is important because previous work (Hayes et al., 2007; Wild, et al., 2010) has 
shown that the imitation of biological motion is attenuated in the presence of an end-state-
target. In this context, the end-target provides a salient task-relevant (Leighton, et al., 2010) 
environmental visual cue that modulates attention so that this feature (target attainment) is 
prioritized and represented during imitation. The removal of end-state-targets in half of the 
present experimental trials generated a protocol that examined biological motion kinematics 
during true imitation (Cook & Bird, 2012; Vivanti & Hamilton, 2014). 
With behaviourally realisable but atypical biological motion (i.e., atypical17; 
atypical26), represented as a non-human agent, it was expected that participants would imitate 
in accord with the observed biological kinematics (Hayes, et al., 2014) and thus produce 
movements scaled to both timing and magnitude of peak velocity. Because of the constraints 
on human movement imposed by the neuro-muscular system (Abend, Bizzi, & Morasso, 
1982), participants were not expected to move with constant velocity having observed the 
constant velocity stimulus, or to execute a kinematic profile that resembled the atypical motion 
kinematics. Rather, it was anticipated that participants would recruit a pre-existing motor 
response and thus exhibit time of peak velocity that was similar to typical aiming movements. 
Finally, it was anticipated that imitation of atypical biological motion would be more accurate 
in the absence, compared to presence, of end-state-targets. In the absence of end-state-targets, 
there should be minimal contribution from top-down attentional processes, thus encouraging 
participants to focus on representing the characteristics of lower-level visual stimuli during 
imitation learning. 
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3.3. Methods 
 
3.3.1. Volunteers 
Data were recorded from twenty participants (aged range 18 - 21 years) who 
volunteered for the study. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave 
written informed consent. The experiment was designed in accordance with the Declaration 
of Helsinki and was approved by the ethics committee of the host University. 
 
3.3.2 Apparatus and Procedures 
The apparatus consisted of a PC (Dell Optiplex GX280), a 21-in CRT computer 
monitor (IIyama Vision Master 505), and a graphics tablet with a hand-held stylus (WACOM 
Intuos 3). The CRT monitor operated with a spatial resolution of 1280 x 1024, and a refresh 
rate of 85 Hz. Visual stimuli were generated via MATLAB (The Mathworks, Inc), using 
Cogent 2000 toolbox (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php). Importantly, the apparatus used in 
the current chapter had the same setup as that used in the previous chapter and were consistent 
throughout the thesis. 
Participants were required to observe and imitate the movement of a model (a white 
cursor, diameter = 8mm) presented on the 21-inch CRT monitor. The model displayed a single 
horizontal trajectory that originated from a home-target positioned on the left-hand side of the 
screen. The amplitude of the movement was 200 mm, with a movement time of 1700 ms, and 
ended on the right-hand side of the monitor. For the end-state-target condition, two red circles 
representing home-target and the end-state-target (diameter = 16 mm) were positioned at 
centre-left (home) and centre-right (end-state) of the monitor (Figure 3.1A). To examine 
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imitation of biological motion, three models were created: atypical (atypical17; atypical26) or 
constant velocity (Figure 3.2). The atypical models displayed a velocity profile that was 
positively skewed so that peak occurred at 17% or 26% of movement time, and with a 
magnitude of 0.37 mm/ms and 0.24 mm/ms, respectively. The models were created by a 
human volunteer who practiced the two atypical goal-directed aiming movements using a 
hand-held stylus on a graphics tablet until a white cursor, which represented the stylus, moved 
from a left-hand home-target to a right-hand end-state-target in a movement time of 1700 ms. 
The displacement time-series data recorded from a successful practice trial for each model 
was selected to create the models. The method of using a human to generate the models was 
critical because it ensured the kinematics of the movement was biological in origin, and thus 
the movement was achievable. The model displaying constant velocity was created according 
to the amplitude (200 mm) and time (1700 ms) constraints associated with the task. The model 
displayed the exact movement time, but with a constant velocity trajectory that had no 
deviations in the perpendicular axis. 
Prior to the experimental trials, all participants completed a familiarization period that 
replicated the conditions of the imitation task. Participants sat on a chair in front of a CRT 
monitor and held the stylus in their preferred hand. The participants performed four 
familiarization trials; 2 trials representing the end-state-target condition (see Figure 3.1A) 
performed in the imitation task, and 2 trials representing the no-end-state-target condition (see 
Figure 3.1B) performed in the imitation task. Participants were instructed to passively observe 
the model stimuli during the observation phase, with the intention of reproducing the model 
as accurately as possible during the imitation trials. These specific instructions were given to 
provide as little information about the nature of the task and kinematic structures of the models 
as possible, thus allowing for the most natural imitation of the respective models. Each trial 
 69
commenced with the model being positioned in the centre of the home-target. The participants 
observed the model display a movement from the home-target to an end-target (end-state-
target condition), or end space (no-end-state-target condition), with a constant velocity 
trajectory and a movement time of 1700 ms. A constant velocity trajectory was used to ensure 
construct validity by preventing participants from experiencing biological motion before the 
imitation trials. Participants were not informed about the agency of the model or duration of 
the movement time. Following observation of the model, participants moved the cursor from 
the centre of the monitor to the centre of the home-target, and clicked the lower-button on the 
stylus. In an end-state-target condition, the two targets remained on the screen as the 
participant imitated the model. In a no-end-state-target condition, the two targets were 
removed before a participant imitated the model. To finish imitation, participants clicked the 
lower-button on the stylus a second time once the cursor was located in the end-state-target, 
or end-space in the no-end-state-target condition. After familiarization, all participants 
confirmed they understood the model, the end-state-target and no-end-state-target conditions, 
the instruction to imitate, and the sensorimotor association between the stylus on a graphics 
tablet, and the corresponding movement of cursor on the monitor.  
 The imitation task comprised 14 blocks of 6 trials (84 trials). A block contained each 
of the 6 combinations of target (end-state-target, no-end-state-target) and velocity model 
(atypical17, atypical26, constant) presented in random order. A trial commenced with an 
observation phase where the home-target (red) was displayed on the monitor for 1000 ms, 
before disappearing for 1000 ms, and being replaced by a model positioned in the same 
location. Depending on the trial type, the model moved to an end-state-target (Figure 3.1A) 
or end-space in the no-end-state-target (Figure 3.1B) condition, with one of three velocity 
models. After observing the model, participants imitated the movement as per the instructions 
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given in the familiarization period. This experimental design ensured consistency between 
experimental chapters within the current thesis by equally distributing trial types and 
containing a total number of trials that produced sufficient exposure to each condition, as 
consistent with previously published research (Hayes et al., 2009; 2014).  
 
3.3.3. Statistical Analysis 
To quantify imitation performance, and imitation of atypical biological motion, 
movement kinematics exhibited by the participants were extracted on each trial. The start of 
movement was defined as the time the centre of the cursor moved beyond the perimeter of the 
home-target, and the end was calculated when the participant clicked the lower-button on the 
stylus. For each imitation attempt, the 2-dimensional displacement data were filtered using a 
low-pass (8 Hz) autoregressive filter. These data were differentiated using a central difference 
algorithm to obtain velocity. A MATLAB routine extracted the primary movement occurring 
in the x-axis and identified the following dependent variables: movement time, peak velocity, 
and percentage-time-to-peak-velocity. The two velocity variables were chosen for analysis 
because they most reflected the difference between the two atypical biological motion models. 
Intra-participant means from the 14 trials per condition were calculated for each dependent 
variable and submitted to separate Model (atypical17; atypical26; constant velocity) x Target 
(end-state-target; no-end-state-target) repeated measures ANOVAs. Alpha was set at p < 0.05 
and follow-up testing used the Tukey post-hoc procedure. 
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Figure 3.1. A visual representation depicting a single trial in the end-state-target-condition 
(A) and no-end-state-target condition (B). The apparatus outlined in Panel A and B is a CRT 
monitor and a graphics tablet. The trial timeline arrows at the bottom of the figure indicate the 
Observation Phase and Imitation Phase. During the Observation Phase, the non-human agent 
model is positioned in the left-hand home target (A) and left-hand space (B). The model 
(atypical17 or atypical26 or constant velocity) displays a horizontal movement of 200 mm 
from the left-hand home target to an end-state-target (A) or end-space in the no-end-state-
target-condition. The model has a movement time of 1700 ms. The Imitation Phase 
commences with the white cursor positioned in left-hand home target (A) or left-hand space 
(B). A participant imitates the observed model by controlling a stylus on the graphics tablet.  
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Figure 3.2. The velocity profiles for atypical17 model (light grey trace; peak), atypical26 
model (dark grey trace), and constant velocity control model (black trace).  
 
3.4. Results 
 
3.4.1. Movement Time 
As illustrated in Figure 3.3, the presence of an end-state-target [F(1, 19) = 36.61, p < 
0.05] modulated movement time, with significantly shorter and more accurate movement 
times imitated in the absence (M = 2156 ms; SD = 387 ms), compared to the presence (M = 
2294 ms; SD = 386 ms), of an end-state-target. Although there was no significant difference 
in movement times when imitating the atypical17 (M = 2121 ms; SD = 382 ms) and atypical26 
(M = 2191 ms; SD = 379 ms) models, the main effect [F(2, 38)  = 17.90, p < 0.05] indicated 
these two movement times were significantly shorter (ps < 0.05) and more accurate than 
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imitating the constant velocity (M = 2362 ms; SD = 399 ms) model. The interaction 
concerning model and target [F(2, 38)  = 3.51, p < 0.05] indicated that significantly shorter 
and more accurate movement times were performed in the no-end-state-target compared to 
the end-state-target condition (ps < 0.05) when viewing atypical17 and atypical26 models. 
This effect was not significant when imitating constant velocity. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Mean movement time data (ms) as a function of model (atypical17, atypical26 
and constant velocity) and target condition (light grey = end-state-target; dark grey bar = no-
end-state-target). The criterion model data for atypical17 and atypical26 is represented in the 
black bars. Error bars (±) display the standard error mean. 
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3.4.2. Peak Velocity 
An effect of model [F(2, 38)  = 59.56, p < 0.05] indicated the magnitude of peak 
velocity was significantly greater when imitating the atypical model (M = 0.24 mm/ms; SD = 
0.048 mm/ms) compared to the atypical26 (M = 0.19 mm/ms; SD = 0.036 mm/ms) and 
constant velocity (M = 0.15 mm/ms; SD = 0.027 mm/ms) models. Moreover, the magnitude 
of peak velocity was significantly (p < 0.05) greater when imitating the atypical26 compared 
to the constant velocity model. As illustrated in left-hand and centre portions of Figure 3.4, 
the magnitude of peak velocity executed by the participants in the atypical17 and atypical26 
conditions (grey bars) was scaled (i.e., more similar) to peak velocity displayed by the model 
(black bar). However, peak velocity was not modulated by the presence or absence of an end-
state-target [F(1, 19) = 1.48, p > 0.05], irrespective of how it was combined with the model 
stimulus [F(2, 38)  = 1.54, p > 0.05]. 
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Figure 3.4. Mean peak velocity data (mm/ms) as a function of model and target condition. 
The target conditions are displayed in the light grey bar (end-state-target) and dark grey bar 
(no-end-state-target). The criterion model data for atypical17 and atypical26 is represented in 
the black bars. Error bars (±) display the standard error mean. 
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3.4.3. Percentage-Time-to-Peak-Velocity 
An effect of model [F(2, 38) = 68.99, p < 0.05] indicated peak velocity occurred 
significantly earlier in the movement when imitating the atypical17 model (M = 22%; SD = 
6%) compared to both the atypical26 (M = 29%; SD = 8%) and constant velocity (M = 38%; 
7%) models (ps < 0.05). As illustrated in Figure 3.5, the grey bars indicate the temporal 
occurrence of peak velocity in the atypical17 and atypical26 conditions was scaled to peak 
velocity displayed by the model (black bar). This effect can also be seen from an exemplar 
velocity trace in Figure 3.6. When imitating the atypical17 (light grey trace) model, peak 
velocity occurred significantly earlier in the movement than the atypical26 (dark grey trace) 
model. When imitating the constant velocity model, peak velocity occurred toward the 
midpoint of the movement (black trace). Although there was no main effect for target [F(1, 
19) = 1.58, p > 0.05], there was an interaction concerning model and target [F(2, 38)  = 11.40, 
p < 0.05]. Percentage-time-to-peak-velocity occurred earlier in the movement in the end-state-
target condition compared to the no-end-state-target condition when imitating the atypical17 
and atypical26 models (ps < 0.05). This effect was reversed when imitating constant velocity 
model.  
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Figure 3.5. Mean percentage-time-to-peak-velocity (%) as a function of model and target 
condition. The target conditions are displayed in the light grey bar (end-state-target) and dark 
grey bar (no-end-state-target). The criterion model data for atypical17 and atypical26 is 
represented in the black bars. Error bars (±) display the standard error mean. 
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Figure 3.6. Exemplar imitation data of atypical (light grey trace), typical (dark grey trace) and 
constant (black trace) velocity models, showing peak velocity (mm/ms) and the relative time 
it occurred (percentage-time-to-peak-velocity) during imitation.  
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3.5. Discussion 
 
The present chapter examined the representation of biological motion kinematics 
during imitation learning using a novel protocol that systematically manipulated the structure 
of a model’s kinematic profile. The percentage-time-to-peak-velocity data supported the 
expectations by indicating peak velocity occurred significantly earlier in the movement after 
imitating both the atypical17 and atypical26 models. Moreover, while movement time was 
similar in these conditions, the magnitude of peak velocity also differed in accord with the 
atypical biological motion models. Imitation of both atypical17 and atypical26 models was 
confirmed by the data showing participant exhibited peak velocity significantly later in the 
movement in the constant velocity control condition. Specifically, percentage-of-time-to-
peak-velocity occurred closer to the mid-point of the trajectory (38%; see exemplar data 
displayed in Figure 3.6), which is consistent with what would be expected if participants had 
imitated a model displaying a typical biological motion profile (Hayes, et al., 2014; Hayes, et 
al., 2009). Because participants were unable to directly match the constant velocity stimulus 
due to the anatomical and physiological constraints of the human-motor system (Abend et al. 
1982), imitation in the control condition most likely occurred by forming a representation 
based on the internal (pre-existing motor priors) and external (amplitude and speed of 
movement) constraints of the task (Elliott, et al., 2001; Roberts, Bennett, Elliott, & Hayes, 
2012). 
As expected, the findings also showed that imitation learning was modulated by the 
presence or absence of end-state-targets. Having observed the two atypical biological models 
in the absence of end-state-targets, participants exhibited shorter movement times, which were 
more accurate (M = 2156 ms) compared to when end-state-targets were present (M = 2294 
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ms). As suggested previously (Wild, et al., 2010), this effect was unlikely to be associated 
with differences in movement amplitude, which was 6 mm shorter when end-state-targets 
were absent1. Neither was it a function of greater average acceleration, which was less in the 
absence of end-state-targets (i.e., similar peak velocity but achieved later). Although not 
measured in the present experiment, an explanation for the less accurate imitation of 
movement time in the presence of end-state-targets is that participants paid more attention 
(Leighton, et al., 2010) to target attainment and thus were more goal-directed during 
movement execution. As a consequence, it is likely they focused more on aiming to position 
the cursor in the end-target, which resulted in proportionately more time after peak velocity 
in the deceleration phase (Elliott, Hansen, Mendoza, & Tremblay, 2004). 
The nature of this top-down attentional effect is important from a theoretical position 
because the decrease in movement time accuracy when end-state-targets were present did not 
lead to a concomitant decrease in the imitation of atypical biological motion kinematics. This 
is consistent with the suggestion that during imitation both lower-level sensorimotor and top-
down attentional processes operate in a complementary (Buxbaum & Kalénine, 2010; 
Footnote 
1Additional analyses were conducted to determine if movement time was correlated with 
movement amplitude. Separate within-participant correlations were run on these two 
dependent variables for end-state-target and no-end-state-target conditions. For each 
participant, a correlation was run on movement time and movement amplitude from 42 trials 
(i.e., 14 trials and 3 velocity models). The logic is that a positive correlation would occur if 
longer movement times were associated with longer movement amplitudes, and vice versa. 
The group mean r value for the end-state-target condition was 0.27 ± 0.27, and 0.30 ± 0.2 for 
the no-end-state-target condition. Furthermore, of the 20 participants, 9 had a significant r 
value in the end-state-target condition, and 12 had a significant r value no-end-state-target 
condition. Only 8 of the participants exhibited a significant r value in both the end-state-target 
condition and no-end-state-target condition. In addition, the mean r2 for the end-state-target 
condition was 0.14 ± 0.18 and 0.15 ± 0.14 for the no-end-state-target condition, and the 
coefficient of determination was less than 0.5 for all participants. These analyses indicate no 
clear trend across participants for a relationship between movement time and amplitude.  
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de Lange, Spronk, Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008; Heyes, 2011) manner in order to 
represent biological motion kinematics, as well as other salient factors in the environment 
(Leighton, et al., 2010).The fact that kinematics and the end-state-target context were coded 
suggests an equitable contribution of processing which is perhaps less hierarchical than 
concluded in previous work (Bekkering, et al., 2000; Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2007; 
Hayes, Hodges, Scott, Horn, & Williams, 2007; Wohlschlager, Gattis, & Bekkering, 2003). 
The more equitable contribution shown in the present chapter most likely reflected the fact 
that the to-be-imitated movement kinematics could not be solved by merely recruiting a pre-
existing motor pattern. 
To minimize the potential modulation of biological motion processing by top-down 
factors associated with goal coding (Bekkering, et al., 2000), attention/salience (Leighton, et 
al., 2010), teleological reasoning (Csibra & Gergely, 2007) and social modulation (Wang & 
Hamilton, 2012), the atypical biological models were observed as non-human agents in the 
absence of end-state-targets. The finding of temporal correspondence (Gangitano, Mottaghy, 
& Pascual-Leone, 2001) between observed (atypical17; atypical26) and imitated movement 
kinematics is therefore consistent with biological motion being processed through lower-level 
visuomotor processes operating in the human mirror-mechanism (Brass & Heyes, 2005; 
Casile et al., 2010; Dayan et al., 2007; Press, Cook, Blakemore, & Kilner, 2011). Detection 
of biological motion is suggested to occur in a neural substrate associated with the pSTS 
(Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000), while coding the kinematic properties of an observed 
action (Hamilton, 2008; Iacoboni, 2009) is suggested to occur in the fronto-parietal mirror-
system (Di Dio et al., 2013; Press, et al., 2011). Within the fronto-parietal mirror mechanism, 
the premotor region has been associated with coding the temporal features of visual 
information through analysis of MEPs during different phases of a grasping action 
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(Gangitano, et al., 2001). Moreover, evidence that certain phases of movement are reflected 
in time-synchronized neural activation (e.g., greatest activation during display of maximal 
grip aperture), has been suggested to indicate online visual processing during observation of 
biological motion. In line with this reasoning, the data from the current chapter suggest the 
finding of temporal correspondence between the model and imitation of atypical biological 
motion was in part based on the online visual processing of such motion during each 
observation trial. Such findings of continual matching of action-execution with action-
observation is consistent with previous work on biological motion coding during 
observational practice (Hayes, et al., 2014). 
In summary, the findings in the present experiment showed atypical biological motion 
kinematics was represented during imitation learning, both in the presence and absence of 
end-state-targets. Imitation of biological motion kinematics involves top-down attentional and 
lower-level visuomotor systems, which operate as complementary processes. 
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Chapter 4: Eye movements confirm visual attention is stimulus driven during 
observation of biological motion. 
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4.1. Abstract 
 
The previous experimental chapters have demonstrated the lower-level coding of 
biological motion (Chapter Two) are influenced by top-down factors related to the goal of the 
movement, namely end-state-targets (Chapter Three). Goal-directed modulation of imitation 
is related to visual attention becoming more goal-directed during observation, resulting in less 
visual information from the observed stimulus being coded (Wild et al., 2010). In order to 
examine eye movement behaviour and strategy, the aim of this study was to record eye 
movements during observation of the model stimuli, prior to imitation of model stimuli. In 
this protocol, a modified version of that used in Chapter Three, a non-human agent model was 
used that displayed novel atypical biological motion kinematics, as well as biological and non-
biological control models that displayed typical biological motion kinematics and constant 
velocity respectively. Importantly the three models had the same movement amplitude and 
movement time. Also, the motion kinematics were displayed in the presence, or absence, of 
end-state-targets. Kinematic analyses showed atypical biological motion kinematics were 
imitated, and that this performance was different from the typical and constant velocity control 
condition. Although the imitation of atypical biological motion kinematics was not modulated 
by the end-state-targets, movement time was more accurate in the absence, compared to the 
presence, of an end-state-target. These data replicate the findings from Chapter Three. Eye 
movement analysis showed no difference in visual strategy during observation of model 
stimuli when end-state-targets were present, compared to when they were absent. Therefore, 
these data suggest that the coding of biological motion kinematics is a result of tracking the 
cursor during observation and consequently, associated with lower-level visuomotor 
processing of the visual stimuli. 
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4.2. Introduction 
 
 Imitation as a learning mechanism is complex, involving the formation and refinement 
of an internal action model that enables observed biological motion properties to be 
voluntarily reproduced by the human observer. Imitation learning requires processes that 
transform and integrate input from observing the visual stimulus, with afferent and efferent 
inputs that are generated when voluntarily activating the motor system. When the observed 
biological motion stimulus is novel, these bi-directional processes are said to operate at a 
lower-level of the CNS, whereby they directly link perception and action (Brass & Heyes, 
2005; Heyes, 2011; Iacoboni, 2005). A seminal example of the direct relationship between 
movement perception and motor execution was reported by Sturmer, Aschersleben and Prinz 
(2000), who showed response times to opening or closing the hand were shorter when cues 
were compatible with the response (e.g. open hand stimulus and open hand response) than 
incompatible (e.g. close hand stimulus and open hand response). Support for sensitivity to 
coding biological motion during observation of a stimulus was reported in a series of studies 
by Kilner and colleagues (Kilner, Paulignan & Blakemore, 2003; Kilner, Hamilton & 
Blakemore, 2007). Both human and robotic arm movements were observed while concurrently 
executing either congruent or incongruent arm movements. It was predicted that if perception 
and action shared similar neural circuitry during activation, observing an incongruent 
movement to that of the executed movement would create interference (e.g. variance from the 
stimulus). Importantly, significant interference was reported when observing human 
incongruent movement but not robotic incongruent movement, which suggests the direct link 
between perception and action is specifically related to the detection of biological motion.  
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 In addition to linking perception and action, the detection of biological motion is also 
crucial to the ability to learn through observation. Indeed, it has been reported that biological 
motion perception underpins the ability to differentiate between moving stimuli (i.e., a video 
clip of a hand moving at slow and fast speeds) and thereby accurate imitation, as evidenced 
by the participant’s movement kinematics relative to the observed model (Wild, Poliakoff, 
Jerrison & Gowen, 2010). The neural components of this process have been examined using 
TMS. When observing a human hand complete a reaching-grasping action, MEPs increased 
in amplitude relative to the amount of observed finger aperture (Gangitano, Mottaghy & 
Pascual-Leone, 2001). These findings showed that as well as linking action observation and 
action execution, underlying visuomotor processing in the mirror mechanism also took 
account of the temporal components of the observed stimuli.  
 The coding of kinematics has recently been demonstrated by examining biological 
motion coding during imitation learning (Hayes, Dutoy, Elliott, Gowen & Bennett, 2016). By 
requiring participants to imitate two slightly different atypical biological motion models (peak 
velocities that occurred at 17% and 26% respectively), the study sought to determine whether 
a general representation was formed during observation or if specific representations were 
developed that reflected the kinematic profile of each model. Imitation of the two atypical 
models was significantly different from each other and importantly, scaled to the models, thus 
demonstrating specific kinematic properties of biological motion are coded during imitation 
learning. Further, and in line with GOADI (Bekkering et al., 2000; Wohlschlager et al., 2003), 
it was predicted that imitation would be modulated by the presence of end-state-targets such 
that visual attention and motor output would become goal-directed (Wild et al., 2010). 
Consequently, when end-state-targets are present it is suggested that goal attainment becomes 
the primary feature of the action, at the expense of coding stimulus kinematics. Results showed 
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that end-state-targets modulated the accuracy of movement time, such that it was more 
accurate when end-state-targets were absent, but not the coding of biological motion 
kinematics. As the imitation of kinematics was not influenced by the presence of end-state-
targets, it was concluded that this process was a function of lower-level visuomotor 
processing. However, the goal-directed modulation of movement time suggested that top-
down attentional systems operated alongside lower-level processing, relative to the 
environmental context.  
 It has been suggested that increased imitation effects when end-state-targets are absent 
could be a function of eye movement strategies during observation (Wild et al., 2010). Due to 
the less predictable nature of a stimulus moving between undefined start and end points, it 
follows that more visual attention would be paid to the stimulus, thus leading to subtle 
differences in movement kinematics being coded through direct visuomotor mapping 
(Rumiati & Tessari, 2002). Conversely, when end-state-targets are present, it is likely that eye 
movements would become more predictive and goal-directed, resulting in a larger saccade to 
the end target and a longer goal-directed fixation (Flanagan & Johansson, 2003). The current 
chapter was designed to further examine these suggestions. The same novel protocol was used 
as in previous chapters (Chapters Two and Three) to examine biological motion coding during 
imitation learning but now with the addition of eye movement recording during the 
observation phase of the protocol. Eye movements were recorded to determine eye movement 
strategies, and thus the location of overt visual attention during observation of the stimulus. 
The observed stimuli showed either typical (percentage-time-to-peak-velocity = 44%) or 
atypical (percentage-time-to-peak-velocity = 17%) biological motion models and a constant 
velocity (non-biological motion) model. The atypical model was replicated from Chapter Two 
whereas the typical model represented a natural aiming movement with a bell-shaped velocity 
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profile (Elliott, Helsen & Chua, 2001). The constant velocity model was generated based on 
an equation accounting for time and displacement of the movement. All model stimuli were 
presented as anon-human agent (white dot) that moved either between two non-defined start 
and end locations (no-end-state-target condition) or two red targets (end-state-target 
condition). 
 As observation and imitation components of the experiment are similar to previous 
research (Andrew et al., 2016;Hayes et al., 2016), the imitation results are expected to replicate 
those findings. That is, biological motion kinematics would be imitated such that there would 
be a difference between the atypical and typical imitation behaviour, with each scaled relative 
to their respective models. Imitation with end-state-targets is expected to be less accurate than 
with no-end-state-targets. With respect to eye movements, it is expected that the cursor will 
be tracked during observation and thus eye movement velocity will closely resemble the 
velocity profiles of the respective stimuli. This pattern of eye movements would confirm that 
overt attention was directed to the observed models, thereby providing the opportunity to 
perceive and code the underlying biological kinematics.   
 
4.3. Methods 
 
4.3.1. Volunteers 
Nineteen participants (aged between 18 and 21 years) volunteered for the study. All 
participants were right-hand dominant, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave 
written informed consent. The experiment was designed in accordance with the 1964 
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Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the research ethics committee of the host University. 
 
4.3.2. Apparatus and Stimuli 
Participants sat facing a 21-inch CRT monitor (Iiyama Vision Master 505) operating 
with a resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels and a refresh rate of 85 Hz, located on a table at a 
viewing distance of approximately 890 mm. The monitor was connected to a desktop PC (Dell 
Optiplex GX280), which received input from a graphics tablet and hand-held stylus (Wacom 
Intuos Pro XL) (Figure 4.1A). Experimental stimuli were generated on the desktop PC using 
the COGENT toolbox (developed by John Romaya at the Laboratory of Neurobiology at the 
Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience) implemented in MATLAB (Mathworks 
Inc.). 
Eye movements of both groups were recorded using the EyeLink1000 (SR Research 
Ltd., Mississauga, Ontario, Canada), which sampled eye gaze locations in the horizontal and 
vertical axes at 1000 Hz. Data was stored for off-line analysis with routines written 
in MATLAB. A chin and forehead rest was used to minimise head movement, and to ensure 
that participant eyes were located 890 mm perpendicular to the centre of the computer 
monitor. At this distance, the cursor subtended a visual angle of 13°. A nine-point calibration 
and validation of gaze location accuracy occurred prior to the pre- and post-test. 
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4.3.3. Procedure 
The imitation task required participants to observe and imitate non-human agent 
models that displayed a single horizontal trajectory that originated from a home-position on 
the left side of the monitor and terminated at an end-position on the right side of the monitor 
(Figure 4.1). The movement amplitude of a model was 200 mm and total duration was 1700 
ms. To examine imitation of biological motion, two models were created that displayed typical 
or atypical velocity profiles (Hayes et al., 2015; 2016; Andrew et al., 2016). The typical model 
was created by a human volunteer and displayed a natural (Flash & Hogan, 1985; Elliott et 
al., 2010) bell-shaped velocity profile (dark grey trace in Figure 4.2) with a peak velocity of 
0.200 mm/ms that occurred at 44 % of the movement duration. The atypical model (solid-
black trace in Figure 4.2) was created by the same volunteer and displayed a novel kinematic 
trajectory, with a peak velocity of 0.410 mm/ms that occurred at 18 % of the movement 
duration. The method of using a human volunteer to generate both models was critical because 
it ensured the kinematics were biological. In addition to the biological motion models, a 
constant velocity model was used to create a non-biological control condition (light grey trace 
in Figure 4.2). This non-biological model was computer-generated and moved at a uniform 
velocity of 0.120 mm/ms across the same 200 mm amplitude and 1700 ms duration as the 
biological motion models. During trials with end-state-targets, two red circles representing 
home-target and end-state-target (diameter = 16 mm) were positioned at left (home) and right 
(end) sides of the monitor respectively. During trials with no-end-state-targets, only one red 
circle was present and represented the home position to encourage a consistent start location 
for all imitation trials. 
Prior to a familiarisation period that replicated the task requirements of the imitation 
protocol (e.g. operating the stylus, start location of each trial, controlling the cursor, ending 
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the imitation trial), participants were informed that their task was to “watch the movement of 
the dot, with the intention to then imitate it as accurately as possible”. Then, during the 6 
familiarisation trials, participants observed a non-human agent model move from the home-
position with a constant velocity to the end-position. The model displayed the exact movement 
duration and amplitude of the experimental models, but with a constant velocity in the 
horizontal x axis of 0.120 mm/ms. There were no deviations in the perpendicular y axis. Using 
this model ensured construct validity by preventing participants experiencing biological 
motion before the imitation trials. Participants were not informed about the duration of the 
movement, or the type of stimuli. After observing the model, participants imitated by moving 
the stylus on the tablet so that a cursor displayed on the monitor moved from the home-
position to the end-position as per the model. Following movement execution, there was a 
4000 ms inter-trial delay before the next trials commenced. All participants confirmed they 
understood the instructions on how to observe and imitate the trajectory of the model, and the 
sensorimotor association between the stylus on the graphics tablet and the corresponding 
movement of the cursor on the monitor. Participants then performed the imitation protocol 
that consisted of 14 blocks of 6 trials. A block contained two typical and two atypical 
biological motion trials, as well as two non-biological motion trials; of the two trials for each 
model, end-state-targets were either absent or present. Trial order within a block, as well as 
block order, was randomised across volunteers. The randomised structure reduced 
predictability of an upcoming model(s) and end-state-target presence and promoted imitation 
on a trial-by-trial basis.  
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Figure 4.1. A visual representation depicting a single trial in the end-state-target-condition 
(A) and no-end-state-target condition (B). The apparatus outlined in Panel A and B is a CRT 
monitor and a graphics tablet. The trial timeline arrows at the bottom of the figure indicate the 
Observation Phase and Imitation Phase. During the Observation Phase, the non-human agent 
model is positioned in the left-hand home target (A) and left-hand space (B). The model 
(atypical, typical or constant velocity) displays a horizontal movement of 200 mm from the 
left-hand home target to an end-state-target (A) or end-space in the no-end-state-target-
condition. The model has a movement time of 1700 ms. The Imitation Phase commences with 
the white cursor positioned in left-hand home target (A) or left-hand space (B). A participant 
imitates the observed model by controlling a stylus on the graphics tablet.  
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Figure 4.2. The velocity profiles for atypical model (black trace), typical model (dark grey 
trace), and constant velocity control models (light grey trace).  
 
4.3.4. Data Reduction 
4.3.4.1. Imitation 
To quantify imitation of movement kinematics, analysis focussed on x-axis data only. 
Within the x-axes, position data was identified at the start and end of the movement in each 
imitation trial. The start was identified by the cursor moving beyond the perimeter of the 
home-position, while the end was identified when the participant clicked the lower-button on 
the stylus. From this identification process, the position data was filtered using a low pass 4th 
order autoregressive filter with an 8 Hz cut-off. The filtered data were then differentiated using 
a 3-point central difference algorithm to obtain velocity. A MATLAB routine extracted the 
movement and displayed the velocity curve for each trial. Using a mouse, an experimenter 
manually selected the start, peak, and end of the movement on the velocity curve to identify 
general regions around which the MATLAB program would then identify the exact locations 
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based on predetermined velocity criteria.. The MATLAB routine integrated the velocity curve 
to identify the start of the movement when velocity was > 0.003 mm/ms, and the end when 
velocity was < 0.003 mm/ms. Movement time, peak velocity and percentage-time-to-peak-
velocity from each trial was quantified. Intra-participant means were calculated from 10 trials 
associated with each model and origin of movement (e.g., 10 trials for the atypical model in 
the left-to-right origin). These kinematic dependent variables were chosen as they provide 
discrete measures that accurately reflect whether participants imitate the magnitude and 
timing characteristics of the observed biological motion kinematics (Hayes et al., 2014; 
Andrew et al., 2016). 
 
4.3.4.2. Eye Movements 
Eye gaze locations were low-pass filtered using a zero-phase digital filter 
(autoregressive; forward and backward filter; cut-off frequency, 35 Hz). Eye velocity and 
acceleration were then derived from eye position data using a three-point central difference 
algorithm. Next, saccades were identified and removed from the smooth response using a 
technique described in previous research (Bennett & Barnes, 2003). Saccades were identified 
as points in the acceleration trace exceeding a threshold of 750°/s2. When the threshold criteria 
were exceeded, the complete saccade trajectory was identified by finding the peak and trough 
of acceleration. On the rare occasions when the use of the acceleration threshold failed to 
identify a saccade, these were identified by a second pass in which a maximum velocity 
criteria of 30°/s was applied. By using these criteria, saccades of 0.3°or more were reliably 
detected and segregated from blinks and other noise. Saccades were generally of small 
amplitude and brief duration, so linear interpolation was used as a simple and adequate method 
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of waveform restoration. To obtain desaccaded smooth eye velocity, data points equivalent to 
12ms at the beginning and end of the identified saccade trajectory were excluded to ensure 
that no saccadic element remained when applying subsequent interpolation. A linear 
interpolation routine was used to bridge the gaps produced by removal of saccades from the 
eye velocity trajectory. The desaccaded eye velocity data were then filtered at 35 Hz with a 
low-pass, zero-phase filter. This extraction process generated a smooth velocity trace of the 
eye movement recorded during observation of the stimuli. From this trace, peak velocity and 
percentage-time-to-peak velocity were extracted from each trial. 
 
4.3.5. Data Analysis 
Intra-participant mean data for each dependent variable were submitted to separate 3 
Model (atypical; typical; constant velocity) x 2 Goal (end-state-target; no-end-state-target) 
repeated measures ANOVA. Significant main and/or interactions effects involving more than 
two means were analysed using Tukey HSD post-hoc procedure. Alpha was set at p < 0.05. 
 
4.4. Results 
 
4.4.1. Imitation Data 
4.4.1.1. Movement Time 
The presence of an end-state-target [F(1, 18) = 15.29, p < 0.05] modulated movement 
time, with significantly shorter and more accurate movement times imitated in the absence (M 
= 2663 ms; SD =431), compared to the presence (M = 2815 ms; SD = 420 ms), of an end-
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state-target. An effect of model [F(2,36) = 89.61, p < 0.05] indicated movement time was 
significantly shorter when imitating the atypical (M = 2502 ms; SD =379 ms) than the typical 
(M = 2625 ms; SD =403 ms) and constant velocity (M = 3089 ms; SD = 495 ms) models. 
Moreover, movement time was significantly shorter (p < 0.05) when imitating the typical, 
compared with the constant velocity model. As seen in Figure 4.3, there was no interaction 
[F(2, 36) = 1.47, p > 0.05] concerning any combinations of model and target. 
 
Figure 4.3. Mean movement time data (ms) as a function of model (atypical, typical and 
constant velocity) and target condition (light grey = end-state-target; dark grey bar = no-end-
state-target). Model data is displayed by the dashed red line and error bars (±) display the 
standard error mean. 
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4.4.1.2. Peak Velocity  
An effect of model [F(2, 36) = 91.05, p < 0.05] indicated the magnitude of peak 
velocity was significantly greater when imitating the atypical model (M = 0.17 mm/s; SD = 
0.04 mm/ms) compared to the typical (M = 0.12 mm/s; SD = 0.02 mm/ms) and constant 
velocity (M = 0.1 mm/s; SD = 0.01 mm/ms) models. Additionally, the magnitude of peak 
velocity was significantly greater (p < 0.05) when imitating the typical compared to the 
constant velocity model. As seen in Figure 4.4, peak velocity was not modulated by the 
presence of targets [F(1, 18) = 1.48, p > 0.05] and there was no significant interaction between 
the presence of targets and the model stimuli [F(2, 36) = 1.42, p > 0.05]. 
 
Figure 4.4. Mean peak velocity data (mm/ms) as a function of model (atypical, typical and 
constant velocity) and target condition (light grey = end-state-target; dark grey bar = no-end-
state-target). Model data is displayed by the dashed red line and error bars (±) display the 
standard error mean. 
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4.4.1.3. Percentage-Time-to-Peak-Velocity 
An effect of model [F(2, 36) = 88.37, p < 0.05) indicated peak velocity occurred 
significantly earlier when imitating the atypical model (M = 25%; SD = 11%) compared to 
the typical (M = 39%; SD =14%) and constant velocity (M = 44%; SD = 17%) models. Peak 
velocity also occurred significantly earlier (p < 0.05) when imitating the typical compared to 
the constant velocity model. Although there was no main effect for targets (F1, 18 = 0.55, p > 
0.05) there was an interaction between model and target (F2, 36 = 4.02, p < 0.05). As seen in 
Figure 4.5, percentage-time-to-peak-velocity occurred earlier in the movement in the end-
state-target condition compared with the no-end-state-target condition when imitating the 
typical and constant velocity models (ps < 0.05). This effect was reversed when imitating the 
atypical model. 
 99
 
Figure 4.5. Mean percentage-time-to-peak-velocity data (%) as a function of model (atypical, 
typical and constant velocity) and target condition (light grey = end-state-target; dark grey bar 
= no-end-state-target). Model data is displayed by the dashed red line and error bars (±) 
display the standard error mean.  
 
4.4.2. Eye Movement Data 
 
4.4.2.1. Magnitude of Peak Velocity 
As seen in Figure 4.6, a main effect of model [F(2, 22) = 4.26, p < 0.05] indicated that 
peak eye velocity was significantly greater when observing the atypical model (M = 12.03/ 
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11) = 0.01, p > 0.05] the magnitude of peak velocity and there was no significant interaction 
between targets and the model stimuli [F(2, 22) = 0.92, p > 0.05]. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Mean peak velocity eye movement data (degrees/s) as a function of model 
(atypical, typical and constant velocity) and target condition (light grey = end-state-target; 
dark grey bar = no-end-state-target). Error bars (±) display the standard error mean. 
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4.4.2.2. Percentage-Time-to-Peak-Velocity 
An effect of model [F(2, 22) = 3.83, p < 0.05] indicated peak eye velocity occurred 
significantly earlier in the movement when observing the atypical model (M = 40%; SD = 
10%) compared to the typical (M = 52%; SD = 13%) and constant velocity (M = 44%; SD = 
12%) models. However, as seen in Figure 4.7, the time of peak eye velocity was not modulated 
by the presence of targets [F(1, 11) = 1.75, p > 0.05] and there was no significant interaction 
between targets and the model stimuli (F(2, 22) = 1.57, p > 0.05].   
 
 
Figure 4.7. Mean percentage-time-to-peak-velocity eye movement data (%) as a function of 
model (atypical, typical and constant velocity) and target condition (light grey = end-state-
target; dark grey bar = no-end-state-target). Error bars (±) display the standard error mean. 
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Figure 4.8. Exemplar traces of eye movement velocities (degrees/ s) during observation of the 
atypical (A), typical (B) and constant velocity (C) models. The dashed black line depicts trials 
where targets were present, and the solid black line depicts trials were targets were absent. 
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4.5. Discussion 
 
The aim of the present chapter was to examine the underlying stimulus features that 
facilitate the coding of atypical biological motion during imitation learning, and whether these 
influence eye movements, and thereby the locus of overt attention. Consistent with previous 
work (Hayes et al., 2016; Hayes, Roberts, Elliott & Bennett, 2014) and those of the current 
thesis, the results demonstrate biological motion coding during imitation learning, such that 
peak velocity was greater and percentage-time-to-peak-velocity occurred earlier when 
imitating the atypical than the typical model. In other words, imitation of kinematics did not 
simply reflect the natural constraints of the task (e.g. bell-shaped velocity profile). These 
results concur with the suggestion that accurate coding and representation of biological motion 
during imitation learning occurs through lower-level sensorimotor processes (Brass & Heyes, 
2005; Press, Cook, Blakemore & Kilner, 2011). Further, it was found that the presence of end-
state-targets modulated imitation similarly to previous research (Hayes et al., 2016). 
Movement time was more accurate to that of the model when end-state-targets were not 
present relative to when they were present, yet kinematics were not modulated. It was 
suggested that this finding was a consequence of increased visual attention to target 
attainment, and thus greater focus was on moving the cursor to the target after peak velocity 
had been achieved (Elliott, Hansen, Mendoza & Tremblay, 2004). 
The eye movement data of the current chapter provides further insight into the process 
of imitation, and more specifically where overt visual attention is directed during observation. 
Results showed that, like the imitation data, eye movements had greater magnitude of peak 
velocity, which occurred earlier in the observation when watching atypical, compared with 
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typical and constant velocity models. Further, these effects were consistent regardless of the 
presence of targets during observation. Thus, the velocity profile of the eyes suggest 
participants were attempting to track the stimuli. By evidencing tracking of the cursor during 
observation, these data confirm that during the observation phase of the experiment, 
participants had the opportunity to extract and code the salient velocity characteristics from 
the respective models.  This finding may have been facilitated by the instructions given prior 
to the experiment, whereby participants were told to observe the model with the intention of 
imitating it as accurately as they could (Hayes et al., 2014; 2016). Indeed, by continuing to 
track the cursor throughout each trial, the direct correlated sensorimotor experience between 
observation and imitation would have become stronger over time (Heyes, 2011), thereby 
underpinning accurate imitation of the respective models. Moreover, when visual attention is 
engaged on a specific feature, for example the trajectory of the model stimuli, it is suggested 
that information processing is up-regulated during the early stages of skill acquisition 
(Higuchi, Holle, Roberts, Eickhoff & Vogt, 2012). Therefore, up-regulation could have 
facilitated the formation of internal representations based on task characteristics such as 
kinematics (e.g. peak velocity, percentage-time-to-peak-velocity) or temporal features (e.g. 
movement time).  
In addition to general tracking of the model stimuli, eye movement data further 
demonstrates tracking of model trajectories is consistent both when end-state-targets are 
absent and present. These findings differ from previous research that showed eye movements 
become more goal-directed when end-state-targets are present during a task and moreover, 
that this results in the modulation of biological motion coding (Wild et al., 2010). 
Consequently, authors suggested that the lower-level processes involved in imitation of 
kinematics, and top-down modulation associated with visual attention and end-state-targets, 
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were exclusive processes that operated independently. In addition to not reporting goal-
directed eye movements, results from the current chapter also show only movement time, and 
not kinematics, are modulated by the presence of end-state-targets. These effects corroborate 
previous research that has shown a general acquisition of kinematics, but modulation of 
movement time, during a learning task with varying levels of feedback (Andrew et al., 2016). 
In line with results in the present chapter, these findings demonstrate that various higher-order 
cognitive systems (e.g. visual attention, end-state-targets, feedback) can influence the 
processing of temporal components of the stimuli during observation of the models and thus, 
not only lower-level, but additional top-down processes are involved in the coding of 
biological motion during imitation learning.  
In summary, the findings in the present study showed atypical biological motion 
kinematics were coded and represented during imitation learning. Further, eye movements 
confirmed that visual attention was directed to the stimuli during observation, thus providing 
the opportunity to perceive and code and consequently, confirms previous assumptions that 
imitation of biological motion kinematics through lower-level visuomotor processing.   
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Chapter 5: Social Attitudes Modulate Biological Motion Coding During Imitation 
Learning 
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5.1. Abstract 
 
Imitation of novel kinematics has been shown to be a function of lower-level processing 
(Chapter Two), which can be modulated by top-down factors related to end-state-targets 
(Chapter Three), attention and social context. In order to further examine the potential 
interaction between lower-level and top-down processes during imitation learning, the aim of 
this study was to systematically control the social context during the imitation protocol. In 
this protocol, a non-human agent model was used that displayed different novel atypical 
biological motion kinematics, as well as a control model that displayed constant velocity. 
Importantly the three models had the same movement amplitude and movement time. Prior to 
observation of the models, a social prime displaying either neutral (no eye gaze), pro- (direct 
eye gaze), or anti-social (averted eye gaze) eye gaze was presented on the monitor. Kinematic 
analyses showed atypical biological motion kinematics were imitated, and that this 
performance was different from the typical and constant velocity control conditions. Although 
imitation accuracy of atypical biological motion kinematics was not modulated by the social 
primes, the variability of imitation reduced after viewing pro- and anti-social primes, relative 
to the neutral prime. The fact that social primes modulated imitation variability, but not 
imitation accuracy, indicates observation of social primes resonated with the fidelity of the 
representations formed during observation, such that the corresponding motor representation 
were produced with greater accuracy relative to the explicit kinematic features of the models.  
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5.2. Introduction 
 
Imitation of an observed action can accelerate the acquisition attainment of complex, 
novel motor skills (Hayes, Elliott & Bennett, 2010) and their respective movement kinematics 
(Wild et al., 2010; Hayes, Dutoy, Elliott, Gowen & Bennett, 2016). Imitation of observed 
actions engages sensorimotor processes (Heyes, 2001) that occur in the fronto-parietal mirror-
mechanism (Fadiga et al., 2000; Rizzolatti & Craighero 2004). This region of the brain is 
known to link perception and action (Rizzolatti, 2005; Rizzolatti & Foagssi, 2014). In addition 
to actions, imitation is also an important feature of developing social interaction and 
communication, as demonstrated in the mirroring of behaviours such as posture, facial 
expressions, language and understanding (Hurley & Chater, 2005; Chartrand & van Baaren, 
2009).  
When the observed and executed actions share spatial alignment, the neural connection 
between perception and action generally enables and facilitates imitation; however; when they 
do not share spatial alignment, results have shown there to be interference effects. For 
example, greater movement deviation occurs when observing a stimulus move orthogonally 
to the concurrent arm movement e.g. observing horizontal arm movements while concurrently 
making vertical arm movements (Kilner, Paulignan & Blakemore, 2003; Chaminade, et al., 
2005). This interference effect was termed ‘motor contagion’ (Blakemore & Frith, 2005) and 
refers to the co-activation of incompatible internal representations. This process is largely 
subconscious and consequently, governed by lower-level processes (Rizzolatti, Fogassi & 
Gallesse, 2001; Iacoboni, 2005). 
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However, it has also been shown that these lower-level processes associated with 
automaticity can be modulated by top-down processes associated with social cognition (Cook 
& Bird, 2011; Wang & Hamilton, 2011). For example, completing a word scramble task 
modulated the accuracy and speed with which imitation was made in a subsequent stimulus 
response compatibility (SRC) protocol (Leighton, Bird, Orsini & Heyes, 2010). When the 
word scramble displayed pro-social words (friend, together, assist), the accuracy of imitation 
and speed of reaction time improved. Conversely, imitation accuracy and reaction time 
deteriorated following anti-social word scrambles (independent, apart, single). It was 
concluded that social primes act as modulatory top-down processes that influence the lower-
level processing of visual information. That is, pro-social cues down-regulate, and anti-social 
cues up-regulate, inhibitory processes operating in the SRC protocol (Cook & Bird, 2011). 
The notion of top-down social processes modulating imitation is the foundation of the 
social top-down response modulation (STORM) model (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Wang & 
Hamilton, 2012). STORM suggests that imitation, or lack thereof, can enhance or inhibit a 
given social situation. For example, the “Chameleon effect” (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) 
suggests that imitating actions or behaviours, such as body language, gestures and postures 
(Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009), can result in increased rapport and feelings of closeness (van 
Baaren, Holland, Kawakami & can Knippenberg, 2004) between people. However, any social 
repercussions are dependent on the imitative behaviours being detected by the partner. Eye 
gaze is considered a critical social cue that conveys important social knowledge, 
understanding and confirms visual attention. As such, they have been extensively examined 
in the context of identifying imitative behaviours (Perrett, Smith, Potter, Mistlin, Head, Milner 
et al., 1985; Pelphrey, Morris & McCarthy, 2005; Wang, Ramsey & Hamilton, 2011;).  
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A recent study combined a classic SRC protocol (Heyes et al., 2005) with an eye gaze 
social prime (Wang & Hamilton, 2011). The imitation task required participants to open or 
close their hand in response to a hand-opening or hand-closing stimuli. Prior to the imitation 
task, a spatially aligned video clip showed a head movement that displayed either a direct 
(pro-social) or averted (anti-social) eye gaze prime. Results showed that observing direct gaze 
improved reaction time of hand movements compared to observing averted gaze. Similarly, 
when the hand and the eye gaze primes were spatially decoupled, such that the hand appeared 
to the side of the face, direct gaze was again the only social prime that enhanced imitation 
(Wang & Hamilton, 2014). These findings suggest that imitation can be modulated by social 
engagement cues and that eye gaze could drive the degree to which an action is imitated.  
Together these findings contribute to the credible interpretation of social context 
directly modulating imitation. It is important to recognise, as has been previously highlighted 
(Roberts, Bennett, Elliott & Hayes, 2015), that the discussion of visuomotor mapping was in 
relation to observing a human hand and subsequent changes in reaction time. This is somewhat 
different from the observation of continuous biological motion and analysis of biological 
motion properties. Therefore, while the research by Wang and Hamilton is well-conducted 
and informative with regard to the social priming of reaction time, it does not provide any 
insight into the underlying processes associated with the imitation of biological motion e.g. 
whether it is a function of lower-level visuomotor processing related to kinematics e.g. being 
topographically similar (Catmur & Heyes, 2011) or top-down modulation based on the goal 
or spatial end-point of the movement (e.g., movement compatibility; Brass, Bekkering & 
Prinz, 2001). 
The present chapter examined social modulation of biological motion coding during 
imitation learning. The same experimental protocol and imitation task as in Chapters Three 
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and Four was used, but with target goals removed from all trials to control for any additional 
top-down goal-related modulatory effects. In addition, a pro-social (direct gaze), anti-social 
(averted gaze) or neutral (no model) human model prime (Wang & Hamilton, 2011) was 
displayed prior to observation of the model stimuli. The model stimuli were also consistent 
with those from the previous chapter; that is, atypical and typical biological motions, as well 
as non-biological constant velocity models. If biological motion is coded during imitation 
learning, it is expected that imitation of the atypical model will be different to that of the 
typical model. Further, if social primes modulate the processing of biological motion, there 
are two additional expectations. First, the coding of biological motion kinematics will be more 
accurate following the pro-social primes and less accurate following the anti-social primes 
(Leighton et al., 2010). Second, in addition to imitation accuracy, social primes have also 
modulated movement variability, as demonstrated during online imitation of congruent and 
incongruent arm movements (Roberts et al., 2015). If this effect is applicable to imitation 
learning, movement variability is likely to be greater following the anti-social primes than the 
neutral or pro-social primes (Roberts et al., 2015). 
 
5.3. Methods 
 
5.3.1. Volunteers 
Nineteen participants (aged 18-21 years) volunteered for the study. All participants 
were right-hand dominant, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave written 
informed consent. The experiment was designed in accordance with the 1964 Declaration of 
Helsinki and approved by the research ethics committee of the host University. 
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5.3.2. Apparatus and Stimuli 
Participants sat facing a 21-inch CRT monitor (Iiyama Vision Master 505) operating 
with a resolution of 1280 x 1024 pixels and a refresh rate of 85 Hz, located on a table at a 
viewing distance of approximately 555 mm. The monitor was connected to a desktop PC (Dell 
Optiplex GX280), which received input from a graphics tablet and hand-held stylus (Wacom 
Intuos Pro XL). Experimental stimuli were generated on the desktop PC using the COGENT 
toolbox (developed by John Romaya at the Laboratory of Neurobiology at the Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience) implemented in MATLAB (Mathworks Inc.). The 
social prime images [120 mm (h) x 160 mm (w)] were integrated into the experimental 
procedure and displayed in the centre of the monitor. 
 
5.3.3. Procedure 
The imitation task required participants to first view an image depicting one of the 
three social primes, then observe and imitate non-human agent models that displayed a single 
horizontal trajectory that originated from a home-position on the left-hand side of the monitor 
and terminated at an end-position on the right-hand side of the monitor (as in Chapters Three 
and Four). The movement amplitude of the models was 200 mm and total duration was 1700 
ms. As in Chapters Two and Four, biological motion was examined by comparing imitation 
of two models that displayed typical or atypical velocity profiles (Hayes et al., 2016; Andrew 
et al., 2016). The typical model (dark grey trace in Figure 5.1D) displayed a natural (Elliott et 
al., 2010) bell-shaped velocity profile with a peak velocity of 0.200 mm/ms that occurred at 
44 % of the movement duration and was designed as a control condition when examining 
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biological motion coding. The atypical model (black trace in Figure 5.1D) was created by the 
same volunteer and displayed atypical velocity profile with a peak velocity of 0.410 mm/ms 
that occurred at 18 % of the movement duration. The method of using a human volunteer to 
generate both models was critical because it ensured the kinematics were biological. In 
addition to two biological motion models, a non-biological constant velocity model (light grey 
trace in Figure 5.1D) was included to act as a stimulus control for any potential biological 
tuning and expectation of the nature of the stimuli. This model also had an amplitude of 200 
mm and duration of 1700ms, thus resulting in a constant velocity of 0.120 mm/ms, and no y-
axis deviation.  
To examine the effect of social primes on imitation learning, an image was displayed 
in the centre of the monitor prior to the imitation task, which displayed either a pro-social (see 
Figure 5.1A), anti-social (see Figure 5.1B) or neutral (see Figure 5.1C) prime. The social 
primes displayed an image of a human head and shoulders in front of a grey background, 
where the salient information pertained to the type of eye gaze the model was engaging in. In 
the pro-social prime, the model engaged in ‘direct gaze’ such that he seemed to be looking 
straight back at the participant and making eye contact. In the anti-social prime, the model 
engaged in ‘averted gaze’ such that the model’s head was turned slightly to one side and was 
looking away from the centre of the image. The neutral prime was designed to control for a 
general effect of social context and as such, only displayed the grey background used in both 
social primes and included no human model. The primes used in the current chapter were 
modified from previous research that had reached publication (Wang et al., 2011a; 2011b; 
Wang & Hamilton, 2012) and had also been used in pilot testing, where the salient features of 
the social primes e.g. the gaze direction of the eyes in the image (direct/ averted), were shown 
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to be obvious and recognisable, without conveying any information regarding what they were 
attempting to modulate. 
Participants first performed 6 familiarisation trials that replicated the task requirements 
of the imitation protocol. The experiment commenced with participants being instructed to 
“observe a model stimulus and then imitate what you see as accurately as possible”. A non-
human agent model located in the home-position then moved with a constant velocity to the 
end-position. The model displayed the exact movement duration and amplitude of the 
experimental models, but the familiarisation phase contained only constant velocity trials. 
Further, the familiarisation phase didn’t display any of the social primes prior to observing 
the model stimulus. Using this model ensured construct validity by preventing participants 
experiencing biological motion or social priming before the imitation trials. Participants were 
not informed about the duration of the movement, or the type of stimuli.  
During the experiment trials, one of the social prime images was displayed for 2000 
ms prior to the beginning of the imitation task, after which there was a 1000 ms delay before 
the onset of the to-be-observed model stimulus. After observing the model, participants 
imitated by moving the stylus on the tablet so that a cursor displayed on the monitor moved 
from the home-position to the perceived end-position as per the model. Following movement 
execution, there was a 4000 ms inter-trial delay before the next social prime and model 
appeared for action-observation. All participants confirmed they understood that there would 
be an image to view prior to observing a model, the instruction on how to observe and imitate 
the trajectory of the model, and the sensorimotor association between the stylus on the 
graphics tablet and the corresponding movement of the cursor on the monitor. Participants 
then performed the imitation protocol that consisted of ten blocks of nine trials. A block 
contained three typical and three atypical biological kinematic models, as well as three 
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constant velocity models. The three trials of each model stimulus were preceded by of one of 
each of the social primes – pro-social, anti-social and neutral – such that each social prime 
was also shown three times in a block of nine trials. Trial order within a block, as well as 
block order, was randomised across participants. The randomised structure reduced 
predictability of upcoming social primes and models and promoted imitation on a trial-by-
trial basis. 
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Figure 5.1. A schematic representation of the experimental design. Prior to observation of the 
stimulus, a social prime was shown depicting pro-social (A), anti-social (B) or neutral prime 
(C). The black outlined rectangle represents a graphics tablet. The white circle displayed on 
the CRT monitor represents the model. The single-segment movement is depicted by the 
arrow (i.e., from the start-position to the end-position). (D) Displacement time-series 
displaying atypical (black trace), typical (dark grey trace) and constant (light grey) velocity 
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models. The black boxes shown in the image were added to conceal the identity of the model 
but were not included in the actual experiment. 
 
5.3.4. Statistical Analysis 
To quantify accuracy of biological motion imitation, movement kinematics were 
extracted from the x-axis movement exhibited by the participants on each trial. Initially, the 
start was identified as the moment the cursor moved beyond the perimeter of the home-
position, while the end was identified when the participant clicked the lower-button on the 
stylus. The resulting position data was filtered using a low pass 4th order autoregressive filter 
with an 8 Hz cut-off. The filtered data were then differentiated using a 3-point central 
difference algorithm to obtain velocity. A MATLAB routine then displayed the velocity 
profile for each trial, such that an experimenter could manually identify the start, peak, and 
end of the movement on the velocity profile. Using these points as a guide, the MATLAB 
routine identified the start of the movement as the moment when velocity was > 0.003 mm/ms, 
and the end when velocity was < 0.003 mm/ms. Peak velocity and percentage-time-to-peak-
velocity from each trial was used to calculate intra-participant means (10 trials per condition) 
for each independent variable (Model – atypical, typical, constant velocity x Social Prime - 
direct gaze, averted gaze, neutral). The kinematic variables (percentage-time-to-peak-
velocity, peak velocity and movement time) were selected as they most appropriately 
represent the structural differences contained within the atypical and typical biological motion 
models and have been used in previously published research, thus acknowledging them as 
suitable kinematic markers (Hayes et al., 2014; Andrew et al., 2016). 
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5.4. Results 
 
5.4.1. Imitation 
5.4.1.1. Movement Time 
 A main effect of stimulus [F(2, 40) = 25.05, p < 0.001] for movement time indicated 
that imitation was significantly shorter when imitating atypical (M = 2591 ms; SD = 463 ms) 
compared to the typical (M = 2677 ms; SD = 468 ms) and constant (M = 3050 ms; SD = 445 
ms) velocity models (ps < 0.05). Movement time was also significantly shorter when imitating 
the typical compared with the constant (p < 0.05) velocity model. As seen in Figure 5.2A, 
there was no main effect of social prime [F(2, 40) = 0.56, p > 0.05] and there was no significant 
interaction between the primes and model stimuli [F(4, 80) = 0.78, p > 0.05]. 
 
5.4.1.2. Peak Velocity 
 As displayed in Figure 5.2B, a main effect of stimulus [F(2, 40) = 27.76, p < 0.001] 
for peak velocity showed that magnitude was significantly greater when imitating atypical (M 
= 0.201 mm/ms; SD = 0.036 mm/ms) compared to typical (M = 0.167 mm/ms; SD = 0.036 
mm/ms) and constant (M = 0.14 mm/ms; SD = 0.034 mm/ms) velocity kinematics. A social 
prime main effect [F(2, 40) = 4.32, p < 0.05] indicated magnitude of peak velocity was greater 
after having viewed the anti-social prime (M = 0.172 mm/ms; SD =0.036 mm/ms ), compared 
to the pro-social (M = 0.167 mm/ms; SD = 0.041 mm/ms) and neutral (M = 0.168 mm/ms; 
SD = 0.029 mm/ms) primes (ps < 0.05). There was no interaction between stimulus and social 
prime [F(4, 80) = 0.29, p > 0.05,. 
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5.4.1.3. Percentage-Time-to-Peak-Velocity 
 As seen in Figure 5.2C, a main effect of stimulus [F(2, 40) = 22.76, p < 0.001] for 
percentage-time-to-peak-velocity showed that peak velocity occurred significantly earlier 
when imitating the atypical (M = 31%; SD = 15%) compared to typical (39%; SD = 14%) and 
constant (43%; SD = 15%) velocity models (ps < 0.05). Peak velocity also occurred 
significantly earlier when imitating the typical compared to the constant velocity model (ps < 
0.05). There was no main effect of social prime [F(2, 40) = 0.79, p > 0.05] and there was no 
significant interaction between the stimuli and social primes [F(4, 80) = 1.14, p > 0.05]. 
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Figure 5.2. Mean imitation data showing movement time (A), peak velocity (B) and percentage-time-to-peak-velocity (C) presented as a function 
of model and social prime (pro-social = white bar; anti-social = light grey bar; neutral = dark grey bar). Error bars (±) display the standard error 
mean.
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5.4.2. Variability 
5.4.2.1. Movement Time 
 A main effect of social prime [F(2, 40) = 9.76, p < 0.001] indicated greater variability 
of movement time when observing the neutral (M =  517 ms) compared with the pro-social 
(M = 419 ms) and anti-social (M = 441 ms) primes (ps < 0.05). As seen in Figure 5.3A, there 
was no main effect of stimulus [F(2, 40) = 0.51, p > 0.05] and there was no significant 
interaction between the primes and model stimuli  [F(4, 80) = 0.93, p > 0.05]. 
 
 
5.4.2.2. Peak Velocity 
 A main effect of social prime [F(2, 40) = 5.49, p < 0.05] indicated less variability of 
peak velocity when observing the neutral (M = 0.029 mm/ms) compared with the pro-social 
(M = 0.037 mm/ms) and anti-social (M = 0.035 mm/ms) primes (ps < 0.05). As seen in Figure 
5.3B, there was no main effect of stimulus [F(2, 40) = 0.67, p > 0.05] and no significant 
interaction between the primes and the model stimuli [F(4, 80) = 0.3, p > 0.05]. 
 
5.4.2.3. Percentage-Time-to-Peak-Velocity 
 As seen in Figure 5.3C, there was no main effect of stimulus [F(2, 40) = 2.27, p > 
0.05] and no significant interaction between the primes and the stimuli [F(4, 80) = 0.32, p > 
0.05]. However, a main effect of social prime [F(2, 40) = 6.75, p < 0.05] indicated greater 
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variability in percentage-time-to-peak-velocity when observing neutral (17%) compared with 
the pro-social (12%) and anti-social (15%) primes (ps < 0.05). 
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Figure 5.3. Mean variability data showing movement time (A), peak velocity (B) and percentage-time-to-peak-velocity (C) presented as a 
function social prime (pro-social = white bar; anti-social = light grey bar; neutral = dark grey bar). 
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5.5. Discussion 
 
 The primary aim of the present study was to examine whether and how social primes 
modulate the coding of biological motion kinematics during imitation learning. By replicating 
a previously studied imitation learning protocol (Hayes et al., 2014; Hayes et al., 2016), the 
first expectation was that imitation of the atypical model would be different to that of the 
typical model. The second expectation was that observing pro-social and anti-social primes 
prior to the imitation task would both improve (increase accuracy and decrease variability) 
and reduce (decrease accuracy and increase variability) imitative performance, respectively. 
 Consistent with previous research (Hayes et al., 2016; 2014; 2010), the results showed 
that biological motion kinematics were coded during imitation learning. Peak velocity was 
greater and percentage-time-to-peak-velocity occurred earlier when imitating the atypical, 
compared with the typical biological motion model (see Figure 5.2). This kinematics are 
different to those that would be expected given the natural constraints of the task (e.g. typical 
kinematics) and therefore replicated the imitation findings from previous chapters. Based on 
the methodologies used in the previous chapters, specifically Chapter Two, the coding of 
atypical biological motion in the present study likely demonstrated lower-level processing of 
biological motion (Iacoboni, 1999; Catmur & Heyes, 2011). It was also found that the 
modulatory effect of social primes occurred at two levels: imitation accuracy and imitation 
variability. In relation to imitation accuracy, peak velocity was more accurate following 
observation of the anti-social prime; relative to imitation variability, movement time and 
percentage-time-to-peak-velocity became less variable after observing the pro- and anti-social 
primes, compared with the neutral prime. 
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 The finding of increased imitation effects following observation of an anti-social 
prime contrast the social top-down modulation effects typically reported in social imitation 
studies (Cook & Bird, 2011; Leighton et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2011a). Behavioural research 
suggests that increased imitation effects often follow pro-social priming, which activates 
social motives designed to affiliate and assimilate (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Wang & 
Hamilton, 2012; Wang & Hamilton, 2013). As a result, these positive interpersonal behaviours 
exert top-down control that up-regulates the lower-level visuomotor processing associated 
with the mirror system to improve imitation (Hogeveen & Obhi, 2012; Wang & Hamilton, 
2014). However, there are instances where anti-social up-regulation of imitation have been 
reported (Wang & Hamilton, 2013; Roberts et al., 2016). These effects corroborate the active-
self theory that operates relative to how primes are processed in relation to the ‘self’; that is, 
first-person pro-social and third-person anti-social primes up-regulate and improve imitation, 
whereas first-person anti-social and third person pro-social down-regulate and reduce 
imitation effects (Wang & Hamilton, 2013). Therefore, the finding of increased imitation 
accuracy of peak velocity following anti-social priming in the present study could be 
interpreted as evidence of the active-self theory, where anti-social third-person priming has 
up-regulated imitative processes to produce a more accurate representation of peak velocity. 
Further, this finding demonstrates evidence that the anti-social prime used in the present 
chapter has acted as a regulator of the underlying processes involved in imitation learning.  
The second and perhaps more important social modulation reported in the present 
chapter concerns decreased movement variability (see Figure 5.3), specifically of movement 
time and percentage-time-to-peak-velocity, following observation of pro- and anti-social 
primes. The significance of this findings lies in movement variability not having been 
previously reported in imitation learning. Variability refers to inherent noise in the motor 
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system during motor execution and is stochastic within typical movement or imitation thereof 
(Elliott, Hansen, Grierson, Lyons, Bennett & Hayes, 2010). However, when amplitude 
remains constant but the force involved in motor execution increases, so in turn does 
variability (Elliott et al., 2010). As, both biological models displayed greater velocities than 
the constant velocity model, it could be expected to result in greater movement variability. 
However, results showed that following the observation of social primes, both models were 
imitated with less variability, compared with the neutral prime. Therefore, it could be 
suggested the social primes modulated coding of biological motion such the fidelity of the 
representations formed during visuomotor processing were more refined, thus resulting in 
greater control and proficiency during imitation of the models.  
As previously discussed, improved imitation following social primes is suggested to 
be a function of engaging specifically with positive social primes e.g. direct gaze (Wang et 
al., 2011) or positive word scramble (Leighton et al., 2010). Neurophysiological research has 
shown that observation or completion of a pro-social prime resonates with and activates 
regions of the brain associated with mirror neurons (e.g. mPFC) and in essence, ‘primes’ these 
regions for the ensuing stimulus (Brass et al., 2001; 2005). With these mirror regions primed, 
processing of the visual stimulus is upregulated, such that the visual and motor representations 
are more accurate and thus, imitation improves. Equally, negative social primes have the 
inverse effect and down-regulate the processing of visual information, such that imitation 
becomes less accurate. These effects have most commonly been demonstrated in automatic 
imitation/ mimicry by measuring reaction times (Cook & Bird, 2011; Wang et al., 2011a), and 
online imitation (Roberts et al., 2015) protocols by measuring imitation accuracy and 
variability. However, the findings here suggest it is the presence of a social prime per se that 
modulated imitation, rather than the explicit nature (e.g. pro-social/ anti-social) of the social 
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prime. These data demonstrate that although the social primes worked in relation to 
modulating imitation, the interpretation of the primes has resulted in the effects discussed in 
the current study.  
 These effects could be associated with the connection between the biological nature 
of the social primes the observed stimuli. While the atypical and typical models displayed 
different kinematic structures, they both displayed biological motion kinematics. Similarly, 
both the pro- and anti-social primes displayed different eye gazes but both were portrayed by 
a human model. Conversely, the neutral prime did not display any biological features. It has 
been shown that the neural mechanisms involved in eye gaze priming correspond with regions 
of the brain associated with detection of biological motion, specifically the STS, IFG and 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), within the mirror mechanism (Wang et al., 2011b). 
Moreover, it was suggested that the enhanced connectivity between STS and mPFC following 
pro-social eye gaze priming implied it was these regions that modulated the sensory input to 
the mirror mechanism during observation. Therefore, in the context of the present results, it 
follows that a biological social prime would upregulate the detection and coding of biological 
motion such that the representations generated were more accurate, as demonstrated by 
imitation being less variable. 
  These results appear to add to the current understanding of social modulation during 
imitation as they are novel in the context of imitation learning. Previous research has largely 
examined social primes during automatic imitation, a process whereby the imitation is 
involuntary and relatively independent of intentions (Heyes, 2011). Instead, these results 
demonstrate that during the intentional acquisition of a novel movement that requires complex 
processing, social primes still modulate features of biological motion. While imitation 
learning and automatic imitation engage similar neural circuitry (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006), 
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the data in the current study suggests they may also share the way in which they are influenced 
by social primes. Moreover, these effects of social modulation corroborate early psychological 
research examining observational learning, which showed task judgements and work 
productivity have been shown to improve because of positive social context (Weiss, 1977; 
Weiss & Shaw, 1979). 
 In conclusion, the results demonstrated that biological motion kinematics were coded 
during imitation learning and that social primes involving eye gaze modulated these processes. 
Based on previous research (Hayes et al., 2016; 2014), biological motion coding was likely a 
function of lower-level visuomotor processing, where the specific kinematics properties of the 
biological motion models were represented for motor execution. Moreover, this processing 
was influenced by social top-down modulation (Wang & Hamilton, 2012), such that the 
biological nature of the social primes resonated with the biological nature of the model stimuli 
and resulted in decreased movement variability during motor execution. 
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Chapter 6: Epilogue 
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6.1. Aim of the Chapter 
 
The epilogue will present and discuss the key findings from all experimental chapters 
in the program of work. There will be a critical evaluation in accordance with current literature 
on imitation and the lower-level processing of biological motion, as well as top-down factors 
that modulate these processes. Future considerations and translational research will also be 
discussed with the view to suggesting practical implications. 
In short, the present thesis has used a novel protocol that has developed existing 
methodologies to more accurately examine biological motion coding during imitation 
learning. Subsequently, the experimental chapters contained within this thesis have valid 
designs relative to the overall aim of the thesis and therefore extend the current understanding 
of biological motion coding during imitation learning. To that end, Chapter Two is considered 
the most important chapter of the thesis as it robustly demonstrates that spatial compatibility 
is not required to imitate biological motion kinematics; rather, the spatially incompatible 
imitation of atypical biological motion is the first example in imitation learning literature of 
discrete kinematic markers being imitated through lower-level processes. In knowing that 
biological motion kinematics are coded through lower-level processes, Chapters Three and 
Four extend the current literature by demonstrating how top-down modulations (end-state-
targets and visual attention) associated with higher-order cognitive processes operate 
cooperatively with lower-level processes during the processing of visual information. Finally, 
Chapter Five provides a further insight into top-down modulation associated with social 
context and imitation, but more importantly is the origin of a broader line of research designed 
to examine imitation and biological motion coding in people with ASC. The finding of social 
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modulation discussed in the present thesis extends the current understanding in imitation 
learning literature, but due to data collection involving neurotypicals only, will also act as a 
control condition or baseline for future research centred around people with autism.  
 
6.2. Rationale for examining biological motion using an atypical biological motion 
model 
 
 While there is strong evidence of biological motion coding during automatic imitation 
(Brass et al., 2000; Sturmer et al., 2000; Heyes et al., 2005), online imitation (Kilner et al., 
2003; Kilner et al., 2007; Roberts et al., 2015) and the underpinning neuropsychological 
processes (Iacoboni, 1999; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Press et al., 2008), it is still unclear 
whether biological motion is coded during imitation learning. At present, only a small amount 
of research has investigated biological motion coding during imitation learning, where 
imitation has been measured in relation to how accurately movement kinematics are 
reproduced (Hayes et al., 2009; Wild et al., 2010). For example, Wild et al. (2010) 
demonstrated that observation of “fast” and “slow” hand movements resulted in imitation that 
was relative to the respective model and thus, the kinematics of the movement were suggested 
to be coded. Although observation of the “fast” and “slow” models produced differences in 
the imitation of movement speed, the biological motion kinematics contained within each 
model were not manipulated directly. For example, while the “fast” and “slow” hand 
movements used by Wild et al. (2010) displayed different speeds, each of the model 
kinematics were not manipulated and thus, displayed natural, bell-shaped velocity profiles 
that were scaled by speed. Therefore, the differences in imitation do not confirm whether the 
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findings are due to coding of biological motion kinematics or a reproduction of generic 
differences in the movement speed differences displayed by the models. In this instance, it 
could be argued that imitation of general movement speed could be a function of strategy 
(Chong et al., 2009; Eliasmith, Stewart, Choo, Bekolay, DeWolf, Tang et al., 2012; Grezes, 
Costes & Decety, 1998; Iacoboni et al., 2005; rather than the coding of kinematics (Roberts 
et al., 2014), where pre-existing motor representations are reconfigured and scaled to produce 
movements that are similar to the observed visual information (Buccino et al., 2004; Roberts 
et al., 2014; Vogt et al., 2007).  Therefore, in the current thesis a novel protocol was developed 
to create an imitation task that manipulated the structure of the biological stimuli to directly 
examine biological motion coding. Within each of the experimental chapters, various 
combinations of biological and non-biological motion models were examined to establish 
whether the biological properties of the stimuli are coded and represented during imitation. 
Chapters Three, Four and Five included a constant velocity model, which was 
designed to display uniform velocity of 0.1 mm/ms from the onset of movement. These 
kinematic features make it physically impossible to be imitated through human reproduction 
because of the constraints on human movement imposed by the neuro-muscular system 
(Abend et al., 1982; Elliot et al., 2001). As accurate imitation of the constant velocity 
kinematics was unachievable, it was anticipated that participants would recruit a pre-existing 
motor response and thus exhibit time to peak velocity that was similar to typical aiming 
movements (Hayes et al., 2014; Roberts et al., 2014). Therefore, the primary purpose of the 
constant velocity model in the current thesis was to act as a control condition when comparing 
imitation of the typical biological and constant velocity models as it allowed a direct 
comparison between imitation of biological and non-biological motion. Having a control 
condition for biological motion coding is important as imitation has been shown to be more 
 133
accurate following observation of biological, compared to non-biological motion (Brass et al., 
2001; Kilner et al., 2003; Press et al., 2005). 
 Typical biological motion was included in Chapters Two, Four and Five and displayed 
human movement that represented a ‘natural’ trajectory. ‘Natural’ trajectory refers to the bell-
shaped velocity profile that is normally produced during human movement and is dependent 
on the time, and displacement (e.g., movement amplitude) of a trajectory, peak velocity 
generally occurs at between 40%-60% of the movement time (Elliott et al., 2001). In the 
present thesis, a number of models were created, all with a movement time of 1700 ms and 
displacement of 406 mm criteria. When recording the typical model, start and end targets were 
visible to ensure trial displacement was consistent and the typical model was performed until 
the timing goal of 1700 ms was achieved, which meant that the kinematic structure for the 
typical model reflected a natural profile based on a 406 mm movement and a 1700 ms 
movement time. As a result, the typical model had a peak velocity of 0.2 mm/ms that, in line 
with ‘natural’ kinematics, occurred at 44% of the movement time.  
The inclusion of typical biological motion was important to examine any effects of 
biological tuning; that is, the perception-action system discriminates between biological and 
non-biological motion, and produces a heightened neural response following detection of 
biological motion (Tai et al., 2004). In line with this suggestion, the imitation of typical 
biological motion should be more accurate than copying non-biological constant velocity 
based on the biological nature of the stimuli. While the perception-action system is suggested 
to be more sensitive to biological motion (Castiello, Lusher, Mari & Edwards, 2002; Longo 
& Bertenthal, 2009; Liepelt & Brass, 2010), it has been recognised that the reproduction of 
typical kinematics could be achieved by rescaling or reproducing existing sensorimotor 
representations (Hayes et al., 2009; Campione & Gentilucci, 2011) and thus, imitation of the 
 134
typical biological motion model does not directly imply biological motion coding. Therefore, 
all four experimental chapters contained novel, atypical biological motion models to more 
specifically examine biological motion coding. These atypical models still displayed 
biological motion, but contained kinematic structures that were not representative of existing 
sensorimotor representations and deviated from the ‘natural’ constraints of the task (Roberts, 
Bennett, Elliott & Hayes, 2012). By not representing existing sensorimotor representations, 
coding of the underlying movement kinematics contained within the stimuli was required to 
reproduce the atypical biological motion. Chapters Two, Four and Five examined the 
imitation of an atypical biological motion model in comparison primarily with a typical 
biological motion model to examine whether atypical kinematics were coded during imitation 
learning. The atypical model in these chapters had a peak velocity of 0.4 mm/ms that occurred 
at 18% of the movement time. Chapter Three, rather than comparing atypical to typical 
biological motion, examined imitation of two atypical biological motion models that had more 
similar kinematic structures (peak velocity occurred at 17% and 26% respectively), to further 
explore the coding of atypical biological motion kinematics. Each atypical model displayed 
peak velocities that were skewed towards the beginning of the movement and importantly, 
occurred outside the boundaries of a ‘natural’ trajectory. 
While each of the atypical models contains specific kinematic features that are highly 
unlikely to be imitated by chance, it could be argued that the discernible kinematic differences 
between the atypical and typical biological motion models in Chapters Two, Four and Five 
mean the issues previously raised with imitation of “fast” and “slow” movements (Wild et al., 
2010) may not have been alleviated. It was likely that coding of the model stimuli was 
localised to the respective kinematics as Chapter Two controlled for spatial compatibility, 
which confirmed that imitation was not a function of reproducing the spatial coordinates of 
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peak velocity e.g. reproducing peak velocity at the left side of the monitor. However, it was 
still unclear whether participants were coding the specific kinematic structure underpinning 
the atypical model (e.g. imitation that was representative of a peak velocity that occurred at 
18% of the movement) or just recognising a difference in acceleration, as no post-
experimental questionnaire was administered to gauge the response to the imitation task. 
Therefore, instead of comparing atypical and typical biological motion models, Chapter Three 
compared two atypical models – atypical17 and atypical 26 – that both had a peak velocity 
skewed towards the beginning of the movement but contained slightly different kinematic 
profiles. Atypical17 had a peak velocity of 0.37 mm/ms that occurred at 17% of the movement 
time. In comparison, atypical26 had a peak velocity of 0.24 mm/ms that occurred at 26% of 
the movement. Here then, imitative differences between these models could not occur without 
their specific kinematic features embedded within the observed biological motion being coded 
for motor execution during imitation.
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Figure 6.1. A summary of the structure, purpose, flow and key findings from the four experimental chapters (Experiments 1-4). 
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6.3. Motion Coding 
 
6.3.1. Constant Velocity, Typical, and Atypical Motion  
 The data reported in the current thesis confirmed the coding of biological motion 
during imitation learning. Imitation data from Chapters Two, Four and Five demonstrates 
imitation of atypical biological motion that was not only different to that of typical biological 
motion, but was also scaled relative to the respective models. Further, imitation data from 
Chapters Four and Five showed imitation of typical biological motion that was different to 
that of non-biological constant velocity.  
 In Chapters Four and Five, where imitation of typical biological motion and non-
biological constant velocity were compared, results consistently showed differences in 
imitation of the two models. For example, results from Chapter Four showed when imitating 
typical biological motion, kinematics was scaled to those of the model, where magnitude of 
peak velocity was 0.12 mm/ms and occurred at 39% of the movement time. In contrast, 
imitation of the constant velocity model produced a peak velocity of 0.1 mm/ms, which 
occurred at 44% of the movement time. While statistically different to the typical model, the 
percentage-time-to-peak-velocity during reproduction of constant velocity indicates rather 
than coding the explicit kinematics of the constant velocity model, imitation represented a 
movement that had been recruited from an existing motor repertoire (e.g. natural kinematics) 
as peak velocity occurred between the 40-60% window typically associated with a generic 
bell-shaped velocity profile (Elliott et al., 2001). Further, although the imitation data suggests 
that the general representation of the typical biological motion model was similar to the 
underlying kinematics, it is unclear whether imitation reflected coding of the biological 
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motion kinematics or reproduction of a non-specific movement pattern based on the perceived 
movement time and displacement during observation of the models. For example, the lacking 
relative accuracy when imitating the typical biological motion model may have been a 
function of the number of practice trials; that is, 84 trials may have been sufficient to form a 
general representation of the typical biological motion model, but insufficient to refine the 
precise kinematics of the typical biological motion model such that they were representative 
of the underlying movement features during imitation trials. The differences in imitation of 
typical biological motion and constant velocity are consistent with previous research that has 
shown differences in imitation following observation of biological, compared with non-
biological motion (Brass et al., 2001; Kilner et al., 2003; Press et al., 2005). In line with these 
findings, it could be suggested that the differences in imitation between typical and constant 
velocity models is a result of the biological nature of the typical model inducing biological 
tuning (Press, 2011) within the perception-action system such that larger visuomotor 
resonance (Becchio & Castiello, 2012) of the typical biological motion kinematics was 
produced (Longo et al., 2008), compared to non-biological constant velocity kinematics (Press 
et al., 2011). Greater visuomotor resonance following observation of human, compared to 
non-human, movement has been demonstrated during congruent and incongruent online 
imitation of horizontal and vertical arm movements (Kilner et al., 2003; Roberts et al., 2015). 
For example, imitation data showed that when making orthogonal arm movements to those 
observed, interference (or motor contagion; Blakemore & Frith, 2005) was greater when 
observing a human arm compared with a robotic arm (Kilner et al., 2003). Relative to the 
current thesis, the difference in imitation of typical biological motion and non-biological 
constant velocity shown in Chapters Four and Five extend these findings into imitation 
learning research, as well as corroborate the suggestion that there is a difference in information 
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processing based on the biological nature of the observed stimuli (Kilner et al., 2007; 
Vangeneugden, Pollick & Vogels, 2009). 
 Biological tuning is supported by neurophysiological research that has shown that 
observation of biological motion leads to greater neural activation in regions of the brain 
associated with mirror neurons, compared to observation of non-biological motion (Tai et al., 
2004; Costantini, Galati, Ferretti, Caulo, Tartaro, Romani et al.., 2005; Oberman, McCleery, 
Ramachandran & Pineda, 2007; Engel, Burke, Fiehler, Bien & Rosier, 2008; Miura, Sugiura, 
Takahashi, Sassa, Miyamoto, Sato et al., 2010). For example, when observing a hand making 
a grasping action towards a cylindrical object, regions of the left premotor cortex in humans 
show stronger activations when the grasping action is performed by a human model displaying 
biological motion, compared to when the action is performed by a robot displaying non-
biological motion (Tai et al., 2004). Greater activation of the premotor cortex following 
observation of biological, compared to non-biological motion hand actions demonstrates 
biological tuning of the premotor cortex, which extended neuroimaging research that had 
shown premotor activation during observation of hand and arm movements (Decety, Grezes, 
Costes, Perani, Jeannerod, Procyk et al., 1997; Grezes, Armony, Rowe & Passingham, 2003; 
Hamzei, Rijntjes, Dettmers, Glauche, Weiller, & Buchel, 2003), as well as 
electrophysiological recordings from monkey showing mirror neuron containment within 
premotor cortex (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese & Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese et al., 
1996). Therefore, the biological motion coding demonstrated in the current thesis could be 
interpreted as the detection of typical biological motion activating the biologically tuned 
premotor cortex during observation, such that mirror neurons contained within the premotor 
cortex mapped the visual representation of biological motion formed through observation onto 
a motor representation that incorporated temporal coding of the movement to be used when 
 140
imitating the typical biological motion kinematics (Gangitano et al., 2001). Moreover, the 
reproduction of existing sensorimotor representations rather than the underlying kinematics 
following observation of the constant velocity model is consistent with the suggestion that 
non-biological motion induces less activation of premotor cortex and the mirror neurons 
contained within it (Tai et al., 2004). 
 Although a difference between biological and non-biological motion coding had been 
established, these findings do not examine whether the underlying kinematics of biological 
motion are coded during imitation learning. Therefore, Chapters Two, Four and Five included 
an atypical biological motion model to examine whether observing a model with kinematics 
different to those of the constraints of the task and not already part of an existing motor 
repertoire would result in differences in imitation from the typical model. Results across all 
three chapters consistently showed that imitation of the atypical model produced a greater 
magnitude of peak velocity that occurred earlier in the movement when compared with 
imitation of the typical model. For example, Chapter Two showed that when imitating the 
atypical model, peak velocity was 0.28 mm/ms and occurred at 32% of the movement time. 
Conversely, imitation of the typical model produced peak velocity of 0.19 mm/ms, which 
occurred at 45% of the movement. This is consistent with previous research that has shown 
learning and imitation of novel atypical biological motion kinematics following periods of 
observational practice (Hayes et al., 2014) and although the present thesis has not measured 
observational practice, it has been suggested that similar processes are recruited during 
observation practice and imitation learning (Vogt et al., 2007; Heyes, 2011). 
More specifically, biological motion kinematics have been examined during imitation 
learning through observation of hand movements that are either “fast”, “medium” or “slow” 
(Wild et al., 2010; Stewart, McIntosh & Williams, 2013). Results showed that observation of 
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faster hand movements elicited faster imitation attempts compared with observation of slower 
hand movements. These results are corroborated by the imitation data shown in Chapters Two, 
Four and Five, which show imitation that is scaled relative to the respective models e.g. 
observation of the atypical model resulted in a peak velocity that had greater magnitude and 
occurred earlier in the movement when compared to the typical or constant velocity models. 
However, the models in the current thesis were manipulated to display explicit kinematic 
structures (e.g. atypical model had a peak velocity of 0.2 mm/ms that occurred at 18% of the 
movement), as opposed to non-specific movement speeds (e.g., Wild et al., 2010) and more 
importantly, those kinematic features were used to examine imitation accuracy. Therefore, by 
reproducing peak velocity and percentage-time-to-peak-velocity that reflected those of 
atypical biological motion, it is likely that participants were coding the underlying kinematics 
contained within the atypical model during observation that formed the representation used 
for imitation.  
To confirm what features of the atypical model were being represented during 
imitation learning, further examination of the atypical biological motion was required. 
Therefore, Chapter Three included a second atypical biological motion model, which allowed 
for the direct comparison of two novel, atypical kinematic models – atypical17 and atypical26. 
By using two different atypical models, neither can be imitated simply by reproducing an 
existing motor repertoire, as with the typical model, and thus differences in imitation of 
atypical17 and atypical26 would confirm the coding of the underlying atypical biological 
motion kinematics. If imitation of atypical biological motion, relative to the typical biological 
motion, is based on detecting a faster acceleration or different movement speed, it would be 
expected that imitation of atypical17 and atypical26 produced similar kinematics during 
imitation. as the differences in acceleration between the models was lower than the 20-25% 
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required to perceptually discriminate the changes in velocity (Babler & Dannemiller, 1993; 
Brouwer, Brenner & Smeets, 2002). Results showed that imitation of the atypical17 model 
produced a peak velocity of 0.24 mm/ms that occurred at 22% of the movement time, whereas 
imitation of the atypical26 model produced a peak velocity of 0.19 mm/ms that occurred at 
29% of the movement time. Here then, rather than showing differences in imitation of two 
structurally dissimilar models (atypical and typical), the imitation data from Chapter Three 
shows that imitation of two comparable kinematic structures embedded within separate 
atypical biological motion models are scaled to the respective models. Scaled imitation of 
both atypical models could not have occurred without the kinematic features of both 
atypical17 and atypical26 being coded during observation, such that the motor representations 
formed for imitation featured the peak velocity and percentage-time-to-peak-velocity 
information of each model respectively. Taken together, these data suggest that biological 
motion is coded during imitation learning and importantly, biological motion coding is a 
function of the kinematic features of the observed stimuli being represented for motor 
execution.   
 
6.3.2. How biological motion is coded? 
 As discussed above, the primary findings from Chapters Three, Four and Five suggest 
that biological motion is coded during imitation learning, but they do not explain how this 
coding occurs. The process of imitation is a product of reproducing the underlying kinematics 
of an action through lower-level processes (Iacoboni et al., 2001; Rizzolatti et al., 2001; 
Buccino et al., 2004), but can often be attributed to the reproduction of the spatial properties 
of the observed movement, termed spatial compatibility (Brass et al., 2000; Sturmer et al., 
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2000; Catmur & Heyes, 2011). When imitation engages implicit lower-level processes, direct 
associations are formed between the observed action and the to-be-executed action (Iacoboni, 
1999; Roberts et al., 2012), such that the visual information provides a visual description that 
is used for subsequent action coding (Heyes & Ray, 2000). Conversely, when imitation is a 
product of spatial compatibility, top-down modulatory processes related to spatial and 
anatomical compatibility are engaged that drive the process of imitation (Heyes, 2011; 
Roberts et al., 2012). In the context of the current thesis, if imitation was a function of spatial 
compatibility it would be spatial positioning of the cursor relative to the environment (e.g. the 
point at which peak velocity occurred on the monitor), rather than the way in which the cursor 
is moving (e.g. the kinematics of the models). The ability to differentiate them is therefore 
important to correctly understand the nature of imitation.  
Therefore, Chapter Two controlled for imitation effects being interpreted as the 
reproduction of the spatial coordinates at which peak velocity occurred by requiring imitation 
of both spatially compatible and incompatible model stimuli. This was experimentally 
controlled by spatially decoupling observation and imitation trials such that spatially 
incompatible imitation trials required a visual transformation. Reproduction of kinematics that 
were closer to that of the model stimuli during spatially compatible, compared to incompatible 
trials, would suggest that imitation was a function of reproducing the spatial properties of the 
observed movement; however, similar reproduction of kinematics during both spatially 
compatible and incompatible trials would suggest the kinematics were coded through lower-
level visuomotor processes. In addition to showing that observation of the atypical model 
produced greater magnitude of peak velocity that occurred earlier in the movement compared 
to imitation of the typical model, the imitation data from Chapter Two showed these imitation 
effects were not modulated by the spatial compatibility between the observed and executed 
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movements. That is, when the stimuli were observed moving in a different direction (right to 
left) or orthogonal plane (top to bottom, bottom to top) to the execution requirements (left to 
right), imitation of both the atypical and typical models were scaled to the respective models. 
For example, after observing the atypical model move from left to right, spatially compatible 
imitation produced average peak velocity of 0.29 mm/ms that occurred at 32% of the 
movement; after observing the atypical model move from top to bottom, spatially 
incompatible imitation produced peak velocity of 0.29 mm/ms that occurred at 31% of the 
movement.  
By controlling for the spatial compatibility between the observed and executed 
movements, spatially incompatible imitation is unlikely to be a function of reproducing the 
spatial coordinates of the visual representation (e.g. movement from right to left where the 
peak velocity occurs towards the right side of the movement) based on the visuomotor 
situation (Hommel & Lippa, 1995) and instead, isolates the coding of visual stimuli to lower-
level visuomotor processes (Press et al., 2008). Therefore, similar imitation of spatially 
compatible and incompatible biological motion models shown in Chapter Two demonstrates 
that the coding of atypical biological motion is likely to be a function of lower-level 
visuomotor processing. The lower-level coding of kinematics suggests the perception-action 
system maps specific characteristics (e.g. movement kinematics) of the observed stimulus 
onto a sensorimotor representation that is directly activated during imitation trials (Buxbaum 
& Kalenine, 2010; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Heyes, 2011), which may indicate the visual 
description produced during observation incorporates temporal coding into the representation 
(Gangitano et al., 2001). Temporal coding has been demonstrated by measuring MEPs in the 
finger that were induced by TMS during observation of a reaching-grasping action, where the 
amplitude of MEPs was modulated by the amount of observed finger aperture; that is, response 
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facilitation was tuned relative to specific kinematic landmarks contained within the observed 
movement.  
Moreover, in demonstrating similar imitation during spatially compatible and 
incompatible trials, the findings in Chapter Two corroborate previous automatic imitation 
research that suggests imitation is not a function of spatial compatibility (Brass et al., 2001; 
Bertenthal et al., 2006; Catmur & Heyes, 2011; Heyes et al., 2005). For example, reaction 
times were similar when imitating a finger raising or tapping movement that was observed 
either in the same orientation as required for imitation (spatially compatible) or when the hand 
was flipped and presented upside-down (spatially incompatible). Flipping the observed finger 
tapping or raising such that they were observed upside-down decoupled the direction of the 
movement required for imitation (e.g. finger tapping when flipped had the same spatial 
compatibility as finger lifting). Likewise, reaction times have been shown to be similar when 
observing hand grasping and opening movements where the hand was observed in the same 
(spatially compatible) or orthogonal (spatially incompatible) orientations, where the stimulus 
hand was observed vertically and imitation hand was horizontal, to that which was required 
for imitation (Heyes et al., 2005). Observing the hand opening or closing in an orthogonal 
plane decoupled both the direction of movement and the plane in which the stimulus was 
observed (e.g. horizontal finger tapping produces a downward movement; orthogonal finger 
tapping produces a right or left movement), such that the observed and executed movements 
did not have the same spatial alignment or orientation.   
Controlling for spatial compatibility by requiring imitation of observed stimuli that 
were both spatially compatible (left to right), as well as incompatible in both the direction 
(right to left) and plane (top to bottom and bottom to top) of the movement, therefore suggests 
that imitation of the biological motion models is based on the extraction of the kinematic 
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properties that define each model –  for example, magnitude and timing of peak velocity. The 
extraction of these kinematics could be facilitated by the tracking of the model during 
observation, as visual attention has been demonstrated to be a crucial feature of biological 
motion coding through use of point-light displays (Johansson, 1973; Bidet-Ildei, Orliaguet, 
Sokolov & Pavlova, 2006) and selective attention (Hayes et al., 2014; Longo & Bertenthal, 
2009). Therefore, Chapter Four controlled for visual attention by recording eye movements 
during imitation. As seen in Figure 4.8, the eye movement velocity data is similar to the 
kinematic structures of each of the model stimuli respectively. For example, observing typical 
biological motion results in eye movement behaviour that produced the expected bell-shaped 
velocity profile of the typical model, whereas observing the atypical model generated a greater 
magnitude of peak eye velocity that also occurred towards the beginning of the movement. 
As the eye velocity data reflects the kinematic structures of the respective models, these data 
suggest that participants were attempting to track the cursor during the observation phase of 
the experimental task and moreover, that the visual description supplied to the perception-
action system contained all the kinematic data underpinning the models. Therefore, 
participants had the opportunity to process all underlying kinematic data contained within the 
model stimuli and thus, project accurate representations of each model onto the motor system 
that resulted in scaled imitation of the respective models (Costantini, Ambrosini, 
Cardellicchio & Sinigaglia, 2013; D’Ausilio, Gredeback, Falck-Ytter & Fadgia, 2013).  
Having controlled for spatial compatibility (Chapter Two) and confirmed eye 
movements are directed to the stimuli during observation (Chapter Four), the imitation of 
biological motion reported in the current thesis corroborates neurophysiological research on 
mirror neurons and the perception-action system (Buccino et al., 2004; Iacoboni et al., 1999). 
Within the perception-action system, it is commonly held that the ‘core circuit’ for imitation 
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includes the posterior IFG, vPMC and IPL (Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006), while frontal regions 
also show consistent activation during observation and imitation in relation to higher-order 
control processes (Molenberghs, Cunnington & Mattingley, 2009). It is suggested that 
observation of biological motion kinematics activated the pSTS, which produced a visual 
description of the observed stimulus (Allison et al., 2000) that was supplied to the temporal 
regions of the perception-action system where a visual representation of the observed stimulus 
was formed for subsequent action coding (Cattaneo et al., 2010; Rizzolatti & Fadiga, 2014). 
If goals were present during the observation trial (e.g. end-state-targets in Chapters Three and 
Four) the visual representation would most likely be processed by IPL, which is associated 
with processing the top-down components of visual information (Southgate & Hamilton, 
2008) such that the goal of the action (e.g. imitating a stimulus that finishes on a red target) 
would have been incorporated into the visual description to become part of the motor 
representation used for imitation (Fadiga et al., 1995; Casartelli & Moteni, 2014). If there 
were no goals present during action-observation (e.g. Chapter Two), atypical biological 
kinematics would have most likely been processed in IFG, which is associated with the lower-
level coding of visual information (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010) and biological motion 
(Saygin et al., 2004). IFG facilitates the understanding of the motoric components of an action 
such that the underlying kinematics of the stimuli would have been represented as a motor 
representation. This direct connection between the visual description produced by STS and 
motor representation for imitation is termed visuomotor processing (Bastiaansen, Thioux & 
Keysers, 2009; Brass, Ruby & Spengler, 2009), which is known to contain neural substrates 
that facilitate imitation (Iacoboni, 1999; Rizzolatti et al., 2001) and is likely to explain the 
coding of unmodulated atypical biological motion reported in Chapter Two. 
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In line with the visuomotor processing substrates contained within the perception-
action system, atypical biological motion coding could be interpreted as the visual 
representation of atypical biological motion directly linking with the subsequent reproduction 
of the same representation, such that subsequent reproduction of the same atypical kinematics 
formed a link between the observed and executed action that resulted in imitation of atypical 
biological motion regardless of spatial compatibility (Catmur et al., 2009; Cavallo et al., 
2014). The mechanisms underpinning visuomotor processing of biological motion are also at 
the basis for the associative sequence learning (ASL) theory of imitation (Heyes & Ray, 2000; 
Heyes, 2001; Brass & Heyes, 2005). ASL suggests that excitatory links or associations 
connect sensory and motor representations of the same action (Heyes & Ray, 2000), which 
are formed during learning and development (Schultz & Dickinson, 2000, Catmur & Heyes, 
2011). This learning occurs when the observed movement and executed movement are 
correlated, which engages regions of the brain with mirror properties that enable action 
understanding (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Ferrari et al., 2003). This effect has been 
demonstrated using countermirror protocols, where periods of training have been shown to 
reconfigure the mirror system (Catmur et al., 2007) and improve automatic imitation effects 
of non-biological stimuli (Press et al., 2007). For example, in the Catmur et al. (2007) study, 
participants underwent incompatible training periods where they executed index-finger 
adductions following observation of little-finger adductions and vice versa, as well as 
compatible training periods where the observed and executed finger movements were the 
same. Using TMS to measure MEPs in the musculature of the respective fingers, results 
showed that incompatible training reversed the mirror effect such that observation of the 
index-finger adduction primed the musculature in the little finger and vice versa and 
demonstrates that sensorimotor experience plays a critical role in imitation. The ASL model 
suggests the proposed visuomotor processing in the current thesis is facilitated by matching 
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vertical associations connecting sensory and motor representations of the same action during 
development and learning, which occur when the sensorimotor experience of the observation 
and execution of an action, in this case observing and imitating atypical biological motion, are 
correlated (Catmur et al., 2009). As such, sensory representations of atypical biological 
motion activated by movement observation are more likely to be active during motor 
representations of atypical biological motion than during motor representations of any other 
movement (e.g. typical biological motion/ constant velocity). 
   
6.3.3. Modulatory Factors 
 Although Chapter Two demonstrates lower-level processing of atypical biological 
motion by controlling spatial compatibility and manipulating biological motion, it did so in 
an unmodulated context; that is, during observation and imitation the only visual information 
available was that of the cursor containing kinematic information of each of the model stimuli 
and there were limited environmental factors that could have created top-down modulatory 
effects e.g. end-state-targets (see “true imitation”; Tomasello, Savage-Rumbaugh & Kruger, 
1993). While that is important in understanding whether biological motion is coded and how 
that process might take place, imitation also recruits general top-down processes that can 
result in modulation (Bekkering et al., 2000; Chong et al., 2008; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). 
Therefore, Chapters Three and Five examined the contribution of end-state-targets (Chapter 
Three) and social primes (Chapter Five) to imitation of biological motion during imitation 
learning. 
 
6.3.3.1. End-state-targets 
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 Chapter Three examined the influence of end-state-targets on imitation of biological 
motion. End-state-targets have been shown to modulate imitation in both a behavioural 
(Wohlschlager et al., 2003; Hayes et al., 2008) and neurophysiological (Hamiton, 2008) 
research. For example, when children observe ipsilateral (cross-hemisphere) arm movements 
that touch an ear (e.g. right hand touches left ear), they often imitate by making a contralateral 
(same hemisphere) arm movements (e.g. left hand touches left ear) as they are the most 
efficient means of achieving the goal (touch the ear). However, when the ipsilateral arm 
movement is made to a space beside the ear (e.g. right hand moves to space by left ear), 
children imitate the way in which the arm moves as there is no clear observable end goal 
(Bekkering et al., 2000). Goal-directed modulation occurs when the observed movement is 
encoded through hierarchical processing, where goals are prescribed primary importance and 
achieved at the expense of the underlying movement kinematics. Therefore, having 
established biological motion is coded during imitation learning in Chapter Two (e.g. the 
means), the purpose of Chapter Three was to manipulate end-state-targets to examine whether 
they modulated the coding of biological motion during imitation learning. 
Imitation data from Chapter Three showed that in addition to atypical biological 
motion coding, the presence of end-state-targets modulated imitation such that, relative to the 
model movement time of 1700 ms, movement time was less accurate when end-state-targets 
were present (2294 ms) compared to when they were absent (2156 ms). An interpretation of 
these findings could be that, in line with GOADI, the presence of end-state-targets results in 
greater importance being placed on goal attainment such that less attention is placed on 
achieving the movement time goal of the task (Ondobaka & Bekkering, 2012). However, 
contrary to recent imitation learning research (Wild et al., 2010), the results from Chapter 
Three did not demonstrate the attenuation of kinematics when end-state-targets were present. 
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Wild et al. (2010) showed that imitation was modulated by the speed of the observed action 
only when end-state-targets were absent, which resulted in a difference between imitation of 
the “fast” and “slow” models that was not reported when end-state-targets were present and 
corroborates both GOADI (Bekkering et al, 2000) and the dual-route model (Rumiati & 
Tessari, 2002). It was suggested that when end-state-targets were present, they were perceived 
as the most important feature of the movement (GOADI), which resulted in less visual 
attention being given to the movement trajectory of the model’s limb during observation such 
that small movement details containing kinematic information were not processed. In the 
study by Wild et al. (2010) visual attention was quantified by recording eye movements during 
observation of the stimuli and showed that participants made more saccades towards the end 
of the movement when end-state-targets were present.  
Conversely, when end-state-targets were absent, each trial was without an obvious 
end-point and as confirmed by the eye movement data, visual attention was orientated to the 
stimulus such that the movement trajectory was tracked during observation. In tracking the 
movement trajectory throughout the duration of the observation trial, all the kinematic 
information contained within the movement trajectory was observed and could be coded. Here 
then, the results from Chapter Three show that imitation of biological motion kinematics 
occurs regardless of the presence of end-state-targets but movement time is modulated when 
end-state-targets are present, which contradicts the suggestion than top-down modulatory 
factors associated with goals are perceived as most important within a hierarchy and instead, 
requires a different explanation for the findings.   
 An interpretation for the goal-directed modulation of movement time, but not 
kinematics, could be related to a mechanism that integrates top-down attentional processes 
and lower-level visuomotor processes based on the goal of the task (Roberts et al., 2012; 
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Andrew et al., 2016). A complimentary relationship between lower-level and higher order 
processes has been shown using motor training that required a 3-segment movement sequence 
to be acquired under varying levels of feedback (no knowledge of results [KR], high-
frequency KR and two reduced-frequency KR) prior to an imitation phase (Andrew et al., 
2016). The imitation phase required imitation of models similar to those used in the current 
thesis (atypical biological motion, typical biological motion and constant velocity) across a 
single-segment movement that had the same movement time (1700 ms) as the movement 
learned during motor training but displayed different movement kinematics, thus examining 
the higher-order processes associated with representing movement time and the lower-level 
processes associated with kinematic coding. Results showed imitation of biological motion 
kinematics was similar across all groups, but movement time was more accurate following 
reduced-frequency knowledge of results (KR), compared to high-frequency KR or no KR 
groups and suggests that although top-down cognitive processes and lower-level sensorimotor 
processes are distinct, they must operate together to facilitate both the imitation of biological 
motion kinematics and modulation of movement time accuracy. Therefore, an appropriate 
inference of the imitation data from Chapter Three, which shows coding of biological motion 
kinematics and goal-directed modulation of movement time, could be that complimentary 
lower-level and top-down systems are active during imitation learning that facilitate the 
coding of biological motion whilst also representing the temporal components of the observed 
action relative to end-state-targets.  
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6.3.3.2. Social Primes 
Chapter Five examined the influence of social primes on imitation of biological 
motion. Images displaying either neutral, direct or averted eye gaze primes were shown prior 
to observation of the model stimuli that were designed to convey neutral, pro- or anti-social 
context respectively (Wang et al., 2011a). While the effects of social modulation have been 
examined in the context of automatic imitation (Leighton et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2011a; 
Wang & Hamilton, 2012), these effects have not yet been examined in the context of imitation 
learning of biological motion kinematics. From a social psychology perspective, social 
interaction has been identified as an evolutionary function of humans that defines how 
imitation occurs, as demonstrated by the chameleon effect (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), which 
refers to the nonconscious mimicry of various interactive behaviours (e.g. postures, facial 
expressions and mannerisms) such that behaviour changes to match that of those within the 
social environment. Social psychology has also shown social modulation of performance 
based on subjective features such as attractiveness (van Leeuwen et al., 2009; Kuleza, 
Szypowska, Jarman & Dolinski, 2014) and social status (Landers & Landers, 1973; 
McCullagh, 1986). For example, McCullagh (1986) showed that when young girls were cued 
with women of high (cheerleader) and low (woman in street clothes) social status prior to 
completing a ladder task, performance of the task was better following observation of the 
cheerleader.  
Imitative behaviour changes can facilitate learning (Bandura, 1977) and/or promote 
feelings of liking and affiliation amongst those engaged in the imitation (Chartrand & van 
Baaren, 2009). It is suggested that these feelings of affiliation occur as a result of the perceived 
positive social consequences (e.g. pro-social priming), which relative to imitation, exert top-
down control that modulates visual information processing such that imitation is controlled to 
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meet the social goal (Hamilton, 2008).  Conversely, perceived negative social consequences 
(e.g. anti-social priming) exert control that down-regulates visual information processing such 
that imitation becomes worse (Tiedens & Fragale, 2003). These up- and down-regulatory 
effects have been demonstrated in automatic imitation of hand opening/ closing movements 
after completing neutral, pro- or anti-social word scrambles (Leighton et al., 2010). Results 
showed that pro-social priming produced a larger automatic imitation effect (e.g. the 
difference between compatible and incompatible reaction times was greater) and anti-social 
priming produced a smaller automatic imitation effect (e.g. the difference between compatible 
and incompatible reaction times was lesser) when compared to the neutral prime, which 
suggests a bidirectional relationship between social primes and imitation. Therefore, the 
purpose of Chapter Five was to investigate how pro- and anti-social eye gaze primes 
modulated the coding of biological motion kinematics in the context of imitation learning. 
In addition to confirming biological motion coding, imitation data from Chapter Five 
showed that social primes modulated imitation. In relation to imitation accuracy, following 
observation of both the atypical and typical biological motion models, imitation of peak 
velocity was more like the respective model when primed with the anti-social prime, 
compared to the pro-social and neutral primes. Improved imitation effects following anti-
social priming could be interpreted as evidence of the active-self theory (Wheeler, Demarree 
& Petty, 2007), which suggests the direction of the prime-to-behaviour effect is relative to 
how the primes are processed in relation to one’s self. For example, while priming with the 
word “smart” is likely to induce an assimilative self-concept (e.g. I am smart) and therefore 
behaviour (e.g. better performance in an intelligence task), priming with distinct examples of 
intelligence (e.g. Einstein) induce contrasting self-concepts (e.g. I am not Einstein, therefore 
I am not smart) and therefore behaviours (e.g. bad performance on an intelligence test 
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(Dijksterhuis, Spears, Postmes, Stapel, Koomen, van Knippenberg et al., 1998). As the social 
primes in the Chapter Five were observed from a third-person rather than a first-person 
perspective, they may have prompted a contrasting self-concept, which meant that rather than 
pro-social primes exerting top-down control that up-regulated information processing 
(Leighton et al., 2010), the third-person anti-social primes may have induced opposing 
modulatory effects to those characteristically associated with the pro- and anti-social primes, 
which resulted in the upregulation of peak velocity during imitation (Roberts et al., 2016). 
Upregulated imitation following anti-social priming from a third-person perspective has been 
demonstrated using word scrambles prior to completion of an imitation task (Wang & 
Hamilton, 2013), where up-regulation and improved imitation was reported when completing 
pro-social word scrambles in the first person (e.g. “unnatrual am trying to help), as well as 
anti-social word scrambles in the third person (e.g. “the white sphere is trying to hinder). 
Conversely, down-regulation and weaker imitation was reported when completing anti-social 
word scrambles in the first-person (e.g. “I am trying to hinder) and pro-social word scrambles 
in the third person (e.g. “the white triangle is trying to help).  
As well as imitation accuracy being modulated by social priming, variability data 
indicated imitation performance was significantly more consistent, and less variable, 
following observation of both pro- and anti-social primes, compared to no prime. For example, 
percentage-time-to-peak-velocity and movement time were less variable following 
presentation of the pro- and anti-social primes, compared with presentation of the neutral 
prime. Percentage-time-to-peak-velocity had a variability of 17% following neutral prime, 
compared with 15% and 12% following the anti-social and pro-social primes respectively. 
Similarly, movement time had a variability of 517 ms following the neutral prime, compared 
with 441 ms and 419 ms following the anti-social and pro-social primes respectively. These 
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findings corroborate previous research that has shown reduced variability of online imitation 
following observation of social primes (Roberts et al., 2016). Prior to observing horizontal 
(control condition) or curvilinear arm movements while executing cyclical horizontal arm 
movements, participants completed pro-or anti-social word scrambles to influence the social 
context of the imitation task. Results showed that in addition to greater contagion during 
observation of curvilinear, compared to horizontal arm movements, completing the anti-social 
primes increased contagion further during observation of the curvilinear arm movements, 
relative to the pro-social primes and thus, demonstrates reproduction of a movement more like 
that which was observed. As only the anti-social prime up-regulated and decreased movement 
variability, the findings were attributed to the self-active theory as discussed previously 
(Dijksterhuis et al., 1998; Wang & Hamilton, 2013). However, the variability findings in the 
current thesis demonstrate that it is the observation of a social prime in general, rather than 
anti-social specifically, that modulates and reduces movement variability during imitation and 
therefore, a different interpretation of these results should be considered.  
Demonstrating that both pro- and anti-social primes improve imitation by reducing 
variability suggests rather than the explicit nature of the prime (e.g. anti-social prime up-
regulates imitation of peak velocity) or observing no social prime at all (e.g. neutral prime), 
there is a general priming effect that is related to the observation of any social prime. A general 
priming effect of imitative variability suggests that social primes are influencing imitation at 
an intrinsic level (Meltzoff, 1996), such that movement execution is facilitated e.g. imitation 
is less variable. The general priming effect on variability in Chapter Five challenges the 
classic understanding of social control of imitation, termed STORM (social top-down 
response modulation; see Wang & Hamilton, 2012), which suggests that during ‘successful’ 
pro-social priming, the observer subconsciously forms a positive social affiliation that 
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enhances and up-regulates the processing of the observed action such that subsequent 
imitation is improved (van Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). Conversely, if anti-social priming is 
‘successful’, the observer forms negative affiliations that diminish and down-regulate the 
processing of the observed action such that imitation is impaired (Leighton et al., 2010). 
A general effect of social priming could be explained by the neural commonalities that 
imitation and social modulation share. The active regions during observation of both 
biological motion and social primes have been explored through the functional connectivity 
and arrangement of the amPFC, associated with social information processing, and the 
IFG/vPMC of the perception action system, associated with imitation (Wang & Hamilton, 
2011; Spunt and Lieberman, 2012). To ensure participants engaged in observation of the 
social primes, prior to the experiment they were instructed that observing the images was 
required during each trial and they were to direct their attention to the images when they were 
presented on the monitor. Relative to Chapter Five, the primes containing eye gazes displayed 
either direct (pro-social) or averted (anti-social) gaze, which were modified from previous 
research that has shown both images to activate regions of the brain associated with the STS 
and the detection of biological motion, as well as the IFG and mPFC that have mirror 
properties (Wang et al, 2011b). Though the data from Chapter Five does not examine 
neurological activity during the imitation task, it is conceivable that the neurological links 
between eye gaze priming and imitation of biological motion influenced the way in which the 
visual stimuli were processed and represented. Based on the neurological associations 
biological motion and social primes share, it could be suggested that the commonalities 
between the eye gaze primes and observed stimuli could have created a biological sensitivity 
(see biological tuning; Blakemore & Frith, 2005), where a biological social prime (pro- and 
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anti-social) would upregulate the detection and processing of biological motion (atypical 
model) representations such that imitation was less variable. 
 
6.4. Models of Imitation 
 The findings discussed throughout the current thesis provide an insight into biological 
motion coding during imitation learning and corroborate the concept of imitation being a 
complex process which varies greatly based on the visual information available (Oztop, 
Kawato & Arbib, 2006; Heyes, 2011, Campbell & Cunnington, 2017). Primarily, all 
experimental chapters show biological motion is coded during imitation learning, either by 
demonstrating a difference in imitation between typical and constant velocity models 
(Chapters Four and Five), atypical and typical models (Chapters Two, Four and Five) or 
atypical17 and atypical26 models (Chapter Three). Moreover, by spatially decoupling the 
observed and imitated trials in Chapter Two, scaled imitation of spatially incompatible 
atypical biological motion isolates the coding of biological motion to lower-level visuomotor 
processing. As imitation was similar during spatially compatible and incompatible trials, 
results confirm that biological motion coding is not a function of top-down control based on 
reproducing the spatial coordinates of kinematic features e.g. peak velocity occurring at the 
left side of the monitor, but the lower-level processing of the underlying movement 
kinematics.  
In addition to these primary findings, which provide insight into the broader 
understanding of biological motion coding during imitation learning, Chapters Three and Five 
were designed to examine the modulatory influences on biological motion coding. For 
example, the imitation task in Chapter Three included end-state-targets to examine the coding 
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of biological motion during goal-directed imitation (Bekkering et al., 2000). Imitation data 
showed that in addition to biological motion coding, the presence of end-state-targets impaired 
the accuracy of movement time imitation relative that of the models (1700 ms). These results 
demonstrate that the lower-level processes involved in biological motion coding operate 
cooperatively with top-down attentional processes associated with end-state-targets to 
facilitate imitation that incorporates different features (e.g. kinematics, goals) of the observed 
stimuli (Roberts et al., 2012; Andrew et al., 2016). In addition to end-state-targets modulating 
imitation, Chapter Five shows that social primes modulate the coding of biological motion 
such that imitation of peak velocity is closer to that of the models following observation of an 
anti-social prime, relative to a pro-social or neutral prime. Anti-social up-regulation of 
imitation could be interpreted as evidence of the active-self theory (Wheeler et al., 2007), 
where the perception of the prime relative to one’s self influences how the prime modulates 
imitation e.g. observing an anti-social prime in the third-person generates an up-regulation of 
information processing (Wang & Hamilton, 2013).  
In addition to the anti-social up-regulation of peak velocity, imitation of movement 
time and percentage-time-to-peak-velocity was less variable following observation of both 
pro- and anti-social primes, compared with neutral primes. The reduction of variability 
following observation of both a pro- and anti-social prime suggests that social modulation is 
a product of a general priming effect, rather than the explicit nature of the social prime (e.g. 
pro-social or anti-social), which modulates the efficacy of the representation formed during 
observation at an implicit level (Meltzoff, 1996). 
While there are many individual theories that posit explanations for how imitation 
occurs (see “theoretical models of imitation”, Chapter One), the current thesis demonstrates 
there are many levels of information processing that underpin imitation, which may be better 
 160
explained by a combination of theories. Fundamentally, the current thesis shows that 
biological motion is processed during imitation learning (all chapters) and that this processing 
can be modulated by the presence of end-state-targets (Chapter Three) and social primes 
(Chapter Five). While previous research has suggested that action-goals are prioritised 
through hierarchical coding (Bekkering et al., 2000; Wohlschlager et al., 2003), Chapter 
Three shows the end-state-target modulation of movement time as well as the coding of 
movement kinematics, which suggests there may be an embedded system where lower-level 
coding of biological motion and top-down modulatory control of higher-order cognitive 
processes operate cooperatively to facilitate successful imitation based on the environmental 
context and visual information available (Andrew et al., 2016).  
The complimentary relationship between lower-level and higher-order systems is 
consistent with the suggestion that multiple routes within the brain underpin imitation 
(Bekkering et al., 2000; Di Dio et al., 2013; Hamilton, 2008; 2015; Rumiati et al., 2009; 2014). 
Relative to Chapter Three, the kinematic features of the atypical biological motion model are 
suggested to be coded by visual areas (temporal gyrus; STS) and IFG (Gallese et al., 2002; 
Kilner et al., 2009; Molenberghs, Cunnington & Mattingley, 2012; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 
2010), whereas the goal of the action (e.g. completing imitation of the atypical biological 
motion model by reaching an end-state-target) is processed by a parietal route (Chong et al., 
2009; Hamilton, 2008). These areas are known to contain mirror neurons and as such, parietal, 
premotor and frontal regions of the brain are considered to form the ‘core circuitry’ within the 
perception-action system and operate together to facilitate the imitation of novel actions such 
as atypical biological motion (Hamilton, 2015; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006). It is suggested 
that the ‘core circuitry’ of the perception-action system may function as a network for visual 
to motor transformations (Hamilton, 2015) that is facilitated by the process of imitation 
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learning (Heyes, 2011) and may have formed links between the observed atypical biological 
motion kinematics and an appropriate motor output (Cisek & Kalaska, 2010). This ‘core 
circuitry’ is also engaged by non-imitative tasks, as demonstrated through sensorimotor 
training that required participants to perform a hand movement while observing a foot 
movement, and perform foot movements while observing a hand movement (Catmur et al., 
2008). Results showed that the perception-action system could be reconfigured such that 
observing a hand movement activated regions of the brain associated with foot movements 
and vice versa. While the perception-action system can be reconfigured by sensorimotor 
training, the current thesis suggests that in the context of imitation learning, the perception-
action system is also configured to represent the underlying features (e.g. kinematics) of novel 
actions (atypical biological motion).  
Chapter Two provided further support to the suggestion that atypical biological motion 
coding is a function of lower-level processing by decoupling the spatial compatibility between 
the observed and executed movements. Results showed imitation of atypical biological motion 
was similar when the atypical model was observed in spatially incompatible and compatible 
orientations. Given the spatially compatible trials involved the stimulus moving from left to 
right, the spatially incompatible trials controlled for movements in opposite direction but same 
horizontal orientation e.g. observing the stimulus move right to left (Brass et al., 2001), as 
well as orthogonal orientation e.g. top to bottom or bottom to top (Heyes et al., 2005). 
Reproducing topologically similar atypical biological motion kinematics during spatially 
incompatible imitation isolates the coding of biological motion to lower-level visuomotor 
processes as it cannot be a function of reproducing the spatial coordinates through higher-
order cognitive processes (Heyes, 2011). Coding biological motion kinematics through lower-
level processes supports the associative sequence learning (ASL) theory of imitation (Heyes 
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& Ray, 2000; Heyes, 2001; Brass & Heyes, 2005), which suggests that excitatory links or 
associations connect sensory and motor representations of the same action (Heyes & Ray, 
2000), which are formed during learning and development (Schultz & Dickinson, 2000, 
Catmur & Heyes, 2011). In line with ASL theory, the coding of spatially incompatible atypical 
biological motion could be a function of the observed and executed movements being 
correlated e.g. observing atypical biological motion and imitating atypical biological motion, 
which is suggested to engage regions of the brain with mirror properties that enable action 
understanding (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Ferrari et al., 2003). 
 The general finding of biological motion coding shown throughout all chapters of the 
current thesis supports the widely-held view that biological motion is coded and represented 
during observation of a stimulus (Cross et al., 2013; Cutting & Kozlowski, 1977; Grossman, 
Donnelly, Price, Pickens, Morgan, Neighbor et al., 2006; Johannson, 1973; Kilner et al., 2003; 
Saygin, Wilson, Hagler, Bates & Sereno, 2004). Further, the coding of all atypical biological 
motion models (atypical model – Chapters Two, Four and Five; atypical17 and atypical26 
models – Chapter Three) is consistent with research that has shown imitation of velocity 
kinematics following observation of biological motion (Bisio et al., 2010; Wild et al., 2010). 
The adaption from a pre-existing movement pattern (typical biological motion) to a novel 
movement pattern (atypical biological motion) suggests that the lower-level visuomotor 
processes associated with direct coding of movement kinematics (Hayes et al., 2009; 2010) 
are engaged during the imitation learning protocol used in the current thesis.  
This visuomotor processing of atypical biological motion supports neurophysiological 
research on the perception-action system, which suggests that the biological motion contained 
within the atypical model is likely to have been detected by the STS (Perrett et al., 1998; 
Jellema et al., 2000; Allison, Puce & McCarthy, 2000). The STS produces a visual description 
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of the model is then sent to the IFG and IPL where visual representation of the observed 
stimulus is formed for subsequent action coding (Cattaneo et al., 2010; Rizzolatti & Fadiga, 
2014). As such, the visuomotor processing of atypical biological motion demonstrated in the 
current thesis provides support to the EP-M model of imitation (Hamilton, 2008), which 
suggests the perception-action system constitutes an indirect, parietal route for goal emulation 
and planning (EP) and a direct, frontal route for mimicry (M). Unmodulated imitation of 
atypical biological motion (Chapter Two) is likely to have engaged the direct M-route, which 
suggests the MTG forms a visual representation of the kinematic features of the atypical model 
that is sent to the IFG and mapped onto a motor representations containing the underlying 
atypical kinematic profile (see also, ASL model; Heyes, 2001). In contrast, the goal-directed 
modulation of movement time (Chapter Three) is likely to have engaged the EP route, which 
as it incorporates higher-order cognitive processes into the visual representation of the 
observed stimulus. The E-route connects the MTG and IPL and allows for emulation and 
understanding of the goal of an action, which in this case was imitating the goal of reaching 
the end-state-target. The P-route connects the IPL and IFG, which facilitates action planning 
and calculates the best way to achieve the goal e.g. reproduce the kinematics to reach the 
target, or get there as efficiently as possible (Bekkering et al., 2000). Importantly, the 
kinematics of the observed stimuli are included in this motor planning, which corroborates the 
suggestion from the current thesis that lower-level and higher-order cognitive processes are 
complimentary and embedded within the same general system to facilitate imitation of 
complex movements. 
In addition to end-state-targets, the current thesis also demonstrates the top-down 
modulation of lower-level biological motion processing through social context in Chapter 
Five. Firstly, results showed that observing an anti-social eye gaze prime produced an up-
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regulation of peak velocity such that it became more similar to that of the model, relative to 
observing a pro-social or neutral prime. By demonstrating that social context can impart 
control on information processing such that it either inhibits or enhances imitation, these data 
support the STORM model (Wang & Hamilton, 2012). In line with STORM, it is likely that 
the social control produced by engaging in the social prime activated the mPFC, which in 
addition to eye gaze primes (Wang et al., 2011b), has been shown to respond to a wide range 
of social cues (Kampe et al., 2003; Zink et al., 2008; Teufal et al., 2010). For example, fMRI 
results showed that during a hand-opening/closing SRC task with eye gaze priming, 
performing the task activated regions of the brain associated with mirror neurons (STS and 
IFG) and the pro- and anti-social eye gaze primes engaged mPFC. In accord with 
neurophysiological research on the perception action system (Buccino et al., 2004; Iacoboni 
et al., 2001) and the EP-M route (Hamilton, 2008), it is suggested that observation of the anti-
social eye gaze prime up-regulated the mPFC prior to observation of the model stimuli such 
that it was primed for the visual representation of the atypical and typical biological motion 
models that were generated in the STS and IFG. 
Importantly, while social context modulated imitation of peak velocity, it did not 
modulate the relative coding of the atypical and typical biological motion models. That is, 
imitation of atypical and typical biological motion kinematics were still scaled relative to the 
respective models following observation of the social primes. The lower-level processing of 
biological motion shown that activates both STS and IFG (Iacoboni, 1999; Di Dio et al., 2013), 
and higher-order cognitive processes associated with top-down modulation controlled by the 
frontal regions of the perception-action system (Hamilton, 2015), have also been confirmed 
during social modulation of imitation through dynamic causal modelling (DCM). DCM 
examines the information processing strength between neural substrates and has confirmed 
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connectivity between STS and IFG during observation of biological motion (Wang et al., 
2011b). Moreover, DCM in the paper by Wang et al. (2011) confirmed the mPFC as the region 
that exerts top-down control on the mirror neuron system by demonstrating strong 
connectivity between mPFC and STS and IFG respectively.  
 
6.5. Concluding Remarks and Considerations for Future Research 
  
The experiments conducted within this thesis provides evidence as to the way in which 
biological motion is coded during imitation learning, and examines some of the attentional 
factors that modulate the process of imitation. As with most research, the answers that 
experiments produce often result in new questions being asked. For example, it would be 
interesting to translate the principles underpinning the imitation task used in the current thesis 
to more natural environments. All four experimental chapters were lab-based and 
computational, and were designed to minimise environmental context that may influence 
imitation. While the current thesis provides several examples of biological motion coding 
during imitation learning within these controlled contexts, the application of biological motion 
coding during imitation learning may be different in a real-world environment. For example, 
sports training in children requires periods of learning that can often involve observation of 
skills prior to physically practising them. It would be interesting to examine whether the 
environmental context of skill-based learning (e.g. observing an effector with biological 
properties, rather than a non-biological white dot) modulated the attention of the observer 
during acquisition of functional skills (Hayes et al., 2007). For example, eye movements may 
be more directed to an effector (Bach et al., 2007) when a skill is located to an area of the 
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body (e.g. hand/ foot) that contains social context, rather than observing the same movement 
performed by a non-contextualised geometric shape (e.g. white dot). Similarly, instructions 
may modulate what features of skills are acquired relative to what children believe they are 
learning (Stanley, Gowen & Miall, 2007), or what features of the movement those instructions 
direct attention towards (Posner, 1980; Safford et al., 2010).  
In addition to sports training in children, the coding of biological motion during 
imitation learning could be examined in children and adults with ASC. Deficits in imitative 
behaviour in children and adults with autism have been acknowledged for a long time (Ritvo 
& Provence, 1953) and more recently, it has been suggested that this deficit stems from 
reduced neural activity within the perception-action system (‘broken mirror hypothesis’; 
Ramachandran & Oberman, 2006; Williams, Whiten, Suddendorf & Perrett, 2001). While 
there is neurological (Oberman, Hubbard, McCleery, Altschuler, Ramachandran & Pineda, 
2005; Pelphrey, Adolphs & Morris, 2004) and behavioural (Williams, Whiten & Singh, 2004) 
support of the ‘broken mirror hypothesis’, there is also evidence that the neurological 
processes underpinning imitation of biological motion are intact within autistic people (Bird, 
Leighton, Press & Heyes, 2007; Grecucci, Brambilla, Siugzdaite, Londero, Fabbro, et al., 
2013; Sowden, Koehne, Catmur, Dziobek & Bird, 2016). Automatic imitation research 
suggests the underlying processing within the perception action system may be intact, which 
is corroborated by imitation learning research that has demonstrated the coding of movement 
time following observation of a stimulus and thus, engagement in the self-regulation of 
sensorimotor adaptations (Hayes, Andrew, Elliott, Gowen & Bennett, 2016). However, the 
imitation of biological motion kinematics has not yet been demonstrated in children or adults 
with autism (Hayes et al., 2016; Stewart et al., 2013; Wild, Poliakoff, Jerrison & Gowen, 
2012), which could suggest that attention is important during the processing of visual 
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information for people with autism. Chapter Five is integral to this potential area of research 
as it is the first example of discrete biological motion kinematics being modulated by social 
priming during imitation learning. Moreover, the imitation task used in the current thesis has 
consistently been shown to be a valid measurement of biological motion coding. By 
combining a robust protocol with social priming effects in participants who were exclusively 
neurotypicals, there is a strong foundation on which to develop research into people with ASC 
and compare imitative responses. By continuing to compare the ways in which neurotypicals 
and people with ASC process visual information, any differences that are discovered have the 
potential to highlight deficiencies or provide alternative solutions to facilitate learning by 
observing and imitating for people with ASC. 
 Data from Chapters Two, Three and Four provide evidence that not only is biological 
motion coded during imitation learning, but that the coding is a function of lower-level 
visuomotor processing. In Chapter Two, it was found that when observation and imitation are 
spatially incompatible, atypical biological motion kinematics are coded and imitated 
accurately, and relative to the model. Imitation accuracy is also consistent when trials are 
spatially compatible. For imitation to remain accurate in spatially incompatible trials, the 
underlying kinematics, rather than the spatial properties, of the observed stimulus must be 
coded directly such that they can be transformed onto a spatially incongruent motor output. 
Importantly, the visual information provided on the monitor during the imitation task was 
designed to create the most natural imitation responses possible and thus, examine the 
fundamental nature of biological motion processing e.g. non-biological motion cursor to 
display the model kinematics, black background. With the evidence that biological motion 
kinematics is coded through lower-level processing, the protocol could be modified such that 
it reflected more relatable, real-world environments. For example, rather than observing a 
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non-biological dot, the study by Wild et al. (2010) examined imitation of movement kinematic 
by observing a video clip of a human hand moving at different speeds (‘fast’ or ‘slow’). In 
both the current thesis, and the study by Wild et al., imitation required motor execution using 
the arm and hand; however, by replicating the effector in both observation and imitation, Wild 
et al. may have elicited motor priming (Bach & Tipper, 2007; Berger & Hadley, 1975) and 
consequently influenced imitation. Early neurophysiological research suggested non-
biological effectors (e.g. tools) do not activate areas of the brain associated with mirror 
neurons compared with biological effectors (Gallesse et al., 1996; Perrett et al., 1990) and 
thus, could influence the processes underpinning imitation. Conversely, more recent data has 
found it is the nature of the stimuli (e.g. biological/ non-biological motion), not the effector 
that displays it, that primarily influences imitation (Di Dio et al., 2013). These data suggest 
that while the protocol in the current thesis provides a more explicit means of examining the 
imitation of biological motion kinematics, observing a human hand that displays the 
underlying kinematics of the atypical biological motion model and then physically replicating 
the movement may influence the way in which the visual stimulus is processed and 
consequently, imitation.  
In addition to restricting the perceived environmental context, the protocol used in the 
current thesis allowed for explicit top-down modulation to be controlled. For example, 
Chapter Two displayed only the model stimuli to examine coding of biological motion at its 
most fundamental level. However, Chapters Three, Four and Five were modified such that 
end-state-targets (Chapters Three and Four) and social primes (Chapter Five) were displayed 
to examine the top-down influences on the lower-level processing on imitation of biological 
motion. The most interesting of these findings was that social primes modulated the 
variability, but not accuracy, of imitation. Whilst social primes have previously been shown 
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to decrease variability (Roberts et al., 2016), the data from Chapter Five demonstrates that 
social primes modulate biological motion coding during imitation learning differently to 
automatic imitation (Brass et al., 2001; Lakin et al., 2003; Wang, et al., 2011a; Bisio et al., 
2010) and it is important to understand the context in which the social primes have induced 
modulatory effects e.g. by influencing the efficacy of the representation formed during 
observation; by up/ down-regulating the regions of the brain associated with coding visual 
stimuli. It was suggested in Chapter Five that this may be related to the more complex 
processes underpinning imitation learning, compared with automatic imitation (Heyes, 2011) 
but the social primes (e.g. eye gaze, word scrambles) also modulate imitation differently. This 
may be due to eye gaze primes providing a subtler social context compared to word scrambles, 
where the words contain explicit connotations that suggest their intent (Heyes, 2011). For 
example, while direct- and averted-gaze were used as the pro- and anti-social primes in the 
current thesis, it is unknown as to whether they were observed as ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
primes. Therefore, a means of confirming social primes have the desired effect would be to 
issue short questionnaires upon the completion of the imitation task. This would provide 
quantifiable evidence that the primes did, or did not, influence imitation in line with the 
purpose of the experiment.  
 
6.6. Summary 
 
To conclude, the current thesis used a novel behavioural protocol to examine the 
coding of biological motion during imitation learning. The protocol required participants to 
observe, then imitate a combination of biological and non-biological motion models that 
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displayed both novel and existing movement patterns to examine whether biological motion 
was coded, what underlying processes were involved in the coding, and whether the 
underlying processes could be modulated during imitation learning.  
Primarily, the current thesis demonstrated that biological motion is coded during 
imitation learning by showing differences in imitation between the typical and constant 
velocity models (Chapters Four and Five), atypical and typical models (Chapters Two, Four 
and Five) and atypical17 and atypical26 models (Chapter Three). Key within these findings 
was the coding of atypical biological motion, which displayed a novel movement pattern that 
was not already part of the motor repertoire and could not be imitated through recruitment of 
existing motor patterns (e.g. typical model) or chance. Scaled imitation of atypical17 and 
atypical26 models confirmed that the coding of biological motion was not a function of 
strategy based on detecting faster movements that occurred towards the start of the movement, 
but the explicit kinematic structures of the respective models (e.g. different magnitudes of 
peak velocity that occurred at 17% and 26% of the movement respectively).  
In addition to imitating the respective model kinematics, Chapter Two confirmed that 
the coding of biological motion kinematics was isolated to lower-level visuomotor processes 
by spatially decoupling the observed and imitated movements. If imitation was governed by 
higher-order cognitive processes associated with spatial compatibility, imitation would have 
been more accurate during spatially compatible, than incompatible trials. That imitation of the 
atypical biological motion kinematics was similar during spatially incompatible and 
compatible trials demonstrated the processing of the visual stimuli was not related to the 
spatial positioning of salient movement features (e.g. peak velocity occurred on the right-side 
of the monitor), but the underlying kinematics contained within the models. As such, the 
representations formed during observation of the stimuli could be visually transformed to 
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produce scaled imitation of atypical biological motion kinematics during spatially 
incompatible trials. 
As well as demonstrating the lower-level processes involved in biological motion 
coding, Chapters Three and Five suggested that higher-order cognitive processes operate 
alongside lower-level processes to modulate features of imitation. Chapter Three included 
end-state-targets to examine whether goal-directed imitation would influence the underlying 
processes involved in biological motion coding. Results showed that while the coding of 
kinematics was not attenuated, movement time became less accurate when end-state-targets 
were present during observation and imitation of the model stimuli. As movement time was 
modulated, but not at the expense of coding the biological motion kinematics, the imitation 
data from Chapter Three demonstrated a complimentary relationship between lower-level 
visuomotor processing and higher-order cognitive control. Similarly, Chapter Five 
demonstrated that observing social primes prior to observation of the stimuli modulated the 
processing of the visual stimuli. Observation of the anti-social prime generated up-regulatory 
effects where imitation of peak velocity was closer to that of the models and corroborated the 
active-self theory, which suggests the perspective from which a prime is observed relative to 
one’s self influences the way in which the prime interacts with the information processing. In 
addition, the observation of both pro- and anti-social primes reduced the variability of 
imitation such that the percentage-time-to-peak-velocity and movement time became more 
like the respective models, which suggests that a general priming effect, rather than the 
specific nature of the prime, could modulate the efficacy of the representation formed during 
observation of biological motion.  
When taken together, the results in the present thesis contribute to an extension of the 
current literature in several ways. Firstly, the protocol used in all four experimental chapters 
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provided a more applicable measurement of biological motion coding by incorporating 
discrete kinematic markers into the design of the models that were also used in the analysis of 
imitation accuracy. Second, results showed that unmodulated biological motion kinematics is 
coded through lower-level visuomotor processes, which suggests that the way in which 
movements are performed are incorporated into visual representations that are mapped 
directly onto motor outputs for imitation, thus improving the understanding of how visual 
information is processed. This improved scientific understanding can inform anyone who 
implements learning by observing (e.g. coaches, teachers) in their daily life. Similarly, 
demonstrating top-down modulation of lower-level processing both extends the current 
imitation learning literature by demonstrating a complimentary relationship between the two 
and has the potential to inform learning techniques that involve goals or social context. In 
addition to extending the current literature and informing practical learning, the social priming 
study also represents the conception of a body of research examining biological motion coding 
in people with ASC, which has the potential to be highly impactful. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Imitation is a powerful mechanism that supports human interaction. In familiar social settings, 
imitation involves the automatic activation of a motor response triggered by observing a 
similar motor action (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Heyes, 2001, 2011; Heyes et al., 2005). For 
example, individuals execute faster pre-specified movements (e.g., finger tapping) when 
observing biologically compatible (finger tapping), compared to incompatible (finger lifting), 
movements (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Stürmer, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2000). The 
shorter motor reaction times occur independent of task instructions, which suggests 
involvement of automatic sensorimotor processes linking perception and action (Brass & 
Heyes, 2005; Prinz, 1997). 
To understand if the automatic sensorimotor effects are developed through experience, and 
linked to a general mechanism incorporating processes associated with perception, action and 
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attention (Leighton, Bird, & Heyes, 2010), studies have examined automatic imitation 
following correlated sensorimotor training (Bird, Brindley, Leighton, & Heyes, 2007; Catmur, 
Mars, Rushworth, & Heyes, 2011; Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2007, 2009; Cavallo, Heyes, 
Becchio, Bird, & Catmur, 2013; Heyes et al., 2005). For example, individuals performed a 
countermirror protocol that required compatible or incompatible sensorimotor training 
(Catmur et al., 2007). During compatible training, individuals executed index-finger 
movements, whilst simultaneously observing index-finger movements. During incompatible 
training, individuals executed index-finger movements, whilst simultaneously observing 
little-finger movements. After incompatible training, TMS-induced MEPs recorded from the 
little finger abductor muscle were greater during observation of index-finger movement 
compared to a little-finger movement. These findings demonstrate the sensorimotor system 
was reconfigured during correlated sensorimotor training, and thus indicate imitation is 
associated with a general mechanism involving lower-level visuomotor processes that 
represent biological motion, as opposed to a specialized mechanism that mediates (Meltzoff 
& Moore, 1997) the translation of visual information into a motor action. 
Of primary interest to the present study is the suggestion that similar sensorimotor processes 
operate during automatic imitation and imitation learning (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Buccino et 
al., 2004; Heyes, 2011; Iacoboni, 2009). Like the countermirror principle, imitation learning 
often requires the sensorimotor system to represent a novel biological motion across 
consecutive imitation trials. Although there is strong evidence that biological motion is 
processed during automatic imitation (Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschlaeger, & Prinz, 2000; 
Heyes et al., 2005; Press & Heyes, 2008) and interpersonal observation–execution imitation 
tasks (Kilner, Paulignan, & Blakemore, 2003), support from imitation learning studies has 
typically been based on protocols that manipulated the speed of the imitated movement (Bisio, 
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Stucchi, Jacono, Fadiga, & Pozzo, 2010; Hayes, Timmis, & Bennett, 2009; Wild, Poliakoff, 
Jerrison, & Gowen, 2010). 
Although participants have been shown (Wild et al., 2010) to imitate different movement 
speeds (e.g., slow, medium, and fast upper-limb aiming movements), it is notable that the 
observed stimulus was representative of typical aiming movements. Thus, it remains possible 
that imitation was limited to recognizing differences in movement speed between 
observations, as opposed to representing the underlying biological motion kinematics. In this 
case, the feedforward contribution to motor execution could have been associated with an 
individual recruiting and rescaling a preexisting motor representation of a familiar and 
meaningful aiming movement (Hayes, Roberts, Elliott, & Bennett, 2014; Hayes et al., 2009). 
This would imply imitation was based on higher-order semantic processes (Rumiati, Papeo, 
& Corradi-Dell'Acqua, 2010; Rumiati et al., 2005), as opposed to lower-level sensorimotor 
processes representing the observed biological kinematics. 
In the current study, we adopted a novel protocol that enabled us to directly examine biological 
motion processing during imitation learning. In addition to displaying a constant velocity 
control model, we manipulated the structure of two experimental models so that peak velocity 
in the aiming movements no longer occurred at the typical mid-point (40–60% of the total 
time) of the trajectory (Elliott, Helsen, & Chua, 2001). With such stimuli, imitation can be 
quantified according to timing and magnitude of velocity, which in combination would not 
reflect the kinematics of typical aiming movements (Hayes et al., 2014). Imitation in this 
context is not solved by merely recruiting an existing sensorimotor representation associated 
with a typical upper-limb aiming movement and rescaling (Schmidt, 1975) the representation 
to meet the goal movement time of 1700 ms. Instead, because the novel atypical biological 
motion profiles are unlikely to be represented in the sensorimotor repertoire of the participants 
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(Hayes et al., 2014), imitation requires the specific velocity profile to be represented. 
Following this logic, we compared imitation learning of two different biological motion 
models, in which percentage-time-to-peak-velocity occurred at 17% or 26% of the total 
movement time (henceforth atypical17 and atypical26), and thus earlier than normally 
expected when aiming to a target. By maintaining equal movement time and amplitude, 
magnitude of peak velocity also differed between the biological motion models 
(atypical17 = 0.37 mm/ms; atypical26 = 0.24 mm/ms). Finally, given that the lower-level 
processes that code biological motion kinematics are modulated by various top-down 
processes (Bekkering, Wohlschlaeger, & Gattis, 2000; Heyes & Bird, 2007; Leighton et al., 
2010; Rumiati et al., 2005; Southgate & Hamilton, 2008; Wang & Hamilton, 2012), we 
displayed motion stimuli as a non-human agent (a white dot) to control social context, and in 
the presence or absence of end-state-targets. The latter manipulation is important because 
previous work (Hayes, Hodges, Huys, & Williams, 2007; Wild et al., 2010) has shown that 
the imitation of biological motion is attenuated in the presence of an end-state-target. In this 
context, the end-target provides a salient task-relevant (Leighton et al., 2010) environmental 
visual cue that modulates attention so that this feature (target attainment) is prioritized and 
represented during imitation. The removal of end-state-targets in half of the present 
experimental trials enabled us to develop a protocol that examined biological motion 
kinematics during true imitation (Cook & Bird, 2012; Vivanti & Hamilton, 2014). 
With a behaviorally realizable but atypical biological motion (i.e., atypical17; atypical26), 
represented as a non-human agent, it was expected that participants would imitate in accord 
with the observed biological kinematics (Hayes et al., 2014) and thus produce movements 
scaled to both timing and magnitude of peak velocity. Because of the constraints on human 
movement imposed by the neuro-muscular system (Abend, Bizzi, & Morasso, 1982), we did 
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not expect participants to move with constant velocity having observed the constant velocity 
stimulus, or to execute a kinematic profile that resembled the atypical motion kinematics. 
Rather, we anticipated participants would recruit a pre-existing motor response and thus 
exhibit time of peak velocity that was similar to typical aiming movements. Finally, it was 
anticipated that imitation of atypical biological motion would be more accurate in the absence, 
compared to presence, of end-state-targets. In the absence of end-state-targets, there should 
be minimal contribution from top-down attentional processes, thus encouraging participants 
to focus on representing the characteristics of lower-level visual stimuli during imitation 
learning. 
 
2. Materials and methods 
 
2.1. Participants 
Data were recorded from twenty participants (age range 18–21 years) who volunteered for the 
study. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave written informed 
consent. The experiment was designed in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and 
was approved by the ethics committee of the host University. 
 
2.2. Apparatus and procedures 
The apparatus consisted of a PC (Dell Optiplex GX280), a 21-in CRT computer monitor 
(IIyama Vision Master 505), and a graphics tablet with a hand-held stylus (WACOM Intuos 
3). The CRT monitor operated with a spatial resolution of 1280 × 1024, and a refresh rate of 
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85 Hz. Visual stimuli were generated via MATLAB (The Mathworks, Inc), using Cogent 2000 
toolbox (www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php). 
Participants were required to observe and imitate the movement of a model (a white cursor, 
diameter = 8 mm) presented on the 21-in CRT monitor. The model displayed a single 
horizontal trajectory that originated from a home-target positioned on the left-hand side of the 
screen. The amplitude of the movement was 200 mm, with a movement time of 1700 ms, and 
ended on the right-hand side of the monitor. For the end-state-target condition, two red circles 
representing home-target and the end-state-target (diameter = 16 mm) were positioned at 
center-left (home) and center-right (end-state) of the monitor (Fig. 1A). To examine imitation 
of biological motion, three models were created: atypical (atypical17; atypical26) or constant 
velocity (Fig. 2). The atypical models displayed a velocity profile that was positively skewed 
so that peak occurred at 17% or 26% of movement time, and with a magnitude of 0.37 mm/ms 
and 0.24 mm/ms, respectively. The models were created by a human volunteer who practiced 
the two atypical goal-directed aiming movements using a hand-held stylus on a graphics tablet 
until a white cursor, which represented the stylus, moved from a left-hand home-target to a 
right-hand end-state-target in a movement time of 1700 ms. The displacement time-series data 
recorded from a successful practice trial for each model was selected to create the models. 
The method of using a human to generate the models was critical because it ensured the 
kinematics of the movement was biological in origin, and thus the movement was achievable. 
The model displaying constant velocity was created according to the amplitude (200 mm) and 
time (1700 ms) constraints associated with the task. The model displayed the exact movement 
time, but with a constant velocity trajectory that had no deviations in the perpendicular axis. 
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Fig. 1. A visual representation depicting a single trial in the end-state-target-condition (A) and 
no-end-state-target condition (B). The apparatus outlined in Panels A and B is a CRT monitor 
and a graphics tablet. The trial timeline arrows at the bottom of the figure indicate the 
Observation Phase and Imitation Phase. During the Observation Phase, the non-human agent 
model is positioned in the left-hand home target (A) and left-hand space (B). The model 
(atypical17 or atypical26 or constant velocity) displays a horizontal movement of 200 mm 
from the left-hand home target to an end-state-target (A) or end-space in the no-end-state-
target-condition. The model has a movement time of 1700 ms. The Imitation Phase 
commences with the white cursor positioned in left-hand home target (A) or left-hand space 
(B). A participant imitates the observed model by controlling a stylus on the graphics tablet. 
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Fig. 2. The velocity profiles for atypical17 model (light gray trace; peak), atypical26 model 
(dark gray trace), and constant velocity control model (black trace).  
 
Prior to the experimental trials, all participants completed a familiarization period that 
replicated the conditions of the imitation task. Participants sat on a chair in front of the CRT 
monitor and held the stylus in their preferred hand. The participants performed four 
familiarization trials; 2 trials representing the end-state-target condition (see Fig. 1A) 
performed in the imitation task, and 2 trials representing the no-end-state-target condition (see 
Fig. 1B) performed in the imitation task. Each trial commenced with the model being 
positioned in the center of the home-target. The participants observed the model display a 
movement from the home-target to an end-target (end-state-target condition), or end space 
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(no-end-state-target condition), with a constant velocity trajectory and a movement time of 
1700 ms. A constant velocity trajectory was used to ensure construct validity by preventing 
participants from experiencing biological motion before the imitation trials. Participants were 
not informed about the agency of the model or duration of the movement time. Following 
observation of the model, participants moved the cursor from the center of the monitor to the 
center of the home-target, and clicked the lower-button on the stylus. In an end-state-target 
condition, the two targets remained on the screen as the participant imitated the model. In a 
no-end-state-target condition, the two targets were removed before a participant imitated the 
model. To finish imitation, participants clicked the lower-button on the stylus a second time 
once the cursor was located in the end-state-target, or end-space in the no-end-state-target 
condition. After familiarization, all participants confirmed they understood the model, the 
end-state-target and no-end-state-target conditions, the instruction to imitate, and the 
sensorimotor association between the stylus on a graphics tablet, and the corresponding 
movement of cursor on the monitor. 
The imitation task comprised 14 blocks of 6 trials (84 trials). A block contained each of the 6 
combinations of target (end-state-target, no-end-state-target) and velocity model (atypical17, 
atypical26, constant) presented in random order. A trial commenced with an observation phase 
where the home-target (red) was displayed on the monitor for 1000 ms, before disappearing 
for 1000 ms, and being replaced by a model positioned in the same location. Depending on 
the trial type, the model moved to an end-state-target (Fig. 1A) or end-space in the no-end-
state-target (Fig. 1B) condition, with one of three velocity models. After observing the model, 
participants imitated the movement as per the instructions given in the familiarization period. 
 
2.3. Statistical analysis 
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To quantify imitation performance, and imitation of atypical biological motion, we extracted 
movement kinematics exhibited by the participants on each trial. The start of movement was 
defined as the time that the center of the cursor moved beyond the perimeter of the home-
target, and the end was calculated when the participant clicked the lower-button on the stylus. 
For each imitation attempt, the 2-dimensional displacement data were filtered using a low-
pass (8 Hz) autoregressive filter. These data were differentiated using a central difference 
algorithm to obtain velocity. A MATLAB routine extracted the primary movement occurring 
in the x-axis and identified the following dependent variables: movement time, peak velocity, 
and percentage-time-to-peak-velocity (i.e., time to peak velocity / movement time) × 100). 
The two velocity variables were chosen for analysis because they most reflected the difference 
between the two atypical biological motion models. Intra-participant means from the 14 trials 
per condition were calculated for each dependent variable and submitted to separate Model 
(atypical17; atypical26; constant velocity) x Target (end-state-target; no-end-state-target) 
repeated measures ANOVAs. Alpha was set at p < 0.05, follow-up testing used the Tukey 
post-hoc procedure, and partial eta squared (ηp2) expressed the size of the effect. 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Movement time 
As illustrated in Fig. 3, the presence of an end-state-target [F(1, 19) = 36.61, p < 0.05, 
ηp2 = 0.49] modulated movement time, with significantly shorter and more accurate 
movement times imitated in the absence (M = 2156 ms), compared to the presence 
(M = 2294 ms), of an end-state-target. Although there was no significant difference in 
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movement times when imitating the atypical17 (M = 2121 ms) and atypical26 (M = 2191 ms) 
models, the main effect [F(2, 38) = 17.90, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.66] indicated these two 
movement times were significantly shorter (ps < 0.05) and more accurate than imitating the 
constant velocity (M = 2362 ms) model. The interaction concerning model and target [F(2, 
38) = 3.51, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.16] indicated that significantly shorter and more accurate 
movement times were performed in the no-end-state-target compared to the end-state-target 
condition (ps < 0.05) when viewing atypical17 and atypical26 models. This effect was not 
significant when imitating constant velocity. 
 
.    
Fig. 3. Mean movement time data (ms) as a function of model (atypical17, atypical26 and 
constant velocity) and target condition (light gray = end-state-target; dark gray bar = no-end-
state-target). The criterion model data for atypical17 and atypical26 is represented in the black 
bars. Error bars (±) display the standard error mean. 
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3.2. Peak velocity 
An effect of Model [F(2, 38) = 59.56, p < 0.05,ηp2 = 0.76] indicated the magnitude of peak 
velocity was significantly greater when imitating the atypical17 model (M = 0.24 mm/ms) 
compared to the atypical26 (M = 0.19 mm/ms) and constant velocity (M = 0.15 mm/ms) 
models. Moreover, the magnitude of peak velocity was significantly (p < 0.05) greater when 
imitating the atypical26 compared to the constant velocity model. As illustrated in the left-
hand and center portions of Fig. 4, the magnitude of peak velocity executed by the participants 
in the atypical17 and atypical26 conditions (gray bars) was scaled (i.e., more similar) to peak 
velocity displayed by the model (black bar). However, peak velocity was not modulated by 
the presence or absence of an end-state-target [F(1, 19) = 1.48, p > 0.05, ηp2 = 0.07], 
irrespective of how it was combined with the model stimulus [F(2, 38) = 1.54, p > 0.05, 
ηp2 = 0.17]. 
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Fig. 4. Mean peak velocity data (mm/ms) as a function of model and target condition. The 
target conditions are displayed in the light gray bar (end-state-target) and dark gray bar (no-
end-state-target). The criterion model data for atypical17 and atypical26 is represented in the 
black bars. Error bars (±) display the standard error mean. 
 
3.3. Percentage-of-time-to-peak-velocity 
An effect of Model [F(2, 38) = 68.99, p < 0.05, ηp2 = 0.78] indicated peak velocity occurred 
significantly earlier in the movement when imitating the atypical17 model (M = 22%) 
compared to both the atypical26 (M = 29%) and constant velocity (M = 38%) models 
(ps < 0.05). As illustrated in Fig. 5, the gray bars indicate the temporal occurrence of peak 
velocity in the atypical17 and atypical26 conditions was scaled to peak velocity displayed by 
the model (black bar). This effect can also be seen from an exemplar velocity trace in Fig. 6. 
When imitating the atypical17 (dark gray trace) model, peak velocity occurred significantly 
earlier in the movement than the atypical26 (light gray trace) model. When imitating the 
constant velocity model, peak velocity occurred toward the midpoint of the movement (black 
trace). Although there was no main effect for Target [F(1, 19) = 1.58, p > 0.05, ηp2 = 0.08], 
there was an interaction concerning Model and Target [F(2, 38) = 11.40, p < 0.05, 
ηp2 = 0.35]. Percentage-of-time-to-peak-velocity occurred earlier in the movement in the end-
state-target condition compared to the no-end-state-target condition when imitating the 
atypical17 and atypical26 models (ps < 0.05). This effect was reversed when imitating 
constant velocity model. 
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.  
Fig. 5. Mean percentage-time-to-peak-velocity (%) as a function of model and target 
condition. The target conditions are displayed in the light gray bar (end-state-target) and dark 
gray bar (no-end-state-target). The criterion model data for atypical17 and atypical26 is 
represented in the black bars. Error bars (±) display the standard error mean. 
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Fig. 6. The velocity profiles are exemplar data from a representative participant imitating 
atypical17 model (light gray trace; peak), atypical26 model (dark gray trace), and the constant 
velocity control model (black trace) in the no-end-state-target (A) and end-state-target (B) 
conditions. The 1700 ms marker displayed on the x axis indicates the total movement time 
displayed by the three models. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
We examined the representation of biological motion kinematics during imitation learning 
using a novel protocol that systematically manipulated the structure of a model's kinematic 
profile. The percentage-time-to-peak-velocity data supported our expectations by indicating 
peak velocity occurred significantly earlier in the movement after imitating both the 
atypical17 and atypical26 models. Moreover, while movement time was similar in these 
conditions, the magnitude of peak velocity also differed in accord with the atypical biological 
motion models. Imitation of both atypical17 and atypical26 models was confirmed by the data 
showing participants exhibited peak velocity significantly later (38%) in the movement in the 
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constant velocity control condition. Moreover, and as displayed in Fig. 6 (black traces in A 
and B), the exemplar velocity profile(s) illustrates a relatively flat, and stable, trajectory that 
contains a number of discontinuities. The fact the velocity profile was not bell-shaped suggests 
participants attempted to imitate the constant velocity model, rather than recruiting a 
movement trajectory based on internal (pre-existing motor priors) and external (amplitude and 
speed of movement) constraints of the task. Moreover, the low peak, and discontinuities could 
be the result of error minimization using visual feedback (Elliott et al., 2001), and/or 
sensorimotor noise associated with anatomical and physiological constraints of the motor 
system (Abend et al., 1982). 
As expected, the findings also showed that imitation learning was modulated by the presence 
or absence of end-state-targets. Having observed the two atypical biological models in the 
absence of end-state-targets, participants exhibited shorter movement times, which were more 
accurate (M = 2156 ms) compared to when end-state-targets were present (M = 2294 ms). As 
suggested previously (Wild et al., 2010), this effect was unlikely to be associated with 
differences in movement amplitude, which was 6 mm shorter when end-state-targets were 
absent.1 Neither was it a function of greater average acceleration, which was less in the 
absence of end-state-targets (i.e., similar peak velocity but achieved later). Although not 
measured in the present experiment, an explanation for the less accurate imitation of 
movement time in the presence of end-state-targets is that participants paid more attention 
(Leighton et al., 2010) to target attainment and thus were more goal-directed during movement 
execution. As a consequence, it is likely they focused more on aiming to position the cursor 
in the end-target, which resulted in proportionately more time after peak velocity in the 
deceleration phase (Elliott, Hansen, Mendoza, & Tremblay, 2004). 
The specificity of the aforementioned goal-directed imitation effect is important from a 
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theoretical position because the decrease in movement time accuracy in the end-state-target 
condition did not lead to a concomitant decrease in the imitation of atypical biological motion 
kinematics. Also, there was an interaction between the biological nature of observed stimulus 
(biological motion versus constant velocity) and end-state-target condition. For instance, 
participants exhibited more accurate movement time in the absence of end-state-targets when 
observing biological motion but not constant velocity. This effect is somewhat consistent with 
the suggestion that multiple goals (kinematics; end-state-target-goal), as well as other salient 
factors in the environment (Leighton et al., 2010), are represented when imitating different 
movements (Bekkering et al., 2000; Hamilton, 2008). Unlike previous work that typically 
demonstrated an action-goal (to grasp an ear) was prioritized (hierarchal goal representation) 
at the expense of biological kinematics (Bekkering et al., 2000; Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 
2007; Hayes, Hodges, Scott, Horn, & Williams, 2007; Wohlschlager, Gattis, & Bekkering, 
2003), we showed the attainment of an end-state-target goal did not affect the representation 
of biological kinematics. Our findings build upon the aforementioned effects by indicating 
that top-down and lower-level processes operate within an embedded system that is less 
hierarchal, and perhaps more complementary (Buxbaum & Kalénine, 2010; de Lange, Spronk, 
Willems, Toni, & Bekkering, 2008; Heyes, 2011), with the contribution of these processes 
modulated by the nature of task context. When the biological movement kinematics are novel, 
as per our atypical biological motion, both processes operate to represent movement 
kinematics and the end-state-target goal. 
To minimize the potential modulation of biological motion processing by top-down factors 
associated with goal coding (Bekkering et al., 2000), attention/salience (Leighton et al., 2010), 
teleological reasoning (Csibra & Gergely, 2007) and social modulation (Wang & Hamilton, 
2012), the atypical biological models were observed as non-human agents in the absence of 
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end-state-targets. The finding of temporal correspondence (Gangitano, Mottaghy, & Pascual-
Leone, 2001) between observed (atypical17; atypical26) and imitated movement kinematics 
is therefore consistent with biological motion being processed through lower-level visuomotor 
processes operating in the human mirror-mechanism (Brass & Heyes, 2005; Casile et al., 
2010; Dayan et al., 2007; Press, Cook, Blakemore, & Kilner, 2011). Detection of biological 
motion is suggested to occur in a neural substrate associated with the posterior STS (Allison, 
Puce, & McCarthy, 2000), while coding the kinematic properties of an observed action 
(Hamilton, 2008; Iacoboni, 2009) is suggested to occur in the fronto-parietal mirror-system 
(Di Dio et al., 2013; Press et al., 2011). Within the fronto-parietal mirror mechanism, the 
premotor region has been associated with coding the temporal features of visual information 
through analysis of MEPs  during different phases of a grasping action (Gangitano et al., 
2001). Moreover, evidence that certain phases of movement are reflected in time-
synchronized neural activation (e.g., greatest activation during display of maximal grip 
aperture), has been suggested to indicate online visual processing during observation of 
biological motion. We concur with this reasoning and suggest the finding of temporal 
correspondence between the model and imitation of atypical biological motion was in part 
based on the online visual processing of such motion during each observation trial. Such 
findings of continual matching of action-execution with action-observation are consistent with 
our previous work on biological motion coding during observational practice (Hayes et al., 
2014). 
In summary, the findings in the present experiment showed atypical biological motion 
kinematics was represented during imitation learning, both in the presence and absence of 
end-state-targets. Imitation of biological motion kinematics involves top-down attentional and 
lower-level visuomotor systems, which operate as complementary processes. 
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